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**Theology of the Nation:
An Introduction**

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This is a draft version. An appendix, *De natione in potentia*, has been omitted from the draft as it is still under construction. The author strongly suggests that readers do not use this copy in any capacity except personal use. The published version will be released free of charge across various servers.

To avoid any potential charges of plagiarism, I note that this work has copy-pasted or consulted various passages from previous original drafts, which may or may not have been disseminated previously: (1) *The Filipino Nation and its Fabrication: From a Catholic Perspective* (2022), which was submitted to various servers as a preprint, (2) *Catholic Ethnology in the Philippine Context* (2022), which was never completed and became (3) *De natione in potentia* or *Natio in potentia* (2022), which became *Ad theologiam nationis* (2023), which became *Theology of the Nation* (2023).

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INTRODUCTION

What does a mere Pope know about the nation?

Upon first glance, John Paul II's "theology of the nation," as he put it in *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections* (W&N, 2005), 78, seems dated. In *Memory and Identity* he affirmed in no more than five pages that nations are both "natural societies - not a product of mere convention. . . ." (77) and *ancient* (78-50). Finding himself 'out of touch' with developments in 'serious' theory; it looks like the Sainly Pope clung to old, *idealistic*, and primordial notions on the nation which no 'serious scholar' would wholeheartedly accept. But we cannot even consider any of these without understanding the premises on which his ideas depend. What is a nation? What is a 'natural society'? How do nations *exist* (so that they may be ancient)? But, at the same time, how can we consider a *theology* of the nation without God? We cannot fully understand the various dimensions of the nation-concept (which John Paul II discussed) if we do not painstakingly look at them one-by-one.

It is indeed possible to synthesize John Paul II's "theology of the nation" as he called it in *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections* (W&N, 2005), 78; with modern theories on nationalism. But before we do so, we must go into the 'stuff' of John Paul II's thought, as well as contend with the present-day diversity of available definitions for *nation*, *nationalism*, *nationhood*, et cetera, which makes it extremely difficult to make coherent connections around the works of related literature, much less the theological significance of the *nation*.

Therefore, I seek to provide a theoretical foundation for any serious inquiry into the role of 'nation' in Catholic social thought, to synthesize John Paul II's "theology of the nation" (*Memory and Identity*, 78) with modern views on nationalism. This would include a framework for my own

study of Filipino identity; and to glorify God all the same. But since I write this book from a ‘theological’ perspective, I make no claim of objectivity. I acknowledge that my argument totally depends on the existence of God. But it does not matter to me if this book is somehow wrong or flawed - for I, too, am a flawed individual on a pilgrimage through this reality which accords to God’s will, and therefore, I am open to correction. For it is God’s will which allows for the existence of *nations* for His greater glory and the salvation of souls.

The difficulty of defining the nation is a cliché, but it is one which we cannot ignore. In his address to the 50th General Assembly to the United Nations Organization (1995), 8; John Paul II said:

Upon this anthropological foundation there also rest [*sic*] the "rights of nations", which are nothing but "human rights" fostered at the specific level of community life. A study of these rights is certainly not easy, if we consider the difficulty of defining the very concept of "nation", which cannot be identified a priori and necessarily with the State. Such a study must nonetheless be made, if we wish to avoid the errors of the past and ensure a just world order.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Murray Rothbard, in “Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation-State,” in *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 11, no. 1 (1994): 1-10; stated that the nation is a “complex of subjective feelings based on objective realities.”

Catholic thinkers had much to say on the concept of nation.¹ Augustine stated in *De civitate Dei*: “*populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus...*” (19:24). Isidore of Seville wrote: “*Gens est multitudo ab uno principio orta, sive ab alia natione secundum propriam collectionem distincta, ut Graeciae, Asiae. Hinc et gentilitas dicitur. Gens autem appellata propter generationes familiarum, id est a gignendo, sicut natio a nascendo.*”². Saint Thomas Aquinas, in *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualis creatibus*, wrote that

¹For the purposes of this discourse, I will conflate *natio*, *gens*, and *populus*.

²“A *gens* is a multitude which comes from one principle or is distinguished from other nations according to its

a *populus* depends on the lifestyle, laws, and territory of its people (a.9, ra.10).³

More recently, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace's *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), which declared that a people's "primary characteristic. . ." is the "sharing of life and values" (386). Yet many have attempted to specify the nature of this *shared life* (ibid., 386): historians have documented instances in which churchmen distinguished the concept of *gens* or *natio* through certain criteria, such as *language, mores, judgements, blood-descent*, etc. (Robert Bartlett, "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity," in *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31, no. 1 [2001]: 39-56; Rees Davies, "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World: An Apologia," in *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis* 34, no.4 [2004]: 567-579.)

Bartlett provided certain instances in "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity" (47). The abbot Regino Prumiensis, in "Epistula Regionis: ad Hathonem archiepiscopum missa," in *Reginonis Abbatis Prumiensis Chronicon*, Monumenta Germaniae historica 50, ed. Kurze (Hanover, 1890), wrote of four differentiating marks of a particular *gens*: "Nec non et illud sciendum, quod, sicut diversae nationes populorum inter se discrepant genere moribus lingua legibus, ita sancta universalis [e]cclesia toto orbe terrarum diffusa, quamvis in unitate fidei coniungatur, tamen consuetudinibus [e]cclesiasticis ab invicem differt." (xix-xx.)⁴ Furthermore, Giraldus Cambrensis, in *Invectiones* 2.7, in *Y Cymmrodor* 30 (1920), mentioned certain characteristics of the Welsh people in a letter to Innocent II: "No[v]eritis autem proculdubio inter pro[v]incias, nostram quidem et Cantuarieusam Londonie pro[v]inciam cum viii comitatibus interiacere, et populos nostre pro[v]incie, natione, lingua, legibus et raoribus, iudiciis et consuetudinibus discrepare."

collection, such as the Greeks, Asians. This is called *gentility*. But the *gens* is named as such according to the generation of families, i.e. being generated, just as a nation accords to being born." (original translation.)

³Pope Francis quoted Aquinas in his introductory "Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants in the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences," in *Nation, State, Nation-State: Proceedings of the 2019 Plenary Session*, edited by Vittorio Hösle, (Vatican City, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2020).

⁴Quoted in Bartlett, "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity," 47. "Furthermore, also that knowledge, that just as the nations of the peoples differ among themselves in blood, mores, language, laws, thus the holy universal Church, spread throughout the world, although connected in the unity of faith, nevertheless differs among itself in the conventions of the ecclesiastics." (original translation.) Bartlett translated "...genere, moribus, lingua, legibus. . ." as "descent, customs, language and law." (Bartlett, "Medieval and Modern Concepts," 47.)

(142.)⁵

But with respect to ‘modern’ considerations, Matlary, in “The Nation-State between the Scylla of Populism and the Charybdis of Identity Politics,” in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, ed. Hosle (Roma: LEV, 2020), wrote that the nation is a non-tangible, natural, and cultural community, a bottom-up process based on various factors such as culture, equality, rights, language, history, and the homeland (319-323). Furthermore, Andrew Heywood, in *Political Theory: An Introduction*, 3rd ed. (2004), defined the nation as a group of people united “...by a shared cultural heritage.” (98.) Anthony Smith called it “...a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties. . .”; declaring that it is an inclusive, mobilized, transcendental community with historical roots, an ethnic core, an abstractable homeland, and exemplars with myths. (Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” in *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 [1996]: 447; Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* [Blackwell, 1988], 49, 166-168, 212-216, 223, 192.) But, according to Gellner, this is not the only definition which abounds. In *Nations and Nationalism*, he mentioned two existing and rudimentary definitions of a nation: the anthropological, i.e. a shared culture which is “...a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating. . .” (7); and the normative definition, which prioritizes a shared acknowledgment of nationality (ibid). Neither of us say that these are mutually exclusive. According to Gellner, they both have elements of truth in them, but are insufficient to define the nation (ibid). It seems that John Paul II gravitated towards the anthropological definition, although, as we will see later, he did not limit himself to it.

Ernest Renan, in *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (1882) identified a nation's existence with a “plébiscite de tous les jours”. (III.) Abp. Roland Minnerath, in “Nation, State, Nation-State, and the Social Doctrine of the Church,” in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, wrote that a nation is a voluntary

⁵Quoted in Bartlett, “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” 47. I also lifted this transcription (with corrections) from *The Filipino Nation and its Fabrication*. “But without a doubt, among the provinces - ours indeed, as well as Canterbury and London with eight counties intermingling, you will come to understand our people in our province to differ in nation, language, laws and understandings, judgments and conventions.” (original translation - I borrowed the translation of ‘raoribus’ from Google Translate.) Bartlett translated this as “...‘the peoples of our province are distinct in nation, language, laws and customs, judgements and manners.’” (“Medieval and Modern Concepts,” 47.)

community which "...is the result of the willingness of a people to live together, to share the same institutions, to refer to common roots in history." (71.) According to him, criteria such as language, culture, lifestyle, etc. are "not conclusive to make up a nation." (71.) According to him, nations "...may be made up of various peoples." (ibid.) In doing so, he distinguished between a nation and a people, which he defined as "...a natural grouping of human beings characterized by common features: religion, customs, language, an economic and political system, a territory and a mythical narrative of their origin." (70.)

But Gellner argued that these definitions fail to explain the national phenomenon - the "normative" fails because it can also apply to other groups (such as gangs) which can "...will themselves to persist as communities. . .", while the "anthropological" fails because cultural boundaries are "differentiated" beyond absolute and possible congruence with political units (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 53-55). In light of this, he opted to approach the nation-concept through the lens of nationalism (55), which he identified as the "principle" that nations should correspond to states (1) and an ideology (123-136). For him, nations exist by nationalism, not vice versa (55). In *Thought and Change*, he wrote that nationalism "...invents nations where they do not exist." (168.) It does so by the "imposition of a 'high culture' on society" (ibid., *Nations and Nationalism*, 55-57), which he also mentioned in *Thought and Change* (London: W&N, 1964), 150-1. In fact, he contended that nationalism is "essentially" the "top-down imposition of a high culture on society", which replaces preexisting 'low cultures' and local communities (*Nations and Nationalism*, 57. See also Brendan O'Leary, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism," in *British Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 2 [1997]: 198.) By high culture, he meant a standardized communication system (54). Because this nationalism involved the atomization⁶ of individuals which occurred during the industrialization process - nationalism would

⁶The term *Fragmentation* was cited by The Pontifical Council for Culture in *Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture* (1999):

Cultural rootlessness, which has so many causes, shows how important cultural roots are. It contributes to a loss of people's social and cultural identity and dignity. People whose lives are thus unravelled become easy prey for dehumanizing business practices...Cultural fragmentation confines values to the private sphere: this alters morality and weakens spirituality to such an extent that one reaches the terrifying concept of the «culture of death», a real semantic nonsense for a counter-culture which reveals the sinister contradiction between the affirmation of a will to live and an obstinate rejection of God, the

therefore depend on industrial society, as Gellner wrote in *Nations and Nationalism* (35-38) and Judith O'Connell mentioned in *The Missing Ink: Re-evaluating Socialisation and Nationalism in the work of Ernest Gellner* (Ireland: National University of Ireland, 2015), 16.

Gellner therefore defined *nationalism* as a principle which "holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1.) Among those who subscribe to this definition include Vittorio Hosle, "Nation, State, Nation-State: An Overview," (2020), 30-31 and Joseph M. de Torre, *The Metaphysical Ground of Social Ethics* (Manila, Southeast Asia Science Foundation, 1977). This may also refer to the 'nationalist sentiment' which Gellner further explained in *Nations and Nationalism* (1) which stems from violations of this very principle. One could also approach it according to John Breuilly (*Nationalism and the State*, 2nd ed. [University of Chicago Press, 1994], 2-3; "Nationalism and the History of Ideas," in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 105 [2000]: 188) who defined nationalism as a *movement* which exercises or covets state power, relying on the nationalist argument, i.e. a broad sentiment which professes a nation with a peculiar character, prioritizes its interests above all, and professes the need for its independence or at least political sovereignty.

Catholic thought paid mind to this: while not equating it with nationalism, Grenier stated (*Thomistic Philosophy* [1950], 1108-1110) *that it is against the common good of society*. On the other hand, Fr. Joseph M. de Torre, *The Metaphysical Ground of Social Ethics* (1977) took a more *nuanced* view on the principle of nationality (and nations in general). According to him, whether the principle is contrary to the common good of society is dependent upon a case-to-case basis: "This principle needs a careful ethical assessment, as it has led both to heroic struggles for freedom and to dreadful genocides." (100.) He defined the nation as such: "A nation is a natural community growing out of the coalescence of a plurality of tribes off the same stock sharing common territory..." (101). But John Paul II, who condemned *nationalism* in various places, (e.g. *Redemptor hominis*, 15), spoke rather positively of the so-called nationalist principle in *Memory and Identity* (77-78): "...the nation cannot be replaced by the State, even though the nation tends naturally to establish

source of all life (cf. *Evangelium Vitae*, 11-12 and 19-28).
But Gellner in (*Nations and Nationalism*) used 'atomization.'

itself as a State, as we see from the history of individual European nations including Poland.” But he did not limit himself to this principle, and he discussed various ways in which a nation can exercise its sovereignty without becoming an independent nation-state:

This fundamental right to existence does not necessarily call for sovereignty as a state, since various forms of juridical aggregation between different nations are possible, as for example occurs in Federal States, in Confederations or in States characterized by broad regional autonomies. There can be historical circumstances in which aggregations different from single state sovereignty can even prove advisable, but only on condition that this takes place in a climate of true freedom, guaranteed by the exercise of the self-determination of the peoples concerned.⁷

Gellner believed that nations are, to a certain respect, cultural, in the sense that they are formed by the same imposition, and in the same light they are also formed by a will to be a community which is caused by the same conditions which generate a national high culture, as we read in *Thought and Change* (150-155) and *Nations and Nationalism* (55-57). In this sense, Gellner limits the nation to industrial society - according to him, the high culture arises from industrial changes such as mass communication and mass literacy (*Nations and Nationalism*, 35-38). Aside from the essential role of industrialization, he declared that these high cultures are dependent on education and state protection (48), writing: “...some organism must ensure that this literate and unified culture is indeed being effectively produced, that the educational product is not shoddy and sub-standard. Only the state can do this, and... [it] does take over quality control in this most important of industries, the manufacture of viable and usable human beings.” (p. 38.)

But according to Gorski in “The Mosaic Moment,” 1430; many definitions of nationalism abound. Anderson approached nationalism in *Imagined Communities*, 5 not as an ideology but something similar to *religion*. He contended that nationalism is the *imagination* of a *community* as limited, sovereign, and a *community* (ibid., 5-6. See also Jessica L. Peters [Jessica Lyn], *A Nation of Those Without a State: A Case Study on Nationalism Regarding Piracy in the Atlantic*

⁷ John Paul II, “Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations,” (New York, United Nations Headquarters, October 5, 1995), par. 8.

before and during the Golden Age, [Western Washington University, 2013], 8.)⁸ Therefore, he defined the nation as an "imagined political community" (6): *people imagine themselves to be a nation despite not knowing or being aware of each other* (5-7). But because every community larger than "primordial face-to-face villages" are "imagined" (6), Anderson adds limiting factors to this imagination: firstly it must hold it as limited, i.e. it does not encompass the entire orb of the earth, secondly, it must involve sovereignty, a recent development which holds as exemplar the "sovereign State," and finally, it must transcend inequalities as a community with a "horizontal comradeship. . ." (5-7). Like Gellner, he approached the nation from nationalism, which, for him, is the act of imagining in itself (*Imagined Communities*, 5-6; Jessica L. Peters, *A Nation of Those Without a State: A Case Study on Nationalism Regarding Piracy in the Atlantic before and during the Golden Age*, [Western Washington University, 2013], 8). But instead of approaching it as an ideology, Anderson approached it as something quite similar to religion (*Imagined Communities*, 5). But unlike Gellner, who wrote in *Thought and Change* (168) that nationalism is the invention of a nation where it is nonexistent, Anderson, criticizing what he saw as Gellner's conflation between *invention* and *fabrication* instead of *imagination*, advised against using true-false typologies and rather focuses on the manner in which a nation is imagined (*Imagined Communities*, 5-7),

In other contexts, *nationalism* may also refer to the *virtue* of loving one's co-nationals as proposed by Henri Grenier, (*Thomistic Philosophy*, [Charlottetown, St. Dunstan's University, 1950], 1108-1110) and Wilfrido Villacorta ("Colonial Legacy in the Development of Nation-States in Southeast Asia," in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, [LEV, 2019], 261.) We may also approach Anthony Smith's definition in *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford University Press, 1999), 189: "a definite ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, identity, and unity of a social group, some of whose members deem it to be an actual or potential 'nation'."

He distinguished this into two non-mutually exclusive types: 'territorial' and 'ethnic' nationalism: territorial nationalism holds the homeland, law, citizenship, 'civic religion' and mass

⁸With respect to this imagination, Breuilly, "Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities: A Symposium," 4; and Michael Gilson, "Imagined But Not Imaginary: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Modern World," in *Exotic No More: Anthropology on the Front Lines*, edited by Jeremy MacClancy, (University of Chicago Press, 2022), 118 distinguished between the imagined, which is simply a product of the imagination, and the imaginary, which is illusionary.

public culture as the defining factor of the nation, while ethnic nationalism holds the nation to be similar to the family and relies on myths of common ancestry, prioritizes vernacular cultures, genealogy, customs, languages, mobilization, native history, and a “more circumscribed ethnic culture” over territory, legal contracts, equality, and mass civic culture (ibid., 190).

Other thinkers preferred to focus on a more visible institution. Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, 116; defined the nation as a “collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states.” (Cf. Ozum Yesiltas, *Rethinking the National Question: Anti-Statist Discourses Within the Kurdish National Movement*, [Miami: Florida International University, 2014], 41.) Eric Hobsbawm, in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); defined the nation as something intrinsically and necessarily connected with the nation-state: “It [the nation] is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the ‘nation state’...” (9-10.) Others, such as Meinecke, in *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert Kimber, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), distinguished between cultural nations and political nations, although he acknowledged that they are not mutually exclusive: some political nations could correspond to cultural nations, consist of many cultural nations, or belong to a cultural nation (9-12). But he believed that although a cultural nation can rarely form without some form of political influence, the vice versa *never* happened: and even if nations may require states in order to become a nation, he refused to abandon the distinction between cultural and political nations (10). Heywood, on the other hand, wrote of the difficulties behind Meinecke’s distinctions between cultural and political nations, namely, the interlinking of both culture and politics (Heywood, *Political Theory*, 99; Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, 11.) Despite this, he did not abandon this distinction, and affirmed that the strength of so-called cultural nations is that they are seen as ‘organic’ or ‘historical’ processes (Heywood, *Political Theory*, 98-100). In contrast, Catholic discourse generally does not approach the nation from the State as they “do not necessarily overlap.” (“Final Statement,” in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, 482; John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 78;

Roland Minnerath, “Nation, State, Nation-State, and the Social Doctrine of the Church,” in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, 70; *Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations*, 8.)

There are also more ‘mathematical’ approaches to the genesis of nations. Karl Deutsch in *Nationalism and its Alternatives* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 19; defined the nation as a “people who have hold of a state or who have developed quasi-governmental capabilities for forming, supporting, and enforcing a common will.” In *Nationalism and Social Communication* (MIT Press, 1962), 3-5; 78-8; he defined the nation as a *nationality* which can achieve its goal of ruling over a country through a common will (a nationality being a people who wish to do so). On the other hand, he defined a *people* as “a group of people who have interlocking habits of communication.” (13-16). He called it a “community of shared meanings” (ibid), with *community* meaning a group with a shared communication facilitated by culture (62-63). Communities are interchangeable with cultures: the latter refers to the institutions in themselves and the former refers to the communication thereof: it is “the collection of living individuals in whose minds and memories the habits and channels of culture are carried.” (ibid.) This is not at all to be confused with ‘society’; which he defines as a group of people mobilized towards labor (ibid).

In this light, he spoke of the formation of such a nation in terms of the mobilization of an underlying population, which he defined as those who have not been mobilized for intensive communication (*Nationalism and Social Communication*, 128-30. Cf. K. Yamamoto, “Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the Philippines,” in *Journal of Peace Research* 44 no. 2 [2007]: #). For him, people became uprooted by the mass growth of “towns and industries” and joined “society”: this often caused them to acquire new languages and assimilate into a certain group: which happens when community grows faster than society, by this he means when people are able to communicate more than is required of them - while national differentiation occurs with the reverse (*Nationalism and Social Communication*, 97-99; *Nationalism and Its Alternatives*, 13-16). He called this process *mobilization*; which “happens to large numbers of people in areas which undergo modernization, i.e., where advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and

economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale.” (Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development,” in *The American Political Science Review* 55, no. 3 [1961]: 493).

In *Nationalism and Social Communication*, he calculated the trajectory of national development in a certain region by dividing the population into nine groups: the *total population* (P), the *socially mobilized* (M), the *underlying population* (U), the *assimilated* (A), the *differentiated* (D), and combinations of *mobilized* and *assimilated* (N), *mobilized* and *differentiated* (H), *underlying and assimilated* (Q), and *underlying and differentiated* (R); and qualified that one is necessarily part of one of these combinations (ibid., 128-130). According to Deutsch, what he refers to as ‘national conflict’ happens between the ‘mobilized and assimilated’ and the ‘mobilized and differentiated’ - otherwise known as the nation and the minority (ibid. Cf. Yamamoto, “Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the Philippines,” in *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007): 198-199.)

But Yamamoto wrote in “Nation-Building and Integration Policy in the Philippines,” in *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007) that the Deutsch model is quite dated, because it did not factor in “...the relationships between mobilized groups,” or those between the four combinations: neither does it expound on the role of the State in national formation (198-200). He therefore developed two models in light of more recent advancements in studies of the nation: the *modernist* and the *historicist* models (ibid). In the modernist model, the process of *modernization* leads *U* to join *M* and in the process, join a *nation*, which is either *N* or *H* (200-201). If *U* is mobilized by the government, *U* will be integrated into the ruling nation (N), while if *U* is mobilized by oppositions, they will join what he calls “differentiated nations” (*H*): this operates under the assumption that nations are modern (ibid). In the historicist model, nations simply come from pre-existing ethnic groups: *N* comes from *Q* and *H* comes from *R* (201). Note that Yamamoto operated under the principle that nations are “modern identity groups” instead of Karl Deutsch’s definition of nation and nationality (p. 200).

Despite their particular differences, they generally agree with regard to what Anderson called “the objective modernity of nations. . .” (*Imagined Communities*, 5). Smith, who mentioned the existence of ancient and medieval parallels between nation and national identity, differentiated

between the nation, which is modern, and the *ethnie*, which is preexistent (Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Blackwell Publishing, 1986), 212-214, 3-7, 11-13; Smith, “The Nation: Real or Imagined?” in *People, Nation, and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. Edward Mortimer, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1999), 36-9). In *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (1999), he defined the *ethnie* as “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites.” (13.) Rees Davies, in “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World” (568-569); contrasted this with Anthony Smith’s definition of the nation in “Culture, Community and Territory” (447): “a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties”.

But Davies disputed the foundations of Smith’s distinction between the *ethnie* and the nation: for him, Smith’s commitment towards “definitional exactitude” through the “creation of a private term [*ethnie*]” manifests a “present-minded arrogance” and sacrifices “good historical sense”, which in turn “...surely demands that we recognise that what appear to be ‘nations’ and ‘national identity’ in common parlance take a variety of forms according to the social, economic, political and cultural context of any period.” (Davies, “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World,” 568-569.) In fact, in *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Smith admitted that the differentiating factors between *ethnies* and nations are not absolute: “To deny the title of ‘nation’ to communities that lacked economic unity or full legal rights for all members would be unduly restrictive and posit a rather static view of the nation as a target to be attained once and for all, rather than a set of processes and a growth of consciousness, as I am suggesting.” (112.)

In order to affirm the existence of *nations* [and not just mere *ethnie*] in the Middle Ages, Davies contended that nations take upon many forms according to different contexts, as we read in “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World” (568-569), declaring: “National identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; as historians we should not privilege one of those dimensions.” (568.) He viewed the nation as a group with a common name and a shared sense of nationality,

i.e., that they consider themselves *as a nation* (572). Similar theories abound, such as Paul James' theory of abstract community manifested in *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community* (SAGE Publications, 1996) in which he explained the phenomena which he refers to as "changing forms of national association" (xiii). According to him, nations are "... vague, elusive and historically changing concepts." (9.) For example, he mentioned the evolution of the medieval concept of 'natio'; from soldier groups to university divisions to the ruling class (for the sake of which blood was shed), which might shed some light onto this concept (9-13). According to him:

The Latin concept of *natio* had a shifting meaning, designating various associations of people. ... *Natio*, which had a similar root to 'native', was used before the Middle Ages for 'uncivilized' people. ... However, *natio* came later to refer to all aggregations, or classings, of people with a common 'ethnic' background, including, as we have seen, those most prestigious and 'civilized' of associations, university corporations. It is a strange twist; the common thread seems to have been that the term marked an association between persons who found it important to distinguish themselves from others, but for whom the distinguishing marks of old were insufficient or no longer available in the same way. (ibid., 10-11.)

Rees Davies, on the other hand, did not profess that nations have a linear connotative shift, which he discussed in "Nations and National Identities" (2004): It is also true that *natio* can refer in medieval documents to student groupings at medieval universities or to what the social anthropologist would term extended lineages. But it is also true that *natio* was often used in medieval documents with a meaning which surely corresponds to the connotations of the word in ordinary parlance today." (570.) But he still applied the basic concept of multiformity in relation to the political nation (571), while Paul James sought to bring readers towards a theory which would "allow us to say that while nations do not come into being until they are lived as such. ... the social forms which ground national formation are already lived prior to the generalization of this new sense of historicity." (*Nation Formation*, 122.)⁹

⁹This theory would avoid essentialism and concern "trans-epochal or transmode-of-production levels of social integration." (ibid.)

At first glance it seems that these approaches render the ‘nation’ as something completely subjective, similar to what characterizes the nominalist thesis. Yet, as Rothbard stated, these "subjective feelings" are "based on objective realities." ("Nations by Consent," 2.) In this sense, he already alluded to the existence of something objective - but James attested to the existence of a certain “continuity-in-discontinuity” (74-80), writing:

... social forms which have a recognizable continuity can be constituted through practices with markedly different content and set at a different point in world time. Hence, in terms of the speculative thesis presented here that national association only becomes possible within social formations constituted in the contradictory dominance-in-intersection of relations of disembodied extension, the *natio* is different from but continuous with the modern nation. (*Nation Formation*, 192-193)

Davies, on the other hand, after acknowledging the importance of “naming and self-identification”, wrote of the importance of “institutions of common governance” for a nation’s “ethnic cohesion” ("Nations and National Identities," 573).

From thence we could perceive a potential conflict between those which prioritize “objective realities” and those which prioritize “subjective feelings”. For example, Heywood, who writes that the nation is united by shared cultural heritage, qualified that nations could only be defined subjectively, based on a people’s consciousness, because there is no ‘blueprint’ of exactly what type of culture a nation should have in order to become a nation.¹⁰ Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism*, 54; has attested to the difficulty in defining a nation with respect to its culture: “Any definition of nations in terms of shared culture is another net which brings in far too rich a catch. Human history is and continues to be well endowed with cultural differentiations. Cultural boundaries are sometimes sharp and sometimes fuzzy; the patterns are sometimes bold and simple and sometimes tortuous and complex.”

From thence we may now present John Paul II’s position. In *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections* (London: W&N, 2005), he defined the nation as “a community of men based in a given

¹⁰ Andrew Heywood, *Political Theory: An Introduction*, 3rd ed., (London: Palgrave, 2004), 98-100.

territory which is distinguished from other nations by its culture” (77). In the “Address of His Holiness John Paul II to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,” in *UNESCO Courier* 33 no. 6 (June 1980), he defined the nation as “that broad community of men united by a variety of ties but are above all joined, in fact, by culture.” (13.) However, there has not been any in-depth analysis on John Paul II’s ideas of nation (that I know of). The closest approximation to such a goal occurred when the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences conducted several discourses on the nation, nationalism, and nation-state, with the participation of philosophers, sociologists, and theologians such as Vittorio Hösle, Walter Cardinal Kasper, Archbishop Roland Minnerath, Paolo G. Carozza, Gerard-Francois Dumont, Juan K. Llach, Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, Gregory M. Reichberg, Allen D. Hertzke, Paulus Zulu, Kuan Hsin-chi, Wilfrido V. Villacorta, Niraja Gopal Jayal, Andrey Zubov, Herbert Schambeck, Theo Waigel, Janne Haaland Matlary, Fr. Piotr Mazurkiewicz, John F. McEldowney, Ana Marta Gonzales, and Jose T. Raga. (*Nation, State, Nation-State: Proceedings of the 2019 Plenary Session*, edited by Vittorio Hösle, [Vatican City, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2020].)

In the “Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to Participants in the Plenary Session of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences,” he clarified that although the church encourages a love for one’s people and country, it discourages “deviations” such as xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, etc (*Nation, State, Nation-State*, 12-13). He asserted that all nations come from consecutive waves of integration and he emphasized on the need for nation states to think multilaterally, but without recourse to *hegemonic globalization models* (ibid) or a “generic internationalism” (15).

Notwithstanding the nation-state’s importance, Vittorio Hösle (editor), in “Nation, State, Nation-State: An Overview,” in *Nation, State, Nation-State* (2020) emphasized the need to understand that a state is not necessarily based on the nation. With respect to the state, he cited both the declarative and the Weberian models, writing that the nation state is a “species of the genus ‘state...’” (28.¹¹) But he noted that Weber’s model is challenged by the fact that premodern states also allowed other forms of *legitimate* violence. (ibid.¹²) He wrote that before the advent of

¹¹cf. “The Empire of Lies and ‘Filipino’ Identity.”

¹²cf. “The Empire of Lies and ‘Filipino’ Identity”; Susan Reynolds, *Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Experience*

modernity, national unity was not much of a basis for state formation, and confederation on such basis was usually only as a reaction to foreign threat: it was therefore only during the end of the early modern period that the principle of nationality became a criterion for state formation (28-29). Nationalist ideology, fostered by the Industrial Revolution, offered the replacement of religion with a cult of nationality, and an egalitarian worldview which displaced the traditional aristocracy (ibid). The mobilization of the workforce led to the disappearance of regional attachments in favor of the greater body politic (ibid., cf. Keep "The Empire of Lies and 'Filipino Identity.'") Due to this, the new tasks of the modern state were no longer limited to the monopoly of violence: these new frontiers required "the use of a common language" which served the additional purpose of "transcending class divisions" with national unity (30.) It is in this respect which Hosle concurred with Ernest Gellner when he wrote that nationalism required an appeal to continuity from the past (historiography), which often included conflation, fabrications, distortions, and exaggerations (ibid; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 125.) In fact, Wojtyla mentioned historiography as an important factor of a nation's culture. in *Memory and Identity* (84). Nevertheless, Hosle recognized the importance of nationalism in the modernization and decolonization process, but, at the same time, he admitted that it remains problematic: therefore, in order to explain why it would remain problematic, he defined both nationalism, and the nation (Hosle, "Nation, State, Nation-State: An Overview," 30-31.)

He defined *nationalism* as a twofold system which proposes that every state *must* be a nation, and every nation *must* be a state (ibid). But this, he wrote, is further complicated by the variation of available definitions of *nation* - although it is conceded that a nation's existence depends on its self-awareness, the nature of a nation itself ranges from the self-aware *ethnic group* (equally difficult to define); to a self-aware polity (30-31). The difficulty in defining *ethnic group* is based on the fact that firstly, conventional criteria used to define ethnic group do not overlap, and secondly, there are no *sharp demarcations* between certain factors such as language and dialect, leading to political will being the main factor in demarcation (ibid).

Reinterpreted, (Oxford University Press, 1991), 27.

From thence he expressed a fundamental problem with the concept of national self-determination: by forming an independent nation-state, the self-determination of minority groups was often neglected: because of the subjective aspect of ethnic demarcation, this problem is projected to remain in the present-day (ibid). Due to the violence perpetrated in the name of the nation, especially during the two world wars, multilateralism emerged in the global scene, although not without its own problems: firstly, although globalization expanded the middle-class, it also widened the gap of inequality; secondly, jobs were increasingly replaced by automization while poorer people did not benefit much from the gains of the rich in globalized societies (ibid., 32). Because of this, populist nationalism reemerged as a reaction against the globalist elite, who are perceived to be more connected to their foreign counterparts than their own people: these sentiments of frustration allow ambitious politicians to bypass these global elites *by the will of the people*, with consequences such as the delegitimization of international and regional unions, economic protectionism, and the rejection of multilateralism, “for example, in ecological matters.” (ibid., 33-34.) = On the other hand, he acknowledged the “great achievements of the national state. . .”; especially the transcendental unity from class stratification offered by the nation, and the role of patriotism as a source of altruism, albeit limited, which is nevertheless superior to “the universalized egoism” of globalized plutocrats (ibid., 34). He emphasizes on the need to channel and respect patriotic feelings, lest it be replaced with nationalist and protectionist sentiment (ibid). Although the state has a *primary responsibility* to its own people, it must also be in conjunction with the moral law and the *jus gentium* (ibid., 34-5). The principle of subsidiarity, which postulates a hierarchy of institutions, requires that even as their own peculiar rights are respected by supranational structures and their citizens, nation-states must respect the rights of minority groups and their constituents and respect the legitimate role of supranational structures, the first of which can *secundum quid* be achieved by federalism: and even as a people must be able to “forge a political will. . .”; a national language or religious homogeneity, despite the usefulness of the lingua franca or the advantage of a shared faith, are dispensable (ibid., 35-6). This is followed by an affirmation that the feeling of belonging can be fulfilled with the constitution and a knowledge that the rights of local communities, the

plurality of national languages and religious freedom are respected: in this sense the editor agrees with Sternberger's idea of constitutional patriotism.¹³

Walter Cardinal Kasper, in "Peace - The Fruit of Justice: Theological Reflections on Peace Between Individuals, Peoples and Nations," in *Nation, State, Nation-State* attempted to make a theological approach to the nation, admitting that this was complicated by the diversity of available typologies (58). He started with the dignity of the human person, made in the image of God, and equal in Christ Jesus, having a sovereignty which, according to him, consists of his self-responsibility, freedom, and control of his own actions (58-9).¹⁴ He connected this with man being an end unto himself: nevertheless, man's nature as a social animal requires that he lives in a society, which due to various circumstances is conflict-prone (ibid). He affirmed, in light of Genesis 4, that freedom and equality imply a brotherhood which is best expressed in the Golden Rule - the "fundamental law of humanity. . ."; a foundation for coexistence and international law, which he identified with the natural law (59-60). In light of this, he defined justice as the *recognition of the life, freedom, and right to humane treatment of the other person*, while defining injustice as the deprivation of the same (60-61). He affirmed that the Catholic origins of human rights, although he notes that due to the French Revolutionary appropriation of the term, contemporary popes were quick to denounce the concept, which was rehabilitated in the middle of the twentieth century and evolved from a weapon against Christianity into its greatest asset (ibid).

He declared that man is *tangible*, and that the notion of humanity, far from being the collective sum of individuals, is rather *unity in diversity* - differences in language, understanding, and cultures (61-2). He placed emphasis on the role of the family as the "basic order and school of humanity" preceding the State itself, which in turn is obliged to protect it. (62; *Gaudium et spes*, 52.) Thirdly, he affirmed that man is a "historical being with his own place in space and time..." (Kasper, "Peace - The Fruit of Justice," 62) and believed that man only achieves the fullness of his humanity through a second "socio-cultural birth." (ibid. cf. John Paul II, "Address to UNESCO," 11.) This is where he defined the *nation* as the familiar place, the country of one's "paternal home"

¹³Ibid., 36.

¹⁴Gen. 1:27; Gal 3:28; 1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11.

in which one is born, and where people feel at home, and belong to each other (ibid). He asserted that this tangibility of man made justice into what it is, and that these principles of human dignity, ordained by God, are not limited by time or space (ibid. cf. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, (London, England: Burns & Oates, 2006), 85). Nevertheless, he warned against the use of logic in the application of these principles to concrete situations, which could lead to the “*summum ius summa iniuria*,” and instead, he advocated for the use of prudence and wisdom (ibid. cf. *Summa theologiae* II-II q.47 a.1.) He then made a connexion between mercy and justice, declaring that mercy is the Golden Rule’s fullest expression (63).

He compared the modern concept of nation-state to the “primordial order” of family, people, and culture; when the advent of Westphalian sovereignty, by relegating religion to the individual person and “withdrawing from science, economics, and culture[,]” separated the concept of state from that of society (ibid). As people stopped viewing the State as a Divine institution, the state appropriated the nation-concept from its cultural connotation to a political one, and so the cultural nation gave way to the nation-state, the latter of which is neither a metaphysical entity, nor a natural occurrence, and not a “historically matured cultural state.” (ibid., 63-4.) These developments, he affirms, changed the Christian notion of State: although early Christians refused to rebel against oppressor states, the evolution of popular sovereignty meant that there was now cause of legitimate rebellion (ibid., 64). This change led to the current Catholic position on the state: although the State is natural and belongs to a Divinely instituted order, citizens are free to choose their mode of government.¹⁵ In light of this, he rejects the Rosseauan notion of state, i.e., a *social contract*, and instead affirms that the will of the people refers to a state’s application and not its essence, which properly belongs to the Divine order: in short, authority comes from God while its specific mode comes from the people (ibid., 65).

The State, existing for the people and not itself, ought not be evaluated by the amendments of its constitution, but rather, in its ability to fulfill its telos, i.e., the protection of individual freedoms and “service of the common good[;]” the premises of which allows and promotes individual and

¹⁵Ibid., 65; *Gaudium et spes*, 74.

community freedoms (ibid). Among these premises are included the two principles of solidarity and subsidiarity, which dictate that statewide decisions are to be made by their constituent societies, which in turn act for the sake of society's common good (ibid). He goes as far as to affirm that the notion of distributive justice is both top-down and bottom-up, the latter of which protects against tyranny (ibid., 65-66).

He lists several challenges to the nation-state. First of all, the State cannot guarantee the peaceful coexistence of its citizens without recourse to authoritarianism; secondly, the nation can replace religion and become an ideology: this happens as globalization widening the gap between citizens and the decision making process, generating appeal towards populist nationalism; and thirdly, the growing gap between developed nations and developing nations (ibid., 66).

Similar to shifting attitudes to state and human rights, Cardinal Kasper writes of the shift in Catholic discourse from just war to just peace and the insufficiency of current understandings of peace: firstly, peace as the absence of war, and secondly, the "utopia of unstoppable progress. . ." as economic globalization cannot be achieved before spiritual globalization (ibid., 66-67). In light of this, he promotes interreligious dialogue "between people of good will" in order for Christians to be the progenitors of world peace (ibid).

In order to find the roots of conflict between nations, Archbishop Roland Minnerath develops Catholic national philosophy and Catholic moral theology.¹⁶ He explains that the nation lacks a "commonly accepted definition[:]" and from this problem, the number of nations cannot be approximated (ibid). Therefore, one cannot apprehend the nation from the State, both of which "do not overlap. . ." (ibid.)

In order to analyze the nation, Archbishop Minnerath goes back to the primordial concept of people or *ethnos*, which is a given reality (ibid). A *people* refers to a group of men who are united by common features, such as myths, language, political systems, et cetera (ibid). But an alternate definition of *people* comes from the Roman sense [*populos*], which refers to civic unity:

¹⁶Roland Minnerath, "Nation, State, Nation-State, and the Social Doctrine of the Church," in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, 70.

this meaning of *people* supplanted the ethnic definition during the modern period.¹⁷

In order to tackle challenges to the development of world peace, the Session distinguishes the nation, which is a self-aware community with objective ties, from the state, which is defined according to descriptive and Weberian theories.¹⁸ It affirms the following points: firstly, multi-ethnic or sub-national states had a historical majority, and they still exist in large numbers and in post-colonies: in light of this, states do not have to be of a single nation in order for them to be legitimate (ibid). Secondly, national secession is morally inadmissible except if their host government is actively violating the basic rights of the constituent nation: in order to prevent this, states must respect the rights of their constituent groups (ibid., 481-2). Thirdly, the federal state is optimal in a certain respect, although its feasibility depends on time-space considerations: nevertheless, federalism can also be applied to great advantage in homogenous nation-states (ibid., 482). Even homogenous nation states should participate in international cooperation, especially due to economic globalization, climate change, and international security, although in light of the principle of subsidiarity, the sovereignty and autonomy of states should be respected in the process (ibid). Finally, supranational structures are important, and they, despite their faults, ought not to be abrogated, but rather, reformed (ibid).

In light of these, the Session promotes patriotism, the love for one's country, which it calls a noble sentiment which ought not be suppressed, so that it may not give way to nationalism, which is manifested in (1) unjustified secessionism, (2) ethnic oppression, and (3) unjust acts of aggression, in addition to economic nationalism which limits free trade, and populism which rejects international cooperation (ibid., 482-3). In light of this, it affirms a need for some form of international governance and the creation of a new institutional setup, although it spurns the notion of post-national democracy, which involves a "cosmopolitan citizenship" and the rejection of the nation-concept, for national identity can coexist with democracy. Nevertheless, it reiterates that aggressive forms of nationalism are contrary to Catholic social teaching (ibid., 483-4).

¹⁷Roland Minnerath, "Nation, State, Nation-State, and the Social Doctrine of the Church," in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, 71.

¹⁸"Final Statement," in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, 481.

Yet, for reasons which I shall explain, I define the nation as *a community which is aware of a proper and specific culture, territory, and relation, which it names*. But, according to the Pope, it “is impossible to conceive of a culture without human subjectivity or human causality” (ibid). Hence it becomes necessary to analyze the ontological principles which will inform our discourse.

Part I

DISCOURSE

DRAFT

Chapter 1

ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

It therefore becomes important to define terms. According to Modrzejewski and Gálik, in “Karol Wojtyła’s Personalistic and Universalistic Philosophy of Culture,” in *European Journal of Science and Theology* 10, no. 4 (2014); Wojtyła always understood *man* in relation to his personhood (108), based on the “*naturae rationalis individua substantia*” of Severinus Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis: contra eutychem et Nestorium*, *Patrologiae cursus completus, series latina* 64, ed. Migne (1847), cap. III.¹⁹

1.1 DEFINING THE PERSON

Karol Wojtyła in “The Person: Subject and Community” (274-5) indeed wrote that Boethius’ definition is the foundation of his notion of subject - but he clarified in *The Acting Person* (1980) that being a *rational individual* is not enough to define the human person:

The person would be an individual whose nature is rational — according to Boethius’ full definition *persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia*. Nevertheless, in our perspective it seems clear that neither the concept of the “rational nature” nor that of its individualization seems to express fully [*sic*] the specific completeness expressed by the concept of the person. The completeness we are speaking of here seems to be something that is unique in a very special sense rather than concrete. (73-74.)

¹⁹Arkadiusz Modrzejewski and Slavomír Gálik, “Karol Wojtyła’s Personalistic and Universalistic Philosophy of Culture,” in *European Journal of Science and Theology* 10, no. 4 (2014): 108; Severinus Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis: contra eutychem et Nestorium*, in PL 64, cap. III. This is corroborated by John Paul II himself in *The Acting Person*: “The person is a concrete man, the individua substantia of the classical Boethian definition.” (73).

He explained that the human person has a “basic ontological structure” which determines him as a “somebody” and not as a “something” (ibid), asserting that man is “...the subject of both existence and acting, though it is important to note that the existence proper to him is personal and not merely individual. . .” (74).

This personal existence, according to him, “is simultaneously both subjective and objective.” (ibid., 109.) In another part of the book we can read that “...[f]rom the metaphysical point of view the person is both the object and the subject.” (112.) This notion of subject and object can be easily explained: the subject *does* the action, while the object *receives* the action.²⁰ But this does not say much about the person - many things which are ‘subjects’ can be objectified or acted upon. But take note of the word ‘simultaneously’ (109). Personal existence is “...simultaneously both subjective and objective” (ibid). For according to Mara in “Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person: A Wojtylan Personalistic Interpretation of the Human Being,” in *Kritke* 1, no.1 (2007), it is through his action that man is both subject and object:

... man as a subject, determines outwardly the object of his action. But also along with the determination of the object of his action, the act bounces back to himself as a determined object of his own action. In action, the subject determines an outer object, but he is also the object determined by his action. He knows that he performs [a] certain action, and above all, he knows that he is the one performing the action. He meets and knows himself as the doer of his action. Man, therefore, becomes the subject and object of the action. (88.)

Wojtyla corroborated this in “The Person: Subject and Community,” 282: “Human action or act has various aims, objects, and values to ward which it is directed.

Turning to these, one cannot fail in his conscious action to direct himself toward his own self as a goal, for he cannot refer to various objects of action and choose various values without determining himself and his value, through which he becomes an object for himself as subject.” He then asserted that the experience of existence and action objectifies the person: “[a]ll men,

²⁰Daniel Tyler Chua, “The School as Moral Person” (University of Asia and the Pacific, 2022); “Object and Subject,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1911); cf. Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, 21.

and 'I' among them, participate in the experience of existing and acting; at the same time all the 'others,' along with myself, are the object of that experience. . . " (273). Wojtyla therefore implies in *The Acting Person* (1980) that only the human person can do this, at least *simultaneously* (109.)

But there is more to human subjectivity than one's ability to exist and act. For Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," man "...is a subject only when he experiences or lives his own self as a subject; he is, then, in some respect a subject fully in act" (279.)

But, at the same time, there is a distinction between *being a subject* and *living* "...one's own self as a subject. . ." (ibid). According to him, the second relates greatly to consciousness (ibid.) He wrote:

The spiritual elements of cognition, consciousness, freedom, and self-determination, slowly begin to dominate the somatic and primitive psychic layers of human subjectivity. The whole development of the individual is clearly directed toward revealing the person and the subjectivity proper to him as a human subject. Thus, on the basis of the subject the concrete human self is slowly revealed and at the same time constituted: it reveals itself by constituting itself. The self constitutes itself precisely through the acts proper to man as a person. . . (277).

It is in this context that he connects action with consciousness, bringing in the notion of "fully human action" which he defines as *conscious action* in "The Person: Subject and Community" (277). For he wrote in *The Acting Person* that "...the term 'human act' or 'action' as such contains a definite interpretation of action as conscious acting, which is strictly connected with the philosophy of being. . ." (26).

He explained in "The Person: Subject and Community" (279) that "...the human subject becomes a human self and reveals itself to itself by consciousness."²¹ He did not associate the *human or conscious act* with the "consciousness of acting", but rather, with "voluntary act" and *free will* (*The Acting Person*, 26-28). His notion of free will is something which we must tackle in another chapter. But now that we have tackled the notions of "...human subjectivity and causality. . ." as is

²¹But it is important to note that he qualifies that the self is "not reducible to consciousness" (ibid).

demanded in John Paul II's address to UNESCO (11), we may now make some considerations on culture.

1.1.1 CULTURE AND COMMUNITY

But even as I rely primarily on Karol Wojtyla's philosophy; I must not separate Karol Wojtyla the philosopher from Karol Wojtyla the Pope. In this sense, we shall not exclusively rely on Karol Wojtyla's statements alone. For example, *Gaudium et spes* (Romae, 1965), 53; provided a very general definition of culture:

Voce cultura sensu generali indicantur omnia quibus homo multifarias dotes animi corporisque perpolit atque explicat; ipsum orbem terrarum cognitione et labore in suam potestatem redigere studet; vitam socialem, tam in familia quam in tota consortione civili, progressu morum institutorumque humaniorem reddit; denique magnas experientias spirituales atque appetitiones decursu temporum in operibus suis exprimit, communicat atque conservat, ut ad profectum multorum, quinimmo totius generis humani, inserviant.²²

By this statement alone, we can understand that culture pertains to the relationship between man and himself. It is in light of this statement, we can move forward to a more "specified" definition of culture.

According to Giacomo Biffi in "Catholic Culture for a True Humanism" (Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith), there are three senses of the word 'human culture'. The first indicates "...the 'cultivation of the human person' above all in his interior reality." We can compare this to *Gaudium et spes* in which we read that culture is "the cultivation of the values and goods of nature." (53.) From a theological perspective, John Paul II explained in *Memory and Identity*, (91-92) that this is in accordance to what was written in Gen 1:28, i.e., the repletion and the subjugation of the

²²"The word 'culture' in its general sense indicates everything whereby man develops and perfects his many bodily and spiritual qualities; he strives by his knowledge and his labor, to bring the world itself under his control. He renders social life more human both in the family and the civic community, through improvement of customs and institutions. Throughout the course of time he expresses, communicates and conserves in his works, great spiritual experiences and desires, that they might be of advantage to the progress of many, even of the whole human family." (ibid., official translation.)

earth. The subjugation of the earth possesses a dual meaning: in one sense, as John Paul II wrote in *Laborem exercens*, (1981): “Ad Dei ipsius imaginem et similitudinem factus in visibili mundi universitate ibique constitutus ut terram subiciat, homo ab ipso suo initio ad suscipiendum laborem vocatur.” (4.) It is in this sense that he approached Genesis 1:28 in light of human work. But in another sense, he connects this to the “truth about being human” in *Memory and Identity*:

Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea (Gen. 1:28). These words are the earliest and most complete definition of human culture. To subdue and have dominion over the earth means to discover and confirm the truth about being human, about the humanity that belongs equally to man and to woman. (91-92.)²³

Following his brief exposition on the nature of culture’s first definition, Cardinal Biffi in “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism” induced the second definition of culture: a “collective system for evaluating ideas, actions, events and therefore an ensemble of ‘models’ of behaviour.”

These usually refer to something collective, this also applies to individuals. As he wrote: “Every ‘culture’ understood this way presumes a ‘scale of values’ proposed and accepted within a certain human group.” (ibid.) Culture in the second sense proceeds from certain ways in which a certain person acts: “Different styles of life and multiple scales of values arise from the diverse manner of using things, of laboring, of expressing oneself, of practicing religion, of forming customs, of establishing laws and juridic institutions, of cultivating the sciences, the arts and beauty.” (*Gaudium et spes*, 53.) This second sense is in many ways related to the third sense, which, according to Biffi, refers to “...all that is expressed by a particular race and recognized as specific to it: its mentality, institutions, forms of existence and work, customs, inventions and creative genius.” (“Catholic Culture for a True Humanism.”)

But, according to John Paul II, in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and

²³The relevance of truth to our topic can be demonstrated in *Centissimus annus* (49-50), which affirms the search for truth characterizes a nation’s character: “Ex veritatis manifesta inquisitione quae in omnibus aetatibus renovatur, notio cultus et humanitatis denotatur Nationis.” This is also attested in John Paul II, “Address of the Holy Father to the New Ambassador of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the Holy See,” in *L’Osservatore Romano* 19, no.5 (2001): 9.

Peace,” (2001), culture is also “the form of man’s self-expression in his journey through history, on the level of both individuals and social groups.” (4.) It is, therefore, both the *expression* and its content. The different ways man expresses himself refer to very particular elements which we call culture: but man expresses himself in his totality in a form which we also call culture, as attested to by *Gaudium et spes* (53); Card. Biffi in “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism” ; John Paul II in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (4); and Joseph Card. Ratzinger in “Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures,” (Hong Kong: LEV, March 3, 1993).

In his Address to UNESCO, 11; John Paul II wrote that “culture is a specific mode of man’s existing [*sic*] and being” and that “[i]t is through culture that man as a human being becomes more human, ‘exists’ more fully and has more ‘being’.” Because Thomistic Philosophy holds that a man already exists by virtue of his soul (*Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a.9), we ought to approach this from the notion of *additions to being*:

... certain additions can be made to being, in as much as certain modes of being are expressed which are not expressed by the term being. This can happen in two ways: a) the mode expressed is a special mode of being which does not universally result from every being; and thus we have the ten predicaments, viz., substance, quantity, quality, etc. b) the mode expressed is a general mode of being which results from every being; and thus we have the property of being, for we have something which universally results from being, and yet is not really distinct from it. (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 508)

We are looking for what John Paul II calls a specific *mode of being*, and so we focus our attention on the *ten predicaments*.

We have good reason to approach culture based on certain *predicaments*, for according to John Paul II in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (14): “...every man necessarily lives within a specific culture, which signs him.” The ten predicaments are therefore defined: *substantia, quantit, relat, qualit, actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, habitus* (Hugon, *Cursus philosophiae*, I, logica minor, 1:1.7). Because we may infer *actio* from the actions listed in the previous section, which for now may require no further explanation, and therefore, it may seem

that culture is a species of the predicament *actio*. This seems to be supported by *Gaudium et spes* (1965), 53; which defines culture as “omnia quibus homo multifarias dotes animi corporisque perpolit atque explicat; ipsum orbem terrarum cognitione et labore in suam potestatem redigere studet. . . ”

But Grenier distinguished between *immanent actions*, which are not meant to produce effects nor to affect a term; and *transitive actions*, which are meant to produce effects or affect a term. (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 299). He asserted that the function of the immanent action is solely to perfect its agent, and lists some examples of immanent actions: *intellection, sensation, etc.* (ibid). Let us review what Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* I, q.18, a.3: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX metaphys., duplex est actio, una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle. Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis.”²⁴

Hence we return to Grenier’s *Thomistic Philosophy* (1950), where he wrote that the immanent action “belongs to the predicament of quality” (299) which he defined as the *determination* of a thing (648), therefore delimiting the accident of *actio* to transitive acts (299). Among other sub-species of quality include disposition and habit, which both dispose a subject to either its own being or an operation (151). From this context one may make a few *a priori* assumptions. Firstly, Wojtyla (quoting Aquinas) declares: “Genus humanum arte et ratione vivit” in his address to UNESCO (1950), 10. He then associated this with human culture:

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the essential significance of culture lies in the fact that it is a characteristic of human life as such. It is through culture that man lives a truly human life. Human life is also culture in the sense that it is through culture that man is distinguished and differentiated from everything else that exists in the visible world: man cannot do without culture. (14.)

²⁴“As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.” (*Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Province.)

Aquinas understood art to be a habit (*Summa theologiae* 1, q.57, a.3): indeed, in the actual quotation of his commentary on *Posteriora analytica* (sec. 1) we may come across his exposition of the relationship between reason and art.

With respect to the concept of life, Grenier understood two senses for life: the first being the “substance of a living being”, while the other being “self-motion” (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 321). With respect to self-motion, he speaks of life as both transitive and immanent: “...self-motion signifies: 1° transitive action which produces a term which remains in the agent; 2° immanent operation which takes place with a transition from potency to act; v.g., the acts of sensation, volition, and intellection in a created being; 3° immanent operation which takes place without a transition from potency to act, as, v.g., an act of intellection in God. . .” (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 320). According to Grenier, “[i]n motion we distinguish three things: 1° the execution of motion; 2° the form which is the principle of motion; 3° the end to which motion tends.” (322). For Aquinas, principle of motion, or put simply, the principles of action, are habit and power (*Summa theologiae*, I, q.29, a.2; *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, 24:8; etc.).

Secondly, according to John Paul II, culture consists of the knowledge of the truth about the self (*Memory and Identity*, 91). But knowledge is an immanent action.²⁵ Therefore, culture is an imminent action. But, as Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* I, q.18, a.3, this immanent action perfects its agent. Hence some prefer the term ‘self-perfecting’ action - which I will use in this discussion. Finally, according to Modrzejewski and Galik (100), man, being of *rational* nature, is cultural, and culture, coming from reason, belongs to human nature. (The major term can be conferred in cap. III of Boethius’ *Liber de persona et duabus naturis*.)

According to them, culture “cover[s] all creations of human intellect, from abstract ideas and values to materialised forms of human thoughts - works of art, literature, architecture, tools, etc. - but also religion, customs, traditions, habits laws, etc. . .” (ibid., 107). Modrzejewski and Galik quoted the late M.A. Krapje (*Człowiek w kulturze* [Warszawa: Gutenberg-Print, 1996], 5), who

²⁵*Thomistic Philosophy*, 299; M. C. D’Arcy, “Knowledge According to Aquinas,” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 28 (1927): 201. In fact, John Paul II connects this to Aquinas’ declaration in *Post analytica*: “*Genus humanum arte et ratione vivit*. The basic assertion is that man is himself through truth, and becomes increasingly himself through an ever more perfect knowledge of truth.” (John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 14).

stated that “[t]he whole [sic] culture originates from man as it is his – man’s – sign of expression. Contents are absorbed in human cognition and expressed by means of different signs, primarily located in [the] human psyche and secondarily moved to an outer mental material, determine culture; and the culture is in its deepest understanding the intellectualization of nature.” (Quoted in Modrzejewski and Galik, “Karol Wojtyla’s Personalistic and Universalistic Philosophy of Culture,” 100.)

By doing so, they necessarily attach culture with the intellect. We may corroborate this with John Paul II’s statements on culture in his Address to UNESCO (11):

And man is always such in his wholeness: in the entirety of his spiritual and material subjectivity. While there is a real distinction between spiritual and material culture in terms of the nature and content of the products in which culture is expressed, it must also be noted that, on the one hand, works of material culture always reveal a "spiritualization" of matter, a subjection of the material element to the spiritual powers of man, in other words, to his intelligence and his will; and, on the other, works of spiritual culture specifically show a "materialization" of the spirit, an incarnation of what is spiritual. This dual characteristic appears to be both primordial and permanent in works of culture.

And so, one may say that culture belongs under the accident *quality* (cf. *Thomistic Philosophy*, 299). But what are we to make of the various *actions* which we associate with culture?

By reading the previous quotation, we can notice a difference between culture per se and the *expressions of culture*. John Paul II affirmed that it is only man “who ‘acts’ or ‘makes’ culture.” (Address to UNESCO, 11). The relevance of this passage lies in the fact that the verbs ‘*acting*’ and ‘*making*’ culture constitute transitive actions by virtue of having a patient (cf. Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 302). In fact, John Paul II qualifies that man is the *only* object of culture (Address to UNESCO, 11).²⁶ We may understand this using St. Wojtyla’s notion of human act, which Mara discussed in “Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person: A Wojtylan Personalistic Interpretation

²⁶Of course, it is easy defend the position that man is an object of culture: in his address to UNESCO (11), the Pope wrote that man; “who expresses and objectifies himself in and through culture, is unique, complete and indivisible.”

of the Human Being,” in *Kritike* 1, no.1 (2007): 88.

From thence we may return to the definition of culture provided in the previous section and its sources: *man cultivates, knows, and expresses himself*. But, in relation to man being the culture’s only object (Address to UNESCO, 11); a difficulty arises for *Gaudium et spes* (53) wrote of the diverse manner of “utendi rebus” or how Cardinal Biffi (Catholic Culture) declared that *inventions* belong to culture. It would therefore appear that man is *not* the only object of culture, because culture involves the *utendum rebus*, which ‘objectifies’ things, according to *Gaudium et spes* (53). This can be reconciled through the Pope’s many insights concerning the *experience* of man and the role of *possession* and *production* of objects. For him, “[a]ll that man ‘possesses’, is of importance for culture, and a factor creative of culture, only in so far as man, by virtue of what he ‘possesses’, is also able to ‘be’ more fully man, to become more fully man at all levels of his existence and in everything which marks out his humanity.” (Address to UNESCO, 11). He wrote that human culture is *directly connected with human nature and only indirectly connected with human production* (ibid.) This becomes much clearer upon recalling what Mara writes about man’s dual nature as subject and object manifested in action in “Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person” (88). Because, according to Corrigan, human actions are “...transitive in so far as they extend beyond us and affect the outside world. They are intransitive [immanent] in so far as they remain in us as subjects and determine our inner quality, structure and makeup as persons.” (“The Problem of the Constitution of Culture in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II,” in *Revista Aporia* 12 [2017], 39-54.)

It follows that a certain action which involves the objectification of a certain thing belongs to culture not by virtue of the relationship between the subject *man* and his term *object*, but rather, the relationship between man and himself which may *per se* objectify a certain term, although the objectification in itself is only part of culture *per accidens*, as is attested to in the same sources - especially John Paul II’s Address to UNESCO. In his own words: “Culture is always essentially and necessarily related to what man is, while its relation to what he has, to his “possessions”, is not only secondary, but entirely relative.” (John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 11). In this sense therefore,

the general notion of *culture* only has one object, i.e., the human reflexive.²⁷ For Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae* (I, q.79, a.1) and *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (1), the intellect is a power of the soul, and also the “*propria operatio animae*”. This is why Modrzejewski and Galik declare in “Karol Wojtyła’s Personalistic and Universalistic Philosophy of Culture” that “[o]nly man – a person – due to his intellect has culture-forming abilities.” (100) Imagine a machine and a man beating a drum in the same room. Even if they were to beat the drum with the same rhythm, from the principles mentioned it would only be the man who practices culture, as the machine does not possess a soul and therefore no intellect, those same works attest to. It is man, through the machine (and its function), who still expresses his own creative genius, as attested to by John Paul II in his “Address to UNESCO” (11) and in conference with *Gaudium et spes* (53) and Cardinal Biffi (Catholic Culture). Secondly, a human action consists of two objects: (1) the “determined object”; and (2) himself (Mara, “Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person,” 88). For him, the reflection on the subject is more of a ‘mental’ thing than it is a physical reflection (*ibid*).

Hence we understand that the Pope identified culture precisely with man’s expression of self (John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 11; John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace,” 4; *Gaudium et spes*, 53; Ratzinger, “Christ, Faith, and the Challenge of Cultures;” Biffi, “Catholic Culture.”) This means that the expression of man is the ‘formal cause’ of culture, because it is the form which “terminates a thing to its species” (*Summa theologiae*, I, q.7. a.3). This means that the ways in which culture manifests itself, or its *modus operandi*, are secondary, as corroborated by John Paul II: “The experience of the different periods of history, not excluding the present, shows that we think about culture and speak about it first and foremost in connexion with human nature, and only secondarily and indirectly, in connexion with the world of human production.” (Address to UNESCO, 11.) So when the Pope declares that man alone is the ontic subject, object, and end of culture (*ibid*); we can know that he calls this subject, because culture is an act (*ibid*); the object, for man expresses himself (check the footnote), and the final

²⁷For another explanation of this, vide R. Jared Staudt, “Culture in the Magisterium of Pope John Paul II: Evangelization through Dialogue and the Renewal of Society,” in *Claritas: Journal of Dialogue and Culture* 3, no. 1 (2014): 54-55.

cause, because culture is the secondary act, and man belongs to culture, and always has the act and final cause (John Paul II, “Address to UNESCO,” 11; John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures,” 4; *Gaudium et spes*, 53. Cf. *Gaudium et spes*, 5; Grenier, *Thomistic Philo.*, 550; 625; 261; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Sachs, 1050a. 21-23; Hugon, *Cursus philosophiae* III, *Metaphysica ontologica*, tr. III, q. 3, 1.VI.) It is for this reason that one may understand the Church’s opposition to the exploitation of culture for commercial gain, for if a culture is exploited for commercial gain, its “practitioners” (suppose, for a tourist exhibition) would become similar to machines beating drums, and it would be difficult to say that they practice true ‘local’ culture, for their practice might lack authentic self-expression. See John Paul II, “Message of John Paul II for the 22nd World Day of Tourism 2001,” (Vatican: June 9, 2001), 2. (Cf. John Paul II, “Address to UNESCO,” 11; John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures,” 4; *Gaudium et spes*, 53.)

We may also understand man as the end of culture, for man exists for his own sake and culture is a *modus essendi*, according to both *Gaudium et spes* (53) and Christopher Tollefsen in “The Catholic Perspective on Human Dignity,” in *Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of God*, (International Theological Commission, 2004) - cf. John Paul II’s address to UNESCO,” 11-12. It thus follows that man is the end of culture. We may also make some additional considerations based on other contexts. According to John Paul II’s “Dialogue between Cultures” (6), *Gaudium et spes* (53), and *Memory and Identity* (65; 85-87); culture has a relationship with territory and history, while *Gaudium et spes* spoke of a “definite historical, milieu which enfolds the man of every nation and age”. In his message “Dialogue between Cultures”; John Paul II had this to say:

In most cases, a culture develops in a specific place, where geographical, historical and ethnic elements combine in an original and unique way. The "uniqueness" of each culture is reflected more or less clearly in those individuals who are its bearers, in a constant process whereby individuals are influenced by their culture and then, according to their different abilities and genius, contribute to it something of their own.

(5)

In *Memory and Identity*, John Paul II connected “culture” with “native land” (65-71) as well as with “history” (85-87). With respect to native land, John Paul II wrote: “Our native land is thus our heritage and it is also the whole patrimony derived from that heritage. It refers to the land, the territory, but more importantly, the concept of patria includes the values and the spiritual content that go to make up the culture of a given nation.” (ibid., 66). With respect to history, he wrote that they, “objectified and recorded in writing, are among the essential elements of culture — the element which determines the nation’s identity in the temporal dimension.” (84.) In this sense, culture also takes upon the dimensions of *ubi* and *quando*.

But so far we have only discussed the ‘cultural’ aspect of the nation. But nations, according to John Paul II, are also *communities* (*Memory and Identity*, 74). Providentially for us, Wojtyla has written extensively about community throughout his academic life. We do not have to read Wojtyla in order to know that communities consist of more than one person together.²⁸ But for Wojtyla, *community* does not signify a mere common action and existence, because it does not signify “the plurality of subjects” in acting - but rather their “specific unity”, as we read in “The Person: Subject and Community” (289). In doing so, he defined community according to this “specific unity” which, according to him, “arises as a relation or a sum of relations existing among them [persons].” (ibid.)²⁹ With respect to these relations, Wojtyla spoke of “two seemingly irreducible profiles or dimensions of the human community” which he identifies with the “interhuman” pattern of “I-you” and the “social” pattern of “we” (291). As for the I-you pattern, Wojtyla writes that “[t]he ‘you’ is

²⁸The Acting Person, according to Wojtyla, “does not contain a theory of community. It considers only the elementary condition which allows the existence and action of man as a person ‘together with others’ to strive toward self-fulfillment or at least not to hinder it.” (“The Person: Subject and Community,” 288). Christian Zeus Suazo, “Between the Wojtylan Theory of Participation and the Confucian Ren: An Anthropological Dialogue”, in *TALISIK: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy* VII (2020): 26-44, identified this acting and existing ‘together with others’ with the notion of intersubjectivity. We will seldom use that word.

²⁹Wojtyla asserted that societies are exclusively a “...complex of relations...” and therefore, an “...accidental being...” (“The Person: Subject and Community,” 289.) We can demonstrate this as we recall in Hugon’s *Cursus philosophiae* that *relat* is numbered among the predicaments (I, logica minor, 1:1.7). Therefore, we may identify the notion of society as belonging under *relat*. However, although Wojtyla admits that the terms community and society are used interchangeably: in “The Person: Subject and Community”, he differentiates between society and community on the basis of perspective, and even goes as far to declare that “[w]e may even say that society or social groups achieve their reality or become themselves through the community of their members.” (290.) *The Acting Person* contains another exposition on this distinction, stating that society “objectivizes the community or a number of mutually complementary communities.” (278.)

another 'I,' different from my 'I.' Thinking and saying 'you,' I express at the same time the relation which, so to speak, extends beyond me but at the same time returns to me. 'You' is not only a term of separateness, it is also a term of contact." (292). But he writes that this is not enough to form community, because it is one way - the fullness of this relation, so necessary for community, only happens upon reciprocation (293-294).

Alfred Wilder, in "Community of Persons in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla," in *Angelicum* 56, no. 2/3 (1979) wrote that the community is the place where "...the 'I' turns to regard the 'you', only to be in turn regarded himself as a 'you' by the 'other I' which is his original 'you'." (211-44.) But, according to Wojtyla in "The Person: Subject and Community" (294); there can still be a real relationship even without reciprocation, because of *participation*, which he defined as a "...property in virtue of which man tends also to self-fulfillment and fulfills himself, acting and existing in common with others." (ibid., 305.) For him, "[m]an as a person fulfills himself through "I - you" interpersonal relations and through the relation to the common good, which permit him to exist and act together with the others as 'we'." (304). But most of all, he defined participation as the "...participation in the very humanity of another man. . ." (ibid., 294).

Wojtyla qualified that this "very humanity" he speaks of "...is understood not as an abstract idea of man, but. . . as a personal self which in each occasion is unique and nonrecurrent." (288.) When it comes to the I-you relation, participation also signifies a turning "...to another 'I' on the basis of personal transcendence, to turn therefore to the full truth of that man, and in this sense to his humanity. . . not as an abstract idea of man, but as an 'I' to 'you'." (305-306.) On the other hand, Wojtyla masterfully explained the notion of "we":

When we say that "we" signifies many human "I's" we try to grasp this plurality and understand it through action, as we have tried to understand "I" itself. "We" signifies many people, many subjects, who in some fashion exist and act together. It is not a question, however, of the plurality of actions which take place, as it were, next to one another. "In common" means that action, and together with it the existence of those many "I's" as well, is in relation to some value. This therefore deserves the name of

"common good," though in speaking thus I do not intend to use the concepts "value" and "good" interchangeably or to confuse these concepts. (298.)³⁰

Gaudium et spes defined the common good as: "...summam eorum vitae socialis condicionum quae tum coetibus, tum singulis membris permittunt ut propriam perfectionem plenius atque expeditius consequantur - hodie magis magisque universale evadere, et exinde iura officiaque implicare, quae totum humanum genus respiciunt." (26.)

Yet, it remains unclear as to how a good may become common. According to Wojtyla in "The Person: Subject and Community":

The constitution of the concrete "I" in its personal subjectivity takes place in a distinctive manner through action and existence "together with the others" in a social community, in the dimension of the different "we's." This differs from the dimension "I - you," for here the relation to the common good is of decisive significance. Through this relation the concrete "I" finds a different confirmation of his personal subjectivity than that found through an interpersonal relation. Nevertheless, this confirmation of the subject "I" in the community of "we" agrees fundamentally with the nature of the subject.

Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person*: "We can conceive of the common good as being the goal of acting only in that double - subjective and objective - sense. Its subjective sense is strictly related to participation as a property of the acting person; it is in this sense that it is possible to say that the common good corresponds to the social nature of man."

Malo, in "Novelty, Self-Determination and Communication as Essential Traits of Human Action: Reflections on K. Wojtyla's Theory of Action," in *Organon* 45 (2013) disambiguated the "subjective"; which "...consists in choosing that end because it is seen as the true good (in the sense that man as person is fulfilled by it). That which in action is loved by another as good is considered a true good by he who cooperates, that is in it he discovers a common good." Wojtyla explained that this common good pertains to the community of being, in which "each of its members expects to be allowed to choose what others choose and because they choose, and that his choice will be his own

³⁰For more information, see Dean Edward A. Mejos, "Against Alienation: Karol Wojtyla's Theory of Participation," in *Kritike* 1, no. 1 (June 2007): 71-85.

good that serves the fulfillment of his own person." (*The Acting Person*, 282-283). This can only occur upon knowing what others choose - the full truth of the other person found via participation (Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," 305-306). For him, the term *we* "signifies not only the simple fact of human multi-subjectivity, but the peculiar subjectivity of this plurality, or at least points to a decided tendency to achieve it." (ibid., 302).

It is from this point that we understand the 'subjectivity of society' which John Paul II mentions and defines in *Centesimus annus* (Rome: St. Peter's, May 13, 1991):

Ad Rerum novarum sententias socialemque similiter Ecclesiae doctrinam socialitas hominis minime ab ipsa republica absorbetur, sed in aliis inferioribus sodaliciis explicatur, capto a familia initio usque ad oeconomicas et sociales politicas et culturales consociationes quae ex hominis natura orientes — bono communi usque servato — sua ipsorum fruuntur libertate. Id quidem ipsum «subjectivitatem societatis» vocavimus quae una cum individui subjectivitate a «socialismo reali» deleta est. (13.)³¹

In *The Acting Person* (277), Wojtyla wrote that the *community* "introduces a new plane or a new 'subjectiveness'." But, on the other hand, he also clarifies that the community "is not the subject in acting", because the human *person* remains the subject of his own existence and action (ibid). He understood the subjectivity of a community as *quasi-subjective*, which he distinguishes from a "proper subject in acting" (ibid). The fact that the human person still remains the "doer" of the action and the one who exists justifies this position:

All the people existing and acting together are obviously exercising a role in a common action but in a different way than when each of them performs an action in its entirety.

The new subjectiveness is the share of all the members of a community, or, in a broader sense, of a social group. In fact, it is but a quasi-subjectiveness, because even when the being and acting is realized together with others it is the man-person who is always its

³¹"According to *Rerum novarum* and the whole social doctrine of the Church, the social nature of man is not completely fulfilled in the State, but is realized in various intermediary groups, beginning with the family and including economic, social, political and cultural groups which stem from human nature itself and have their own autonomy, always with a view to the common good. This is what I have called the 'subjectivity' of society which, together with the subjectivity of the individual, was cancelled out by 'Real Socialism'." (ibid., official translation.) Cf. *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 420.

proper subject. (ibid.)

For him, community is a secondary order and simply “introduces new relations” between subjects: the community depends on the individual person, not the other way around (*The Acting Person*, 277).

In his article “The Person: Subject and Community”, he wrote (in terms of the Thomistic categories) that communities are accidental (289) and furthermore declared that the notion of ‘we’ does not replace or deform the “I” (299). With respect to the way in which many “I”s become a ‘we’, he wrote: “ . . . people who experience their personal subjectivity, and therefore the actual plurality of human ‘I’s,’ realize that they are a definite ‘we’ and experience themselves in this new dimension. . . In this relation the ‘I’ and ‘you’ find their reciprocal reference in a new dimension: they discover their ‘I - you’ through the common good which constitutes a new unity among them.” (298.) So it would follow that a nation, at least according to John Paul II’s definition in *Memory and Identity* (74), is a community which is united by a common good - their culture. But this definition uncovers more nuances.

Chapter 2

BEING A NATION

The Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (Rome: LEV, 2006) identified a nation's *subjectivity* with its 'sovereignty' (435), citing three documents which I will expound upon: John Paul II's encyclical *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (Rome: LEV, 1987); John XXIII's encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963), and John Paul II's address to the fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations (1995). Concerning the rights of nations or "jura nationum"; the Pope wrote in *Sollicitudo rei socialis* (1987):

Consectaria sua secum affert talis rerum condicio, etiam quod ad «iura nationum singularum» attinet. Etenim accidit crebro ut Civitas aliqua suo destituatur subiectivo iure, id est propria «maiestate», quae ei convenit, secundum vim illius oeconomicae atque etiam politicam et socialem certoque quodam modo culturalem, quandoquidem omnes hae vitae rationes apud ipsam nationis communitatem inter se iugantur. (15.)³²

He used the word *civitas* with respect to this «iura nationum singularum»; which can be grounds for confusion, in a great part due to the fact that in his Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations he very clearly states that the nation "cannot be identified *a priori* and necessarily with the State" (8).

Indeed, we can observe the Latin text switching from *nationum* [genitive plural of *natio*] to *civitas* [nominative singular] to *nationis* [genitive singular of *natio*] again.³³ Nevertheless, the

³²"Such a situation has its consequences also from the point of view of the 'rights of the individual nations.' In fact, it often happens that a nation is deprived of its subjectivity, that is to say the 'sovereignty' which is its right, in its economic, political-social and in a certain way cultural significance, since in a national community all these dimensions of life are bound together." (ibid., official translation.)

³³The official English translation translated the Latin *civitas* as 'nation' instead of its conventional definition as

official Polish translation uses the word «naród» which, according to Buttignole, means “nation” and is (according to him) distinct from the «państwo», which he identifies as the State, basing this on historical circumstances, such as the separation of the *naród* from the *państwo*, as discussed by Buttignole in *Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who Would Become Pope John Paul II* (William B. Eerdmans Company, 1997), 19.³⁴ John Paul II declared in his address to the authorities of the Popular Republic of Poland, otherwise known as *Discurso di Giovanni Paolo II alle autorità della Repubblica Popolare di Polonia* (Castello Reale di Varsavia, LEV, 8 Junii 1987): “Tylko wówczas naród żyje autentycznie własnym życiem, gdy w całej organizacji życia państwowego stwierdza swoją podmiotowość.” (5.)³⁵ He distinguished more clearly between the nation and the State, although in these two contexts they are greatly connected, just like the nation with democratic society as attested to in *Memory and Identity* (78).

But in his address to the 50th General Assembly of the United Nations (New York: LEV, 1995); John Paul II associated the “fundamental spiritual ‘sovereignty’...” of a nation with its culture: “Its right to exist naturally implies that every nation also enjoys the right to its own language and culture, through which a people expresses and promotes that which I would call its fundamental spiritual ‘sovereignty’.” (8.) Of course, discussion on the “spiritual” aspects of a nation is nothing new: we can approximate Ernst Renan’s definition in *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?* (University of Paris, March 11, 1882): «Une nation est une âme, un principe spirituel.» (III.) But John Paul II’s most explicit affirmation of a nation’s “spiritual sovereignty” came from his address to UNESCO (1980); which simply declared: “The nation exists ‘by’ culture and ‘for culture’...”. (13.) Of course, the words ‘subjectivity’ and ‘sovereignty’ were scattered throughout his address - for example, when he stated: “There is a fundamental sovereignty of society which is manifested in the culture of the nation.” (ibid.)

‘State’, but this might not be able to express the thoughts of John Paul II due to the fact that the Pope was not a native English speaker.

³⁴In the Polish edition of *Memory and Identity* the concept of *naród* is explicitly distinguished from the *państwo*: “Nie można na przykład zastąpić narodu państwem, chociaż naród z natury pragnie zaistnieć jako państwo, czego dowodzą dzieje poszczególnych narodów europejskich i polska historia.” (Ioannes Paulus II [John Paul II], *Pamięć i tożsamość: rozmowy na przełomie tysiącleci*, [Sweden: Litteratursällskapet Ligatur, 2012], 58).

³⁵“The nation lives its own life authentically only when it experiences its own subjectivity in the whole life of the state...”. (official translation.)

From thence, we can demonstrate that something called ‘culture’ is the formal cause of a nation, with the Scholastic maxim: *forma dat esse, dat distingui, et dat operari*.³⁶ Note that *esse* refers to ‘existence,’ or the ‘act of being’; according to Maágorzata Jaócho-Palicka, in “Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy of Being as the Basis for Wojtyla’s Concept and Cognition of Human Person,” in *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 127–153; and Paul Gerard Horrigan, *Being (Ens), Essence (Essentia), and the Act of Being (Esse)* (2017), 6-11. For the purposes of this discourse, we shall speak of the nation as a real subject of existence, despite it not being a proper subject, as Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person* (277). John Paul II wrote in his address to UNESCO (1980) that “...the nation exists ‘by’ culture. . .” (13). Yet, according to him, the nation is also “...distinguished from other nations by its culture.” (*Memory and Identity*, 77). From these two statements alone we can conclude that *cultura dat esse, dat distingui*. But what about *operari*? We can understand from our previous discussion that culture, being a habit, is the principle of operation, according to Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy* (1950), 650; and Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, q. 49, a. 3. Therefore, one can demonstrate that culture, being that by which a nation exists, acts, and is distinguished, is its formal cause. One can also say that as the formal cause of a nation is its own unity, because in his *Summa theologiae* (1, q.76, a.3) Aquinas wrote that “...magis anima continet corpus, et facit ipsum esse unum.” But men, or the nation’s body, are united to each other by culture, and so it follows that culture is also the nation’s unity, and thus its formal cause (John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 11). And because nations are living subjectivities, we can say that their ‘material cause’ consists of their nationals.³⁷

Nevertheless, the subjectivity of a collectivity can only be possible because of the subjectivity of the human person, who is the proper subject of culture, as stated by Wojtyla in *The Acting Person*

³⁶ ‘Form gives *esse*, gives distinguishes, and gives operation.’ For the general maxim, see G. F. Rossi, “S. Tommaso nell’Insegnamento Filosofico Alberoniano (Cont.),” in *Divus Thomas* 61 (1958): 205–36. For more on *forma dat esse*, see Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, 29.8; *Sententia libri metaph.*, V, 2.14; Aquinas, *De anima*, II, 1.5. For more on *forma dat distingui*, see *QD de veritate*, 29.8; Otto Willmann, “Idealism,” in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 7 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910); Gioachinno Ventura, *La philosophie chrétienne*, vol. 2, (Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861), 55; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, q.56, a.14; II, q.40, a.3. For more on *forma dat operari*, see Rossi, “S. Tommaso nell’Insegnamento,” 205–36; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, q.59, a.12.

³⁷ Nicholas DiMarzio, “Intercultural Dialogue in the World of Migrants and Itinerants, with Future Prospects,” in *People on the Move* N° 96, (Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and Itinerant People, December 2004). Cf. *Sollicitudo rei solidalis*, 15.

(277) and John Paul II in his address to UNESCO, 11. We may correspond his position to what Aquinas declared in *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualis creatibus* (a.9 ra.10): “...populus non propter identitatem animae aut hominum, sed propter eandem habitationem, vel magis propter easdem leges et eundem modum vivendi, ut Aristoteles dicit in III politic.”³⁸ With respect to the *identitas* ‘animae aut hominum,’ he refers to the nation’s *matter*, in which he compared to a river which remains a particular river due to its source and its riverbed, “licet sit alia aqua defluens” (ibid.) But this question could (and should) be approached from the standpoint of universals, for Aquinas wrote in *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 63: “...individuationis enim principium materia est, sicut forma est principium speciei.”³⁹

According to Grenier in *Thomistic Philosophy* (no. 141) the notion of genus is that which incompletely expresses the essence of a particular thing. In a similar way, the notion of ‘society’ or ‘community’ can be extremely broad and might not express the particular essence of a nation, people, or even of a family, the last of which is considered a society in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [*Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae*] (LEV, 2018), 2207. But the term *nation* (or people) refers to a distinct class of society which shares life and values and is distinguished by its culture, as respectively defined in the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 386; and John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 77. Therefore, we can argue that there exists a species ‘nation.’ If there is a species of nations. which are communities which exist “...‘by’ culture and ‘for’ culture” (John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 13); then a ‘being’ within the genus *society* would be terminated to the species *nation* by its formal cause, i.e. its culture. It would follow that the universal ‘cultural’ is a differential, e.g. a people is a *cultural* society.⁴⁰ Therefore we may defend that culture is the formal cause of the nation.

³⁸“...a people is the same, not because of a sameness of soul or of men, but because of the same dwelling place, or rather because of the same laws and the same manner of living, as Aristotle says in III Politica.” Thomas Aquinas, *Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures*, translated by Mary C. Fitzpatrick and John J. Wellmuth, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1949).

³⁹“...for the principle of individuation is matter, just as form is the principle of species.” Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O’Neil, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (New York: Hanover House, 1955-57).

⁴⁰For more on *differentiae*, consult Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 140-141.

2.1 BETWEEN ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE

But this is not as simple as it seems. How can we justify the existence of particular group cultures, which are not so specific as to be limited to a human individual, but not so general as to ‘apply’ to the whole human race? We can consider the entire human race to possess the quality of ‘culture’ which can be predicated on individuals.

Cardinal Biffi in “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism” declared that the Christian people precedes Christian culture. But at the same time, the nation receives its identity from its culture, as Archbishop Marchetto asserted in his discourse “Religion, Migration, and National Identity,” in *People on the Move* 109 (2009): “Based on this profound bond with their own roots – at the level of the family, territory, society and culture – people acquire a sense of their nationality, too, and culture takes on a national configuration, providing people with a national identity.” But we can approach this question with the principle of individuation.

Aquinas wrote in his *Summa theologiae* I: “forma, absolute accepta, consuevit significari ut eius cuius est forma, ut virtus Petri. E converso autem, res habens formam aliquam non consuevit significari ut eius, nisi cum volumus determinare sive designare formam.” (q.39, a.2.)⁴¹ We also recall how Alvira et al. in *Metaphysics* described the process of individuation:

As it actualizes matter, the substantial form of a corporeal being causes the accident quantity to arise in matter, since quantity constitutes the body as such...As quantity gives dimensions to matter, it makes some parts in it distinct from other parts, thus making it individual. By virtue of its concrete dimensions, quantity limits matter to being this matter, distinct from all the rest...Matter, thus singularized by quantity, individuates the specific form. (103.)

We have hitherto determined the *material cause* or the subject of a nation to be its persons, according to Wojtyla in *The Acting Person* - for communities are ultimately dependent on human persons (277).

⁴¹ Additionally, we read in *Summa theologiae* (I, q.29, a.1) that “accidentia individuantur per subiectum, quod est substantia, dicitur enim haec albedo, in quantum est in hoc subiecto.” (“...whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because it exists in this particular subject.” - *Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Province.)

We also understand that the subject receives an accident and then contributes to its production, as Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* I, q.77, a.6: “...subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum.”⁴² In this sense, we can understand that ‘this culture’ exists in virtue of ‘this subject’; be it a nation or an individual.

In a similar way, when a nation receives ‘nationality,’ it individuates it and makes it ‘this nationality.’ The same thing can be said for culture. When Cardinal Biffi wrote that Catholic culture presupposes the Catholic *people*, we can interpret this in the Thomistic sense: A society of Christians receives the communicable accident *culture* which determines their existence as a Christian *people*, which is then individuated and becomes ‘this’ incommunicable *Christian culture*.⁴³ In this sense one can say that *culture* reaches a *national* or ‘Christian’ configuration.⁴⁴ We can also apply this for the human individual, because culture “*is the form of man’s self-expression in his journey through history*, on the level of both individuals and social groups.”⁴⁵

From thence, we can understand that a culture becomes *Christian* by virtue of its relationship with its Christian subjects.⁴⁶ John Paul II wrote in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” that “[t]he ‘uniqueness’ of each culture is reflected more or less clearly in those individuals who are its bearers, in a constant process whereby individuals are influenced by their culture and then, according to their different abilities and genius, contribute to it something of their own.” (5.) So we begin to see that matter [the persons] makes a culture into ‘this’ particular culture by virtue of receiving an accident, both individually and collectively (ibid., 4-5; Biffi, “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism”; Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 63). Therefore, a *culture* makes a community a *nation*, while the nation gives its culture a national character. Thomistic philosophy can justify this position, for Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* I, q.7, a.3 on how the formal cause terminates an essence to a species but is individuated by matter (cf. *Summa Theologica*, trans.

⁴²“...the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it.” (*Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province.)

⁴³Biffi, “Catholic Culture.”

⁴⁴Cf. Biffi, “Catholic Culture.” John Paul II, in “Dialogue between Cultures,” 6.

⁴⁵John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures,” 8.

⁴⁶Biffi, “Catholic Culture.”

English Dominican Province, I, q.7, a.3).

It is important to keep in mind, however, that we are (as of this moment) referring to the nation as if it was a suppositum, when it is not (Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 277). But Gellner's objection in *Nations and Nationalism* (54), that

Any definition of nations in terms of shared culture is another net which brings in far too rich a catch. Human history is and continues to be well endowed with cultural differentiations. Cultural boundaries are sometimes sharp and sometimes fuzzy; the patterns are sometimes bold and simple and sometimes tortuous and complex require us to find the means in which a nation receives its culture and individuates it. But, unlike Gellner, we are not simply referring to the cultural differentiations between smaller groups (within a *nation*), but rather, in the human individual. By reviewing the notion of the subjectivity of society, we understand that the subjectivity of a collective is, according to Wojtyla in *The Acting Person* (277), a "quasi-subjectiveness, because even when the being and acting is realized together with others it is the man-person who is always its proper subject." This subjectivity of the nation, therefore, ultimately depends on the human person: therefore, when we speak of a nation's culture, it can always be reduced to the culture of an individual person. For John Paul II in "Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace" (5) declared that it is the human person who receives and contributes to a collective culture, and that the particularity of culture is manifested in the human individual:

... in examining a culture we are struck above all by those aspects which distinguish it from our own culture; these give each culture a face of its own, as an amalgam of quite distinctive elements. In most cases, a culture develops in a specific place, where geographical, historical and ethnic elements combine in an original and unique way. The "uniqueness" of each culture is reflected more or less clearly in those individuals who are its bearers... In any event, a person necessarily lives within a specific culture. Hence we understand that the only 'unitary' culture is that of the human individual. It is the only culture which can be manifested in a concrete subject without need for further abstraction.

Yet we can contrast the particularity of a culture in the human individual with their commonality: “there is also a need to recognize that every culture, as a typically human and historically conditioned reality, necessarily has its limitations. . . when cultures are carefully and rigorously studied, they very often reveal beneath their outward variations significant common elements. This can also be seen in the historical sequence of cultures and civilizations.” (ibid., 7.) But how can we determine what makes a culture *specific* but not individual? In the moderate realist framework there exists a universal ‘culture’ which is only manifested in particular individual subjects. “Human behavior” can be simply predicted from “Tyler Chua’s behavior”, but an abstraction of “Filipino behavior” from “Tyler Chua” would require another party: the Filipino. This becomes difficult, especially if one fails to determine what a Filipino is; which is easier said than done, for communities are neither subjects in acting nor four dimensional suppostiums, as Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person* (277) and “The Person: Subject and Community.” (289-290). And so there is truth in Gellner’s exposition differentiation in *Nations and Nationalism* (54) with respect to cultural differentiation: “ . . . this richness of differentiation does not, and indeed cannot, normally or generally converge either with the boundaries of political units (the jurisdictions of effective authorities) or with the boundaries of units blessed by the democratic sacraments of consent and will.”

But because of the nature of the human person as the proper subject of culture, as stated in John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, the existence of common cultural elements which John Paul II speaks of in “Dialogue Between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (7) can allow for culture to be in some sense *congruent* with a political community, although in a broad sense. But how can this be possible? Suppose we count a group of about five thousand people. They would have at least five thousand different cultures. In fact, it would only be these five thousand cultures which would be concretely manifested without having to make new abstractions. The problem does not lie in the fact that a national culture needs to be translated into a different species, like a *red telephone* or a *red toy* within the *red thing* - the problem lies in the fact that nations themselves are not four dimensional things we can sense (with our five senses).

For example, each individual person has their own unique language which is called an

idiolect, which, according to R. Henry Robins and David Crystal, “language,” in *Encyclopedia Britannica* (August 18, 2022), “...implies an awareness that no two persons speak in exactly the same way. . .”. But idiolects can be thought of as belonging to a dialect, a language, or the entirety of human speech. So far, we have only discussed the ‘objective’ progression from the idiolect to the dialect or language. But when does a language go from being ‘my language’ to ‘our language’ but not ‘their language’? As Michael Billig wrote in *Banal Nationalism* (SAGE, 1993): “... national languages also have to be imagined, and this lies at the root of today’s common-sense belief that discrete languages ‘naturally’ exist.” (10.) He continued:

The mediaeval peasant had no official forms to complete , inquiring whether the respondent speaks Spanish or English. . . The questions about language, which today seem so ‘natural’ and so vital, did not arise. To put the matter crudely: the mediaeval peasant spoke, but the modern person cannot merely speak; we have to speak something - a language.” (ibid., 31.)

In “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (6); John Paul II wrote that culture takes, “...to a greater or lesser degree in some places. . .”, upon itself a national configuration *as* people acquire a sense of their nationality.

This *sense of nationality* is simply that of existing “...‘by’ culture and ‘for’ culture. . .”; similar to what John Paul II described in his address to UNESCO (13).⁴⁷ We can defend this synthesis by approaching and reinterpreting the realities expressed from Anderson’s point of view in his classical definition in *Imagined Communities* (5-7): a nation is *imagined* as a *limited* and *sovereign* community. This seems to be completely different: but it will become clear by the end of this chapter that they complement each other. The dimensions of a nation are represented by non-tangible and imagined concepts such as borders and population, which include but are not limited to territory.⁴⁸ The borders of a nation, finite and sometimes elastic, fall under the finity of the national imagination, as Anderson wrote in *Imagined Communities*

⁴⁷Rothbard wrote in “Nations by Consent: Decomposing the Nation-State” (2) that the nation is a “...complex of subjective feelings based on objective realities.”

⁴⁸Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5-7. On the non-tangibility of nations, see Matlary, “The Nation-State between,” 320-321.

The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind.

(7). But John Paul II connected the concept of 'patria' to 'culture' in *Memory and Identity*, 66: "Our native land is thus our heritage and it is also the whole patrimony derived from that heritage. It refers to the land, the territory, but more importantly, the concept of patria includes the values and the spiritual content that go to make up the culture of a given nation."

When a nation is imagined (as per Anderson's sense), Thomists can say that it receives its quantity from the imagination. By engaging in a dialectic with John Paul II's writings, we can say that when people imagine the 'borders' of their nation, they are selecting from something which corresponds to a certain and particular reality - both in terms of culture (the null nation) and territory.⁴⁹ Another 'selection' pertains to as Renan mentioned in *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*⁵⁰ For John Paul II, the nation possesses a history "...going beyond the history of the individual and the family." (John Paul II's address to UNESCO, 13.) But, for him, man is distinguished by his ability to objectify history, i.e., to *act* on history (*Memory and Identity*, 83). It is in this way that history "becomes historiography"; an *element of culture*" which "determines the nation's identity in the temporal dimension." (ibid., 83-4.) By objectifying history, we often idealize it, generalize it, or mythicize it - as Ernest Gellner made clear in *Nations and Nationalism* (25). For example, Davies discussed in "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" how the clerical literati in Medieval Britain skillfully invented the British people - and their history:

The English got in on this act very early indeed and created a historical mythology for themselves which has stood them in remarkably good stead for over a millennium. The founding father of the mythology was, of course, the Venerable Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English people (*gens Anglorum*) written c.731. Bede was, in effect,

⁴⁹But when the borders of culture and territory do not coincide, it may become problematic if it would involve other identity groups (Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church).

⁵⁰Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 125; Ernst Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, (Parisiensis, apud Universitatem Parisiensem, 11 Martii 1882), I; III; Cf. Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", in Ernest Renan, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?*, translated by Ethan Rundell, Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6-7.

inventing the English people as a concept, endowing it with its own chronology commencing with the coming of the English to Britain (*adventus Saxonum*) and interpreting its history as that of an elect nation, the new Israel. (574.)

Therein lies the importance of Wojtyła's personalist philosophy. For Wojtyła, the community is not signified by a mere common action and existence, because community does not signify "the plurality of subjects" in acting, but rather their "specific unity", as we read in "The Person: Subject and Community" (289). According to him, the term *we* "signifies not only the simple fact of human multi-subjectivity, but the peculiar subjectivity of this plurality, or at least points to a decided tendency to achieve it." (302.)

In *The Acting Person* (277), Wojtyła wrote that the *community* "introduces a new plane or a new 'subjectiveness'." But, on the other hand, he also clarified that the community "is not the subject in acting", because the human *person* remains the subject of his own existence and action (ibid). He understood the subjectivity of a community as *quasi-subjective*, which he distinguishes from a "proper subject in acting" (ibid). This position is justified by the fact that the human person still remains the "doer" of the action and the one who exists (ibid). With respect to the way in which many "I's become a 'we', he wrote: "... people who experience their personal subjectivity, and therefore the actual plurality of human 'I's,' realize that they are a definite 'we' and experience themselves in this new dimension. . . In this relation the I' and 'you' find their reciprocal reference in a new dimension: they discover their 'I - you' through the common good which constitutes a new unity among them." (298.) But, as we read in *The Acting Person*, all this can only take place due to participation. For Wojtyła, participation is the "participation in the very humanity of another man" (294). This "humanity" he speaks of "is understood not as an abstract idea of man, but. . . as a personal self which in each occasion is unique and nonrecurrent." (288). When it comes to the I-you relation, participation also means "to turn to another 'I' on the basis of personal transcendence, to turn therefore to the full truth of that man, and in this sense to his humanity. . . not as an abstract idea of man, but as an 'I' to 'you'." (305-306.)

For culture is - for all intents and purposes - the knowledge of the self (*Memory and Identity*,

91-92). We understand this through the "reflection" of the transitive human action upon the agent: "... He [man] knows that he performs [a] certain action, and above all, he knows that he is the one performing the action. He meets and knows himself as the doer of his action. Man, therefore, becomes the subject and object of the action." (Mara, "Understanding Man as a Subject and as a Person," 88.) These self-perfecting acts, therefore, which remain in the agent (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 320) - become shared. For when a person who 'knows himself' via culture comes to know the other via participation, he begins to conceive of similarities. Nations therefore rely on culture and participation - hence, they are communities united by culture - as John Paul II declared in his address to UNESCO (13). But how can a culture, hitherto unshared, be known through participation? It has been brought up to me that as the intransitive action remains in the agent (Grenier *Thomistic Philosophy*, 320) - it cannot be 'shared' by a collective. This is true. Therefore, there must be a way in which a culture is known, so that a nation may be formed.

Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote: "habitus cognoscantur per actus et actus per obiecta" (*Summa theologiae*, II-II, q.4, a.1). Hence, a culture can be manifested by human action. Habit can be known through verbal or nonverbal cues, both of which are in common parlance referred to as communication.⁵¹ In fact, according to Modrejewski, in "The Personalistic Aspect of Truth and Dialogue in the Context of Karol Wojtyla's Philosophy: John Paul II's Ethics of Media," in *Communication Today* 7, no. 1 (2016):

Latin etymology of both terms 'communication' and 'community', i.e. *communicare*, means to connect, to make common as well as to discuss, to confer and to inform. That is why in the light of personalistic philosophy we do not understand the communicational act as only a transfer of information. It has also, or better it first of all has a community-making character." (8.)

According to Colosi, in "The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler," in *Karol Wojtyla's Philosophical Legacy*, ed. Bilias, Cirry, and McLean (The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2008):

⁵¹ See Gordon, G. N.. "communication," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*. I thank my mentor and our chaplain from bringing the need to include communication to my attention.

"It must be noted that the word 'incommunicable' looks as though it could mean 'unable to be communicated,' however, the incommunicable in personas is that in them which actually makes possible the deepest and most meaningful forms of communication."

Hence, the unshareable culture of the individual, once manifested, conceptualized, and communicated, becomes shared. Hence we can somewhat understand what someone like Deutch would synonymize culture with communication, as he did in *Nationalism and Social Communication* (62-63), or how Gellner would refer to a "system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating in Nations and Nationalism (7). But the unpersonalistic nature of their theories entail that their point of reference is not as much the human person as it is the social institution. Yet, there is a reason why I did not emphasize on language as I did in the past, or as Isidore did in *Etymologiae*. This is because it is not absolutely necessary for a nation to 'possess' its own language - that is, a 'native' language in which its identity is reflected and belongs to no other nation's genius. This is because a national culture could, in a particular way, be communicated in a language which is not considered 'indigenous' - although, this cannot always or immediately take place. This is why Grenier, in *Thomistic Philosophy* categorized its language as a factor of conservation of a nation instead of its production (1107). He wrote: "...the existence of nationality is so intimately connected with language that it will gradually disappear if it loses its language." (1110.) But, as Araneta noted in "The Problem of Cultural Diversity," in *Philippine Studies* 12, no. 2 (1964) - a foreign language can be inserted into the national genius. Even Isidore of Seville mentioned how nations have outnumbered languages: "Initio autem quot gentes, tot linguae fuerunt, deinde plures gentes quam linguae; quia ex una lingua multae sunt gentes exortae." (*Etymologiae* IX, 1:1). John Paul II wrote in *Memory and Identity*:

Peoples recount their history through narratives recorded in documents of many different types, through which national culture takes shape. The principal instrument of this process is language, with which man expresses the truth about the world and about himself, and he shares with others the fruits of his investigations in various fields of knowledge. In this way, communication takes place, leading to greater knowledge

of the truth and thereby deepening and consolidating the identities of the respective interlocutors. (86.)

Language therefore remains a necessity - although one must avoid being rigid in distinguishing between 'shared' and 'national' languages.

What therefore comes out of this communication? It is, as the Pope wrote, the *consolidation of identity* (ibid). This consolidation of identities is also manifested in the formation of a 'common good' - which facilitates the pronoun 'we' (Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," 298). This truth about the self is communicated - or made common (ibid., 300; Modrejewski, "The Personalistic Aspect of Truth and Dialogue in the Context of Karol Wojtyla's Philosophy," 8). The communication of the truth about the other person (Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," 305-306) allows a person "to choose what others choose and because they choose, and that his choice will be his own good that serves the fulfillment of his own person." (*The Acting Person*, 283). It then becomes common (ibid). For according to Malo, in "Novelty, Self-Determination and Communication as Essential Traits of Human Action: Reflections on K. Wojtyla's Theory of Action," in *Organon* 45 (2013) disambiguated the 'subjective': "That which in action is loved by another as good is considered a true good by he who cooperates, that is in it he discovers a common good."

This imagination, on the other hand, of a given nation manifests itself in its name, as Rees Davies in "Nations and National Identities" (572) discussed: "A nation becomes a nation when it believes itself to be such and gives itself a name to distinguish it from other nations or peoples." According to Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism*, "... nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units, suitable for the conditions now prevailing, though admittedly using as their raw material the Cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world." (49.) On the contrary, Llobera in *The God of Modernity* moved the goalposts of crystallization: "Having a proper name for a country was also important; it implied the crystallization of a sense of collective identity; in some cases it signified the existence of a state, in others that of a nation, and in

some cases both.” (82.) Billig provided a concrete historical example of this in *Banal Nationalism* (SAGE, 1993) when he mentioned that language differentiations (or the concept of languages) were not at all clear cut among the medieval peasants (29-32).

The theological significance of naming has been discussed by Loren Graham, “The Power of Names: In Culture and in Mathematics,” in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 157, no. 2 (2013): 229–34; and the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (2005), 113. According to Pope Francis in his General Audience (LEV, Jan. 5 2022):

In ancient times, the name was the compendium of a person’s identity. To change one’s name meant changing oneself, as in the case of Abraham, whose name God changed to “Abraham”, which means “father of many”, “for”, says the Book of Genesis, he will be “the father of a multitude of nations” (17:5). The same goes for Jacob, who would be called “Israel”, which means he who has “striven with God”, because he fought with God to compel Him to give him the blessing (cf. Gen 32:28; 35:10). But above all, naming someone or something meant asserting one’s authority over what was named, as Adam did when he conferred a name on all the animals (cf. Gen 2:19-20).

It is in naming that culture takes upon a “...‘national’ configuration. . .” as said by John Paul II in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (6.) For Biffi wrote in “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism” that the Christian *people* precedes Christian culture.

This refers to the naming of a culture, from ‘culture’ to ‘this’ culture to a ‘Christian’ culture. A person who names his own culture by the cognomen ‘Christian’ already presupposes his Christianity - even for ‘nominal’ or ‘cultural’ Christians who may not believe in God. His (or her) culture is no longer in reference to himself (or herself), but rather, to another reality (the Christ or Christians). He manifests his dominion over his culture by naming it - he acknowledges his ownership of the same. But at the same time, the dominion in itself (including, in some way, its manifestation) is indeed culture, as John Paul II declared in *Memory and Identity*:

Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea (Gen. 1:28). These words are the earliest and most complete definition

of human culture. To subdue and have dominion over the earth means to discover and confirm the truth about being human, about the humanity that belongs equally to man and to woman. (91-92.)

Indeed, this dominion over culture (by naming it, according to the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*) is in fact culture. Culture therefore takes upon itself more aspects than one. For example, *I am a Christian and I belong to the Christian people in virtue of my culture which from hence is 'Christian culture': this culture is mine as it is Christ's, and it is mine as it is that of the Christian people.* It is in this way that the culture becomes national, and that the nation is born, as John Paul II attested to in "Dialogue Between Culture for a Civilization of Love and Peace" and Cardinal Biffi mentioned in "Catholic Culture for a True Humanism". But at the same time, it is this act of subjugation of a particular collective culture that fully actualizes the nation. For according to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church [Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae]* [=CCC] 2158-2159:

(2158) Deus unumquemque eius vocat nomine. Omnis hominis nomen est sacrum. Nomen est personae icon. Observantiam exigit, tamquam signum dignitatis illius qui illud fert.⁵² (2159) In Regno, indoles arcana et unica uniuscuiusque personae Nomen Dei signatae pleno resplendet lumine.⁵³

What we find interesting are two specific statements made in these paragraphs. The first is "Deus unumquemque eius vocat nomine." (2159.) The second is "Nomen acceptum est nomen aeternitatis." (ibid.) It appears that the name given to a person is the name which God will use to call him (or her). From thence, one could somehow hypothesize that the name people give to their nation and culture constitutes it in its subject.

In "The Person: Subject and Community," Wojtyla defined participation as turning "to another 'I' on the basis of personal transcendence, to turn therefore to the full truth of that man, and in this sense to his humanity. . . not as an abstract idea of man, but as an 'I' to 'you'." (305-306.)

⁵²"God calls each one by name. Everyone's name is sacred. the name is the icon of the person. It demands respect as a sign of the dignity of the one who bears it. (2159) Nomen acceptum est nomen aeternitatis." (official translation)

⁵³"The name one receives is a name for eternity. In the kingdom, the mysterious and unique character of each person marked with God's name will shine forth in splendor." (official translation)

But this ‘turning to the truth (of the other)’ implies a knowledge of this concrete man - this he called ‘culture’ (*Memory and Identity*, 91-92). Culture, the discovery of the truth (about ourselves and about others), leads us to turn to the truth about the other person. As John Paul II wrote in *Memory and Identity* (93):

Of course human culture depends not only on our knowledge of the outside world, but also on our knowledge of ourselves, including our twofold gender: ‘male and female he created them’ (Gen. 1:27)... The second and third chapters provide further material that helps us to understand God’s plan. Here we read about man’s solitude, about the creation of a being like him, about the wonder felt by the man on seeing the woman drawn from his flesh, about the vocation to marriage, and finally about the entire history of original innocence, tragically lost through original sin — all this expresses the importance for culture of a love based on knowledge.

Our subjugation of the Earth is biblically manifested in the naming of the things around us, as the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2005), 113. Thence we can make a coherent connection between this specific application and the general principles which permit it. By our own practice of culture we come to know our own humanity, as John Paul II wrote in *Memory and Identity*, (91-92): and through participation we turn towards the truth about others, as Wojtyla wrote in “The Person: Subject and Community.” The confirmation of the truth about others is the essential element of a community, as Wojtyla noted in “The Person: Subject and Community” (294; 305). Upon knowing the truth of the other person and that of ourselves, we are able to find out our ‘commonalities’ and differences. Hence Augustine wrote in *De civitate Dei*: “...populus est coetus multitudinis rationalis rerum quas diligit concordi communione sociatus. . .” (XIX, 24).

Upon acknowledging our commonalities, we name them, acknowledging our ownership of such. And by naming them, they truly become our culture - even national culture in certain cases. In doing so, a nation exists inasmuch as it possesses a ‘culture’ (cf. John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 74; John Paul II’s Address to UNESCO,” 13). It is in this sense that the nation ‘makes’ its culture. In his *General Audience* (Rome: LEV, November 6, 2013); Pope Francis declared that

“...if on the one hand it is the Church that ‘makes’ the Sacraments, on the other, it is the Sacraments that ‘make’ the Church, that build her up, by generating new children, by gathering them into the holy people of God, by strengthening their membership.” The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [*Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae*] also stated:

Sacramenta, hoc duplici sensu, sunt «Ecclesiae»: ea sunt «per illam» et «pro illa». Sunt «per Ecclesiam» quia haec sacramentum est actionis Christi in ea per Spiritus Sancti missionem operantis. Et sunt «pro Ecclesia», sunt «sacramenta [...] quibus aedificatur Ecclesia», quippe quae hominibus, praesertim in Eucharistia, mysterium communionis Dei-Amoris, Unius in Tribus Personis, manifestant et communicant. (1118.)⁵⁴

In a similar way, the people of a given nation determine their culture - but at the same time, their determined culture determines them. Just like the example of the Church and its Sacraments, we can say that the *nation* makes its *culture* and *culture* makes the nation. For John Paul II wrote in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” that “[t]he ‘uniqueness’ of each culture is reflected more or less clearly in those individuals who are its bearers, in a constant process whereby individuals are influenced by their culture and then, according to their different abilities and genius, contribute to it something of their own.” (5.) We found earlier that *persons make a culture into ‘this’ particular culture by virtue of receiving an accident, both individually and collectively*. (John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures,” 4-5; Biffi, “Catholic Culture for a True Humanism”; Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 63.) But far from being mere individuation (Hughes, “Matter and Individuation in Aquinas,” 1-16) as Wojtyla hinted at in *The Acting Person* (74), we may connect this with the specific notion of human subjectivity - a person is determined by the knowledge of his action which he makes, which makes him an object of his own action (Mara, “Understanding Man as a Subject and a Person,” 288).

⁵⁴“The sacraments are ‘of the Church’ in the double sense that they are ‘by her’ and ‘for her.’ They are ‘by the Church,’ for she is the sacrament of Christ’s action at work in her through the mission of the Holy Spirit. They are ‘for the Church’ in the sense that ‘the sacraments make the Church,’ since they manifest and communicate to men, above all in the Eucharist, the mystery of communion with the God who is love, One in three persons.” (official translation.) I was first exposed to this subject through the notes of Dr. Pilar Rio pertaining to *Sacramental Theology: The Sacraments in General* (2019), which was sent to me as a class handout. I cannot access the original text, and so, I cannot cite it properly.

Wojtyla corroborated this in *Centesimus annus*, when he declared that the search for truth characterizes a nation: “Ex veritatis manifesta inquisitione quae in omnibus aetatibus renovatur, notio cultus et humanitatis denotatur Nationis.” (49-50.) Compare this with John Paul II’s address to the New Ambassador of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the Holy See, in *L’Osservatore Romano* 19, no.5 (2001): 9. He also corroborated this with different and more concrete words in *The Acting Person* (282-283) when he wrote communities of being such as nations “...have earned the name of natural societies because they inherently correspond to the social nature of man — each of its members expects to be allowed to choose what others choose and because they choose, and that his choice will be his own good that serves the fulfillment of his own person.”

This way, we may understand the nation to be a natural society, as stated in *Memory and Identity* (2005), 74. The fact that the nation is “...not a product of mere convention...” (ibid.) means that there is some objective ontological basis to the nation, that is, the subjectivity of man expressed through his culture as stated in his address to UNESCO (1980) and his social nature as stated in *The Acting Person* (1980), which can form ‘being-together-with-others’ as Wojtyla called it in “The Person: Subject and Community” (1979). This is also corroborated in other sources, such as the International Theological Commission, *In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law* (2009):

The inclination to live in society derives first of all from the fact that the human being has need [*sic*] of others to overcome his own intrinsic individual limits and to achieve maturity in the various spheres of his existence. But for his spiritual nature to fully flourish, a person has the need to form relations of generous friendship with his fellow human beings and to develop intense cooperation in the search for the truth. His integral good is so intimately linked to life in community that he enters into political society by virtue of a natural inclination and not by mere convention. (50.)

But appeals to truth may be hampered by the fact that this necessarily involves invention, as Gellner wrote in *Thought and Change*, 168: “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to

self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on. . . ”.

Gellner discussed the inverse relation between nationalist belief and what “actually happens” in *Nations and Nationalism* (41-41; 57-58) - declaring that nationalist belief holds that nations have an objective reality which they become conscious of, while his reality is that these objective realities are invented by this national consciousness (ibid). For him; nationalism is *essentially* the top-down "imposition of a high culture on society", which replaces preexisting ‘low cultures’ and local communities: this involves, of course, the atomization of individuals which occurs during the industrialization process - therefore, nationalism comes from industrial society (ibid., 35-38, 57).⁵⁵ His appeal to the replacement of low cultures and high cultures in *Nations and Nationalism*, 50-52; is not something I would question. Indeed, even if a large number of people could collectively imagine a culture and borders, there will be great variations in its application in every life, that several co-nationals may in fact become foreigners to each other. Nevertheless, owing to the fact that cultural differentiation (as Wojtyla hinted at in *The Acting Person*) rests primarily, if not solely, on the human individual; it might not even be of much consequence.

There will always be ‘others’ in the notion of community - what matters is whether or not they could retain this sense of community despite their differentiation. It would therefore be convenient for a State or another institution to enforce a high culture - although it would be enough to inculcate a general concept of place and culture. We are unable to ascertain if this happened among the masses in the Medieval World, as Marc Bloch mentioned in *Feudal Society*, vol. 2 (Routledge, 1993), 432 - although it is completely possible that knights and lesser clergy were able to have such conceptions (ibid. Cf. James, *Nation Formation*, 9-10). Some of us may recall how Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (6); pointed out a flaw in Gellner’s point: “Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretenses that he assimilates ‘invention’ to ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’, rather than to ‘imagining’ and ‘creation’. In this way he implies that

⁵⁵See also Brendan O’Leary, “On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism,” in *British Journal of Political Science* 27, no. 2 (1997): 198; and Judith O’Connell, *The missing ink: Re-evaluating socialisation and nationalism in the work of Ernest Gellner*, (Ireland, National University of Ireland, 2015), 16.

‘true’ communities exist which can be advantageously juxtaposed to nations.”

But another sense of the word ‘invent’ comes from its original Latin etymology of *invenire* or *to find* (*Collins English Dictionary*, s.v. “invent,” accessed Jan. 25, 2023). A nation’s creation, as Llobera, *The God of Modernity* (1994) explained, does not come *ex nihilo*. With respect to this ‘national selection’, let us think about what Miroslav Hroch wrote: “Intellectuals can ‘invent’ national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist. Karl Deutsch long ago remarked that for national consciousness to arise, there must be something for it to be conscious of.” (Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully Formed Nation,” in *Mapping the Nation*, edited by Gopal Balakhrisnan [Verso, 1996]. 79.)⁵⁶ This something, no matter how faint, can constitute a ‘national subject’ inasmuch as it is a community with a “shared culture,” which takes upon very broad senses as mentioned in the past. But we can make our synthesis between invention and objective truth from the vantage point of multiple identities.

The Prumiensian notion of “*genere moribus lingua legibus*,” which Bartlett discussed in “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” (47); necessarily included local variations of these categories, such as dialect and local custom. In fact, the existence of multiple national identities corroborates this fact, as Bartlett wrote with respect to a certain William of Malmesbury’s writings:

William of Malmesbury’s usage sometimes suggests that there may be *gentes* of more than one kind, specifically that one *gens* may be a subdivision of a larger *gens*. He is willing to call the Northumbrians, Mercians, East Anglians, and men of Kent *gentes*, but also refers continually to the *gens Anglorum*. A member of the “Kentish nation” (*gens Cantuariorum*) was also presumably a member of the “English nation,” hence having more than one ethnic identity simultaneously.⁵⁷

The Pope also affirmed that a *nation* can consist of various *peoples* in “To Build Peace, Respect Minorities” (3, 12). With respect to this, the Special Assembly of Oceania, *Jesus Christ and the Peoples of Oceania: Walking his Way Telling his Truth and Living His Life*, instrumentum laboris

⁵⁶Also quoted in James, *National Formation*, 8.

⁵⁷Robert Bartlett, “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” 43-44

(Vatican City: 1998) affirmed: “Most national societies are multi-cultural, with more than one national language. Notwithstanding this variety, there is a strong tendency in many countries to develop a national cultural identity.” (11.)⁵⁸

The nation overlaps other nations, which we decided to propose in light of Gellner’s [correct] objection in *Nations and Nationalism*. (Cf. Davies, “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World,” 572.) Although a nation can consist of several peoples, which are “distinguished” from nations, and which have their own distinct language and culture, these nations also have common cultures, which is corroborated by John Paul II’s mention of common elements in “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace” (7), it is preferable to approach this from the vantage point of the “open nation”. People retain their own ideal conception of what is signified by a certain term, e.g. national language, national culture, national traits, et cetera. In his World Day for Peace Message “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace,” he wrote of a ‘cultural equilibrium’ which can help facilitate openness in particularity: “This equilibrium, even while welcoming minorities and respecting their basic rights, would allow the continued existence and development of a particular “cultural profile”, by which I mean that basic heritage of language, traditions and values which are inextricably part of a nation’s history and its national identity.” (14.) His idea of a ‘cultural profile’ is that which can be open to change yet retain some mode of particularity, from which countries “...develop a national cultural identity. . .” as attested to by the *Instrumentum laboris* (Oceania). John Paul II mentioned *Filipino culture* and *Filipino cultural diversity* in several places - e.g. the message of His Holiness John Paul II to the President and to the People of the Philippines (LEV, 1981), pp. 3; 5. In the local context; the conciliar document of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines entitled “Go. . . I am with You Always” in *Acts and Decrees of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines* (CBCP, 2004) mentioned a ‘generic Filipino culture’ based on common societal structures and values (19). In a similar fashion, Miguel Bernad, “Philippine Culture and the Filipino Identity,” in *Philippine Studies* 19, no.4 (1971) argued for a “natural basis” regarding a unified ‘Filipino nation’ under Spain:

⁵⁸Henceforth this source will be referred to as *Instrumentum laboris* (Oceania).

Although they lived in a fragmented society, the people of these Islands belonged to the same race. They spoke different languages, but they belonged to the same linguistic family: the Malayo-Polynesian. And with the exception of the people of Mindoro and certain parts of Luzon and of southern Mindanao who had been converted to Islam, all the others had similar religious practices and beliefs, namely the religion which is called Animism. There was therefore a potential unity arising from racial and cultural similarities. (580.)

Of course, this Filipino culture or 'natural basis' might be too generic for certain tastes. I was once told by an associate of mine something to the likes of "it's too specific as to delimit the notion of Filipino to the Tagalog people or too general as to make everyone Filipino". But I digress. What I am trying to demonstrate is that certain stages in identity formation seem to appeal to the abstraction of concrete facts, which Paul James in *Nation Formation*, (145) and even Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism* (57-62) acknowledged (as quoted in Paul James, *Nation Formation*, 145).

But a generalized identity, although generalized, is still an identity. As Davies, "Nations and National Identities" (568) wrote: "Jellyfish may be difficult to handle; but at least they are alive. Nations likewise are always in a state of becoming; they are never static. The processes of national and ethnic self-classification never cease." Gellner himself, in *Nations and Nationalism* (55-56) wrote: "Admittedly, nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very selectively, and it most often transforms them radically." Not even territorial concepts are exempt from this. Michael Billig wrote in *Banal Nationalism* (SAGE, 1995) that places, not just nations, are imagined - that is, the extension of a place beyond what is immediately apprehended (74-76). It may be true that the islands which we call the Philippine archipelago exist as they are, with or without the Philippines, the Filipino, or the Filipino nation.

In a similar way, certain conceptualized and named commonalities may still exist without any concept of a Filipino nation. But this is not to say that it would remain one and the same. Without Filipino nationalism, there would probably still remain a place which we now know as

Luneta Park, that patch of land which existed before the birth of Rizal. But it would probably not have that Masonic obelisk by which we recognize it, which came from nationalist sentiment.⁵⁹ The same can be said for culture. There would still remain common societal structures and values (PCP II, par. 19), although they would remain in their self-reference. They might not even have a Christian character. Nevertheless, they would still exist - and they could be built upon and named. John Paul II asserted in his address to the New Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Holy See (Khartoum, January 22, 2001): “It is largely through culture that people acquire a sense of national identity.” We have already covered a sense of that statement in the previous section. But it becomes apparent that this also refers to a distinct stage, as Archbishop Marchetto demonstrated in his discourse “Religion, Migration, and National Identity”: “Based on this profound bond with their own roots – at the level of the family, territory, society and culture – people acquire a sense of their nationality, too, and culture takes on a national configuration, providing people with a national identity.”

So we see that people get a sense of nationality from culture, culture becomes national, and then it gives people another sense of nationality. This *national configuration* hitherto is understood as simply the naming of a culture. But Celles asked us whether this would render culture relative. If two Filipinos disagree on the nature and extent of Filipino culture, what therefore constitutes Filipino culture? Suppose that Filipino₁ and Filipino₂ both hold ‘Filipino culture’ to be the ‘formal cause’ of the ‘Filipino people.’ If Filipino₁ holds Filipino culture₁ to be X, and Filipino₂ holds Filipino culture₂ to be Y, even supposing that X and Y are not mutually exclusive, Filipino₁ and Filipino₂ would still belong to two distinct group identities (we did not mention individual identities, but I can apply it here). Or, in more technical terms, if (according to Celles) X and Y are theoretically (or perhaps *per se*) non-mutually exclusive, their self-reference and the group identity which corresponds would lead to mutual exclusion. He concluded his statement of the difficulty with a dichotomy between a logical path, which conglomerates all relevant cultural elements (suspending self-reference) into a *Filipino culture*, and the second option, which would

⁵⁹Wikipedia contributors, "Rizal Monument," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia (accessed December 26, 2022).

mutually exclude the identities based on these self-references.

We can enumerate the consequences of this problem. Firstly, the two parties associate themselves with a nation which they call Filipino. Secondly, they disagree as to what culture corresponds to their nation. We can already assume that they both believe themselves to belong to the same nation. But at the same time, they would objectively belong to two nations and two national identities with a similar name. We can resolve this difficulty by being selective in suspending self-reference. For we understand *nationalism* as the claiming of a culture (or a territory, ergo a nation) (*Imagined Communities*, 5-6). In this case, we will apply the significance of *naming* to this framework. Even if (as Celles argued) being selective with the logical application constituted philosophical dishonesty (as one pretends to be logical yet is selective with the facts); he admits that this is a human reality. How can we be selective in suspending self-reference?

Despite this obvious differentiation, there is at least some sort of unity when they refer to something like the 'Filipino' nation, be it a rather particular sense of place or history or both. We shall not mention the historical and quite modern evolution of the concept of the Filipino people: indeed, we are using the term 'Filipino' almost as a placeholder. But this unity would be quite generic, as was pointed out earlier. Therefore, it is convenient that a state would impose a high culture upon preexisting low cultures, (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 57). So there is a reality expressed in Gellner's formulation, that nationalism "...invents nations where they do not exist. . ." (*Thought and Change*, 168). Indeed, his assertion in *Nations and Nationalism* (57) that "Nationalism usually conquers in the name of a putative folk culture. . ." (while the opposite is what really goes on) is compatible with how a configured 'high' culture provides people with a 'national identity'. But it is important to make note of one important qualification. According to him, "It is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a wilful cultural *Machtbedurfniss*; it is the objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism." (46.) But it is not necessary (although it is helpful) to have a homogeneous culture in order to have a common conception thereof - in fact, people still remain free to retain their own ideal conception of what is signified by a certain term, e.g. national language, national culture, national traits, et cetera. In the United States of

America, there is debate concerning the role and the extent of the national constitution, especially when it pertains to gun ownership.⁶⁰ Roman Catholics disagree with one another as to whether the *Missale Romanum* (1970) constitutes what Pope Francis called the “unica expressio ‘legis orandi’ Ritus Romani. . .” in *Traditionis custodes* (Rome: LEV, July 16, 2021). But, in some way, they can refer to the same concept (the Roman rite).

Gellner wrote in *Thought and Change*, culture and other boundaries grant some sense of exclusivity and identification for “privileged” nationals. (167-168.) This *closing* of the nation would then provide some sort of mark or protection: John Paul II wrote in *Memory and Identity* that “every nation draws life from the works of its own culture.” (94.) According to John Paul II in his Message to the 50th General Assembly of the UNO (8), a nation’s culture “...enables [it] to survive the loss of political and economic independence.” (Cf. John Paul II’s address to UNESCO, 13; *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 435.) Yet, the *closure* or the *protection* of this nation actually begins when people start thinking of what distinguishes them from other nations (cf. *Memory and Identity*, 74). Saint Paul wrote in 1 Cor. 14:11 (NV) about the way he might view someone who speaks a different language: “Si ergo nesciero virtutem vocis, ero ei, qui loquitur, barbarus; et, qui loquitur, mihi barbarus.” The closure of the nation is the selection of a certain culture, and then the selection of another culture within this culture. In a friendly discussion with Celles, I remember a difficulty which was proposed as to whether my theory (as it was before the actual grunt work of theorization) would render culture [or the nation] arbitrary, leaving it without “real boundaries or distinctions.” For if Filipino culture is Filipino on the basis of it being received (and individuated) by Filipinos, and not because of its intrinsic ‘Filipinoness,’ then the notion of ‘culture’ would *become arbitrary and non-real*.

But this, he contended, conflicts the very fact that there are some elements of culture which are not mutually interchangeable. But this presupposes that culture, in order for it to be not mutually exclusive, has to refer to the qualifier ‘Filipino’; that is, a *conceptualized* nation. On the contrary, culture, in order for it to be non-mutually interchangeable, can simply refer to itself,

⁶⁰Williamson Evers, “Debating the Second Amendment,” in *Independent Institute*, Mar 19, 2002.

without reference to the concept of ‘Filipino’, which Niels Mulder expounded upon in “Filipino Identity: The Haunting Question,” in *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2013): 55–80. For example, the tradition of the Sinulog can refer to the individual who practices it, or to those who know they practice it, or a group which claims it for its own, i.e. Cebuano Catholicism or even the Catholic Church as a whole. In fact, there were such times when the Sinulog tradition (in practice) referred to itself or to a cultus distinct from the Catholic religion, as Julius Bautista wrote of in “An Archipelago Twice Discovered: The Santo Niño de Cebu and the Discourse of Discovery,” in *Asian Studies Review* 29, no.2 (2005): 194-196. Simply put, a culture can refer to its own individual practitioner or to any group which lays stake to it. This is not to say that the Sinulog tradition, even as self-referential, or referential to an animist cultus, did not refer to God (Acts 17:23). This brings us to the hotly debated question on the appropriateness of using the cognomen Catholic to refer to God: for example, in Eugenio Scalfari, “The Pope: How the Church Will Change” (*la Repubblica*, 1 Octobris 2013).

Benedict Anderson wrote that due to its perception as both “a historical fatality and... a community imagined through language”; he concluded that the nation “presents itself as simultaneously open and closed.” (*Imagined Communities*, 146.) He was referring to the process of naturalization of ‘citizens,’ but I concern myself with the naturalization of a practice or culture. Yet the exclusive nature of a nation is a point of contention, especially with the markedly negative viewpoints ascribed to ‘nationalism’ by Catholic thinkers. St. Paul VI defined *nationalism* as the exaltation or the self-isolation of a nation above other nations and the global community (“*propriae civitatis gloriatio*”) in *Populorum progressio* (62). In *Redemptor hominis* (15); John Paul II referred to a “*nimia suae gentis studia*” and states that it is not “*vera patriae caritas*” - the English translations provide the word ‘nationalism’. The “Final Statement” of the 2019 Plenary Session in *Nation, State, Nation-State* (2020) agreed with this definition of exclusivism and chauvinistic tendencies, which is manifested in (1) unjustified secessionism, (2) ethnic oppression, and (3) unjust acts of aggression, in addition to economic nationalism which limits free trade, and populism which rejects international cooperation, which it rejects on moral grounds (482-483).

In his Message for the 50th Anniversary of the Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations Organization for Education, Science, and Culture (UNESCO), John Paul II had this to say about "...excessive particularity and narrow and exclusive nationalism. . ." (4):

We should keep in mind that "every culture, as a typically human and historically conditioned reality, necessarily has its limitations" (Message for the World Day of Peace, 1 January 2001, 8 December 2000, n. 7; ORE, 20/27 December 2000, p. 10). Thus, "in order to prevent the sense of belonging to one particular culture from turning into isolation, an effective antidote is a serene and unprejudiced knowledge of other cultures" (7.)

Nevertheless, there is obviously something particular (if not exclusive) about the *boundaries* of a nation and culture, which is admitted by the Pope in the very same message in addition Card. Poupard and Ardura O.Pream, *Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture* (10), and the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (157), notwithstanding the various analyses made by theoreticians such as Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism* (168). We read in a previous section that "the *closure* of this nation actually begins when people start thinking of what distinguishes them from others."

So, in some sense, there must be some sort of 'exclusion' in order to make 'solidity'. But according to John Paul II in "Dialogue between Cultures" (5); "[t]he 'uniqueness' of each culture is reflected more or less clearly in those individuals who are its bearers, in a constant process whereby individuals are influenced by their culture and then, according to their different abilities and genius, contribute to it something of their own." The Pope conceptualized nations (and cultures) as open and living processes, somewhat like what Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 212; *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, 112 and Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation" (79) attest to. Smith and Hroch, in this particular context, refer to the *origin* of nations - but we are focusing on its ontological aspect and its relationship with culture.

After all, the nation is subjective - both in the ontological sense and also in the sense

that the human person can contribute to his/her own culture.⁶¹ In his World Day for Peace Message “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace,” he wrote of a ‘cultural equilibrium’ which can help facilitate openness in particularity: “This equilibrium, even while welcoming minorities and respecting their basic rights, would allow the continued existence and development of a particular “cultural profile”, by which I mean that basic heritage of language, traditions and values which are inextricably part of a nation’s history and its national identity.” (14.) John XXIII (*Pacem in terris*) with respect to the relationship between a minority group and a ruling nation, declared:

Rationi vero consentaneum est, ut iidem cives commoda quoque agnoscant, sibi ex peculiaribus hisce rerum adiunctis orta: ad ingenii sui nempe atque animi perfectionem non parum conferre cotidianam cum civibus alio civili cultu imbutis consuetudinem; cum ex hac paulatim ipsi virtutes, quae ad aliam gentem pertineant, in sucum et sanguinem suum convertere possint.⁶² (97.)

From thence we can understand how a friend of mine, reacting to certain statements made about Filipino identity, declared that “no one is gatekeeping the concept of the Filipino nation”. I will not assign a truth value to this proposition, but this speaks volumes about the openness of the nation concept.

Two Americans can disagree on the Second Amendment yet share a common understanding of the role of the American Constitution. Two Filipinos can disagree on Filipino culture yet be able to refer to the same place on the map. In this sense, Gellner is correct when he wrote in *Thought and Change* (168) that nationalism is not the self-awakening of a nation (but rather its invention). He is equally correct to define the nation in terms of nationalism, as he does in *Nations and Nationalism*, 53 - but with the qualification that it is the imagination of a limited and sovereign

⁶¹ John Paul II, “Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace,” 5; *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 435; Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 277; Matlary, “The Nation-State between the Scylla of Populism and the Charybdis of Identity Politics,” 319-323; et cetera.

⁶² “A more reasonable attitude for such people to adopt would be to recognize the advantages, too, which accrue to them from their own special situation. They should realize that their constant association with a people steeped in a different civilization from their own has no small part to play in the development of their own particular genius and spirit. Little by little they can absorb into their very being those virtues which characterize the other nation.” (official translation.) Of course, *Pacem in terris* is quite old.

community - as Anderson wrote in his book.

2.1.1 COMMUNITIES WITH CHOICES

Hence, we will return to the notion of a nation's very subjectivity. John Paul II wrote in *Laborem exercens* (1981):

Tertius veluti ambitus praestantium bonorum, qui in hac considerandi ratione — quae subiectum respicit laboris — occurrit, ad magnam illam pertinet societatem, cuius homo est particeps vi peculiarium nexuum, quos ingenii cultura et historia effecerunt. Quae quidem societas — etiamsi ad maturam formam nationis nondum pervenerit — non solum est cuiusque hominis grandis educatrix, licet modo indirecto (quoniam unusquisque in familia eas res eaque bona assumit, in quibus universus cultus humanus alicuius nationis consistit), sed etiam praeclara ostensio, historica et socialis, laboris ab omnibus generationibus patrati. (9.)⁶³

We find his statement to be rather ambiguous. In his discourse, the Pope did not specify what a 'mature form of the nation' is. If the 'mature form of a nation' is based on something like its *consciousness*, we would be hard pressed to explain why in *Memory and Identity* His Holiness also spoke of "young nations" which have not yet attained a comprehensive level of national consciousness, e.g. culturally diverse African nations (97-98).

Furthermore, this statement implies that there are societies which possess a culture but are not (yet) mature nations. We corroborate with the statement in the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* that for "every people there is in general a corresponding nation, but for various reasons national boundaries do not always coincide with ethnic boundaries." (387.) The *Compendium* cited a passage in John XXIII's *Pacem in terris* (94) for further context:

Quam ad rem peculiari modo pertinet ille publicarum rerum cursus, qui inde a saeculo

⁶³"The third sphere of values that emerges from this point of view—that of the subject of work—concerns the great society to which man belongs on the basis of particular cultural and historical links. This society—even when it has not yet taken on the mature form of a nation—is not only the great "educator" of every man, even though an indirect one (because each individual absorbs within the family the contents and values that go to make up the culture of a given nation); it is also a great historical and social incarnation of the work of all generations."

XIX ubique terrarum increbruit passim atque invaluit, quo fit ut homines eiusdem stirpis sui iuris esse velint atque in unam nationem coire. Quod cum pluribus de causis non semper effici possit, illud exinde oritur, ut gentes pauciores numero intra fines nationis alius stirpis saepe contineantur, atque ex hoc quaestiones magnae gravitatis exsistant.⁶⁴

We find a clear and fundamental distinction between the *gentes* and the *nationes* in this passage. This presents us with a categorical difficulty which cannot be further ignored: that is, the relation between the *people* and the *nation*. Previous chapters have already supported the definition provided in *Memory and Identity* (77). The problem is that this does not separate the *nation* from the *people* who have not yet *become a nation* or from a *particular minority group*, because the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church (387) likewise understands that minorities have the right to maintain their particular culture, while John Paul II in “To Build Peace, Respect Minorities” (no. 6) maintains that minorities have a right to their own *territory*. It would then follow that even a minority group can fit in this general definition of nation. Gellner’s objection in *Nations and Nationalism* with regard to the broadness of anthropological definitions of ‘nation’ seems to be appropriate in this context.

But the distinction between a *people* and a *nation* is nothing new. In his *Etymologiae* IX, 2:1; Isidore of Seville wrote: “Gens est multitudo ab uno principio orta, sive ab alia natione secundum propriam collectionem distincta, ut Graeciae, Asiae. Hinc et gentilitas dicitur. Gens autem appellata propter generationes familiarum, id est a gignendo, sicut natio a nascendo.”⁶⁵ Davies associated this “unum principium” with blood descent (“Nations and National Identities,” 570), but it is also possible to read this in light of what Isidore wrote prior to his definition in his *Etymologiae* IX,

⁶⁴“A special instance of this clash of interests is furnished by that political trend (which since the nineteenth century has become widespread throughout the world and has gained in strength) as a result of which men of similar ethnic background are anxious for political autonomy and unification into a single nation. For many reasons this cannot always be effected, and consequently minority peoples are often obliged to live within the territories of a nation of a different ethnic origin. This situation gives rise to serious problems.” (official translation.)

⁶⁵“A *gens* is a multitude which comes from one principle or is distinguished from other nations according to its collection, such as the Greeks, Asians. This is called *gentility*. But the *gens* is named as such according to the generation of families, i.e. being generated, just as a nation accords to being born.” (original translation.)

1:14: "...ex linguis gentes, non ex gentibus linguae exortae sunt."⁶⁶ Equally interesting is the approach between the gens-natio distinction, in which Isidorus identifies the etymology of both words. According to Louisa Foroughi, "Chapter 11 - 'If yt be a nacion': Vernacular Scripture and English Nationhood in Columbia University Library, Plimpton MS 259," in *Europe After Wyclif*, edited by J. Patrick Hornbeck II and Michael Van Dussen, (New York, USA: Fordham University Press, 2016), 265-287; Isidore "identifies the *natio* as a synonym of *gens*..." in his *Etymologiae*. This is substantiated in some form in an interesting passage in Isidorus Hispalensis, *Etymologiae* IX: "Genus autem a gignendo et prognerando dictum, aut a definitione certorum prognatorum, ut nationes, quae propriis cognationibus terminatae gentes appellantur."⁶⁷ (IX, 4:4)

But owing to the connection between *natio* and *nascendo* (2:1), the word *natio* also takes upon the consideration of birthplace: according to Jesse Hysell, "*Videbantur Gens Effera*": *Defining and Perceiving Peoples in the Chronicles of Norman Italy* (Western Michigan University, 2011), the *natio* also referred to somebody's birthplace, as attested to in the use of [*ex*] *natione* [*n.n.*] in correspondence and literature (159-160). But in some other places, it referred to clothing, place, politics, or language, such as in the case of the many relations written by Liutprand, diocesan bishop of Carmorra indexed by a certain Germana Gandino (ibid., 20). Let us compare this to Walter Card. Kasper's statement in "Peace – The Fruit of Justice: Theological Reflections on Peace Between Individuals, Peoples and Nations," in *Nation, State, Nation-State* (2020):

One's nation (from the Latin *nasci*, 'to be born') is the place where one was born, the homeland, the country of my paternal home where I was born and raised, which is familiar to me, where I feel at home, where people and things belong to me and I to them. When these familiar places are missing or dissolve, when family life crumbles, when there is no longer any tradition or culture of everyday life, when everything becomes simply functional and technical, the human world is no longer a place you would want to inhabit. (62.)

⁶⁶"...nations are taken from languages, not languages from nations." (original translation.)

⁶⁷"But a *genus* is named from begetting or birth, or a boundary of certain descents, like *nations*, which are called designated peoples by their proper affinities." (original translation.)

It could be appropriate to say that nations and peoples (*populi, gentes*) have a merely semantic distinction, with each term referring to one special aspect of the national community - but to apply this to the Compendium's statement would require a great amount of mental gymnastics. For semantical differences do not account for the categorical distinction for peoples-who-are-not-nations and peoples-who-are-nations. Neither can we reliably apply Anderson's *sovereign* imagination (*Imagined Communities*, 5-7) to this situation, for the Compendium acknowledges that minority groups are wont to seek independence (387).

Perhaps we could look at the context behind the Compendium's statement, which we find in *Pacem in terris* (94). This passage, which the authors of the *Compendium* used to justify their distinction between *people* and *nation*, clearly referred to a concrete and temporal situation (national unification) from which follows the creation of national minorities, which it places in the middle of the nineteenth century.⁶⁸ It is likely that the term 'nation' in this sense referred to a group which, as Deutsch put it, possessed political power and sovereignty (*Nationalism and its Alternatives*, 19). We can corroborate this speculation in the relevant passage in *Pacem in terris*, John XXIII wrote:

Etenim, cum omnes populi sese in libertatem vel vindicaverint, vel sint vindicaturi, ob eam causam futurum est, ut brevi neque iam populi exstent, qui in alteros dominantur, neque qui alienae pareant potestati. . . Homines enim, qui ubique sunt gentium, vel in civium ordine liberae cuiusdam civitatis iam censentur, vel in eo est ut censeantur; neque ullius stirpis communitas alienae ditioni iam esse vult obnoxia.⁶⁹

We find that this can explain the separation between nation and self-aware people in *Pacem in terris* and the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*. As nations take upon various forms according to specific contexts (Davies, "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World," 569), we can argue that the distinction of nation and people referred to a very specific instance of the *nation*. But I prefer fall back to Anderson's emphasis on the " style in which they

⁶⁸This is not purely modern, according to Rees Davies, "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World: An Apologia," in *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis* 34, no.4 (2004): 567-579.

⁶⁹"(42). . . Since all peoples have either attained political independence or are on the way to attaining it, soon no nation will rule over another and none will be subject to an alien power. (43) Thus all over the world men are either the citizens of an independent State, or are shortly to become so; nor is any nation nowadays content to submit to foreign domination." (official translation.)

[communities] are imagined.” (*Imagined Communities*, 6.) In a similar way, Paul James wrote in *Nation Formation* that “... both tribal and national communities are, *at different dominant levels*, constituted abstractly.” (6)

For example, in “To Build Peace, Respect Minorities,” John Paul II wrote: “In a nation made up of various groups of people there are two general principles which can never be abrogated and which constitute the basis of all social organization.” (3.) Note how he conceived of these “groups of people” as something which *constitutes* or *makes up* a greater *nation*. The conception of a so-called ‘people’ could be that which belongs to a *nation* and under a nation - while nations might belong to no other nation. But these borders are not rigid: we cannot use these as ideal ‘exemplary’ patterns to distinguish between a nation and a *mere* people. Heywood, in *Political Theory*, wrote that the *ethnic group* usually does not seek to become a nation - and therefore is distinguished from the nation due to this (100). This contrasts with the assertion made by Jones in *Ethnos Needs Logos: Why I Spent Three Days in Guadalajara Trying to Persuade David Duke to Become a Catholic* (Indiana, Fidelity Press, 2018) in which he wrote that every ethnic group aspires to become a nation (14). Hosle also discussed two definitions made in light of the distinction between nation and people, viz. the self-aware and politically active ethnic group, or the political community without a dominant ethnic group. (“Nation, State, Nation-State: An Overview,” 30.)

In ancient times, as stated before by James, Llobera, etc., it would have probably been a different manifestation. Even the English translation of *Pacem in terris* refers, when providing guidelines for minority groups, the “other nation” (official translation) or “*alia gens*” (no. 97). The difference between people and nation, as stated before, can be reducible to convenience. Even in the Middle Ages, Joannes de Fordun, *Chronica gentis Scottorum* 2.9; e.d Skene (Edinburgh, 1871–72), 1:42 wrote:

Mores autem Scottorum secundum diversitatem linguarum variantur; duabus enim utuntur linguis, Scotica, videlicet, et Theuthonica, cujus lingu[a]e gens maritimas possidet et planas regiones, Scoticae vero [linguae] montanas inhabitat et insulas ultiores. Maritima quoque domestica gens est et culta, fida, patiens et urbana, vestitu siquidem

honestā, civilis atque pacifica, circa cultum divinum devota, sed et obviandis hostium injuriis semper prona. Insulana vero sive montana, ferina gens est et indomita, rudis, et immorigerata, raptu capax, otium diligens, ingenio docilis et callida, forma spectabilis, sed amictu deformis, populo quidem Anglorum et lingu[a]e, sed et propriae nationi, propter linguarum diversitatem, infesta, jugiter et crudelis. [R]egi tamen et regno fidelis et obediens, necnon facilliter legibus subdita, si regatur.⁷⁰

According to Bartlett in “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” (49): “Fordun’s language suggests that the concept of ‘nation’ (*natio*), that apparent corner stone of the genealogical idiom, can be adapted to describe a political entity made up of more than one race—for he explicitly states that the highland and lowland gentes are part of one *natio*.” It is in this light that we can differentiate between ‘people’ and ‘nation’ while sticking with our earlier formal definition - that of categorical convenience.

But, upon a closer look (with respect to the problem of universals), this dichotomy can be resolved with an understanding of the difference between perfect and imperfect within a certain species, just like how *boy* and *man* (both belonging to the same species) are imperfect and perfect respectively, as Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* I-II, q.91, a.5. Can we connect the notion of “reaching the mature form of the nation” to the Thomistic notion of perfection? In order to do so, one must discuss the way in which a nation can *mature*, and then connect this with the Thomistic notion of perfection. Providentially, Wojtyła handed us the key to answering this in “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom” (1981), 11: “Freedom is the measure of the maturity of man and of the nation.”

⁷⁰Quoted in Bartlett, “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” 48. “But the mores of the Scots vary according to the diversity of their language, for they use two languages, Scotch, namely, and Teutonic - the ethnic groups of that latter language live in the coastal regions and plains, while the ethnic group of the Scotch language inhabit the mountains and the ulterior islands. The coastal people are also a domesticated ethnicity, and religious and faithful, patient and urban, being accordingly clothed, honest, civilized and peaceful, devoted to the Divine religion, yet always also inclined to resist attacks by their enemies. But the insular or montane ethnic group is a feral people, and untame, and rude, and immoderate, and capable of theft, labor-averse, with a teachable and clever inclination, a remarkable figure, but deformed clothing, always being hostile and rude towards the English people and language, but also to their own nation, according to their difference in language. Nevertheless, they are faithful and obedient to the King and Reign, furthermore they are easily subjected to the laws, if they are regulated.” (original translation.) Of course, Bartlett attested to the difficulty in translating the Latin *gens*. “If we do wish for word-for-word translation, there is the tricky issue of which English word to chose. As we have seen, in the space of one work by one author *gens* can be rendered ‘race,’ ‘nation,’ ‘people,’ ‘tribe,’ ‘stock,’ or ‘family.’” (44.)

One may recall that the revelation of the human *self* is manifested in “cognition, consciousness, freedom, and self-determination”, as Wojtyla wrote in “The Person: Subject and Community,” 277. But what is freedom? Benedict Anderson qualified in *Imagined Communities* (6-7) that the nation is not only limited, but it is also sovereign:

It [the nation] is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such religions, and the allomorphism between each faith's ontological claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.

It becomes clear that sovereignty is key to this discussion of nation. In his “Discorso alle autorità della Repubblica Popolare di Polonia,” he affirms that a nation “lives its own life authentically only when it experiences its own subjectivity in the whole life of the state; when it is aware of being the master of its own house, of participating in decisions through its – work, through its contribution.”⁷¹ This *subjectivity* can be understood with the precedent statement.: “To be a subject means to participate in the management of the public affairs of all the... people.” (ibid.)

He affirmed the link between national sovereignty and modernity in *Memory and Identity*, 122: “Similarly the rights of nations are linked with the Enlightenment tradition and even with the French Revolution. During this period, that is to say the eighteenth century, the right of nations to exist, to maintain their own culture and to exercise political sovereignty mattered greatly to many nations on the European continent and elsewhere.” He also made some claims about the relationship between the nation and State: “the nation cannot be replaced by the State, even though the nation tends naturally to establish itself as a State, as we see from the history of individual European nations including Poland.” (77-78.) But at the same time, he writes that the nation has an “exclusively historical meaning”, and writes about the existence of the nation in Medieval Poland

⁷¹Ioannes Paulus II, “Discorso de Giovanni Paolo II alle autorità della Repubblica Popolare di Polonia,” (Castello Reale di Varsavia, 8 Junii 1987), 5.

(83-87). The ‘sovereignty’ which Anderson discussed is modern (*Imagined Communities*, 6-7) - it refers to Gellner’s nationalist principle (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1). How can these be reconciled?

Providentially for us, in John Paul II, “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom,” we can see a comprehensive discussion on the general concept of freedom. He discusses the nuances off the modern notion of freedom, which “is shown for example by the frequency with which the term “freedom” is used, even though not always in the same sense, by believers and non-believers, scientists and economists, those who live in democratic societies and those who live under totalitarian regimes. Each one gives the term a special nuance, and even a profoundly different meaning.” (1.) But despite these nuances, he writes that “[a]s we seek to develop our service of peace, we must therefore understand clearly the real nature of this true freedom that is at one and the same time the root of peace and its fruit.” (ibid). He therefore declared that man “is free because he possesses the faculty of self-determination with regard to what is true and what is good. He is free because he possesses the faculty of choice.” (ibid., 5.)

We recall how Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person* that communities of being such as nations “...have earned the name of natural societies because they inherently correspond to the social nature of man—each of its members expects to be allowed to choose what others choose and because they choose, and that his choice will be his own good that serves the fulfillment of his own person.” (282-283.) We begin to see that this faculty of choice is the Wojtylan notion of self-determination. I do not contend the notion of the modernity of state sovereignty: instead, I appeal to the right to practice culture, which John Paul II referred to as the expression of a nation’s spiritual sovereignty in his address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations (8). Indeed, the connections he made between freedom, community, and culture cannot be understood without their mutual connection to the true and the good, which he made in *Memory and Identity* (91-92), “The Person: Subject and Community” (305-306), and “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom” (5).

The diversity of human cultures make it so that they are not always congruent with political communities, as Gellner wrote in *Nations and Nationalism* (54). But in *Centesimus annus* (Rome, LEV, May 1, 1911), John Paul II wrote: “Ex veritatis manifesta inquisitione quae in omnibus

aetatibus renovatur, notio cultus et humanitatis denotatur Nationis.” (49-50.)⁷² In fact, John Paul II writes that this very search for the truth is the most fundamental and perfect definition of human culture:

Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea (Gen. 1:28). These words are the earliest and most complete definition of human culture. To subdue and have dominion over the earth means to discover and confirm the truth about being human, about the humanity that belongs equally to man and to woman. (*Memory and Identity*, 91-92.)

The Pope also connected self-determination with “what is good” in “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom,” 1. It is in this sense that concepts such as laws, mores, etc fit in. Indeed, among the elements of culture, *Gaudium et spes* (1964), 53 mentioned the diversity of “religionem colendi moresque formandi, statuendi leges et iuridica instituta”, etc. Thinkers such as Aquinas and Augustine associated the *populus* with the law in *Quaestiones disputatae de spiritualibus creaturis* (a.9 ra.10) and *De civitate Dei* II, XXIX. (Minnerath mentioned this in “Nation, State, Nation-State and the Social Doctrine of the Church,” 70-71.)

Indeed, Bartlett, writing about medieval attitudes towards the rights of nations, asserted that although it was true that the medieval nation did not seek political sovereignty, there was a concept of its right to exercise its own culture and law:

A nation with its own language should have its own laws and customs; it did not insist on political sovereignty. Edward I ruled a number of countries, with their own languages and customs, just like Charles IV’s Holy Roman Empire. There was no requirement that political boundaries coincide with linguistic or legal ones, simply a recognition that each ethnic entity had the right to its own language and law. (“Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” 52.)

It is in the same sense that the Pope, in his Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United

⁷²“From this open search for truth, which is renewed in every generation, the culture of a nation derives its character.” (official translation.) See John Paul II, “Address of the Holy Father to the New Ambassador of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the Holy See,” in *L’Osservatore Romano* 19, no.5 (2001): 9.

Nations, along with his Address to UNESCO, mentions a “fundamental sovereignty” of the nation which is manifested in its culture. Indeed, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church *magnifies* the cultural dimension of sovereignty, which “takes on particular importance as a source of strength in resisting acts of aggression or forms of domination that have repercussions on a country’s freedom. Culture constitutes the guarantee for the preservation of the identity of a people and expresses and promotes its spiritual sovereignty.”⁷³ Indeed, we may see the importance of this spiritual sovereignty of a nation, whose. . .

... right to exist naturally implies that every nation also enjoys the right to its own language and culture, through which a people expresses and promotes that which I would call its fundamental spiritual "sovereignty". History shows that in extreme circumstances (such as those which occurred in the land where I was born) it is precisely its culture that enables a nation to survive the loss of political and economic independence.⁷⁴

Although it is true that, in this day and age, the concept of sovereignty has long evolved from the *mere* right to practice its law and culture; as Davies was quick to point out in “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World,” nations take upon various forms according to their human contexts (569). It is equally true that the conception of what a nation *is* has changed throughout the years: as Davies put it, “Nations likewise are always in a state of becoming; they are never static. The processes of national and ethnic self-classification never cease.” (568.) Bartlett even wrote of the quadruplex ‘customs, laws, language, and descent’ criteria used to determine a nation in “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” (47). We can compare this with some modern definitions, such as Anderson’s in *Imagined Communities* (5-7).

The nation’s experience of “its own subjectivity in the whole life of the state”, which John Paul II wrote about in his “Discorso alle autorità della Repubblica Popolare di Polonia,” 5; can be understood with this fundamental sovereignty. “To be a subject means to participate in the management of the public affairs of all the. . . people.” (ibid.) It is true that he wrote in a

⁷³ *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 435.

⁷⁴ Ioannes Paulus II, “Address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations,” 8.

modern context. But did this not reflect on his notion of spiritual sovereignty? Bartlett affirmed in “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” (53) that a medieval *natio*, in many instances, practicing its own culture and laws (even within the bounds of a different political entity), was satisfied - it appears that they did, in some way, *decide for themselves* with respect to the *true* and the *good*, as John Paul II mentioned in “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom” (6). The “...gauge and the emblem. . .” (using Anderson’s term with regard to the state) of the ‘freedom’ of nations such as medieval Wales consisted of the recognition of its laws, as Bartlett mentioned in “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” (52). Even in biblical times, the Jews were adamant about the preservation of their own law. In the trial of Jesus we read of the respect allotted to Jewish law in the Roman Empire. This is consistent with the notion of *jus gentium*.⁷⁵ Indeed, as Augustine says and Aquinas records in his *Catena aurea*, Ioannes 19, lec.4:

Pilatus autem eorum legem non timuit ut occideret; sed magis filium Dei timuit, ne occideret. Nunc vero non sic potuit contemnere caesarem auctorem potestatis suae, quemadmodum legem gentis alienae; unde subditur Pilatus autem cum audisset hos sermones, adduxit foras Jesum, et sedit pro tribunali in loco qui dicitur lithostratos, Hebraice autem gabbatha.

Pilate’s *contemnere legem gentis alienae* was striking enough to be included in the commentary. John 18 mentions that the Jewish customs were generally respected, and in some cases the Jewish people (or their representatives) had a say in certain matters: additionally, Pilate acquiesced to their demands, fearing a riot.

Can one say that the Jewish representatives participated (or felt entitled to do so) in the management of certain public affairs (e.g. the imposition of death and amnesty), at least for themselves? Did they not, as we read in “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom”, exercise their ‘faculty of choice’, that is, to choose the death of the Messiah and the amnesty of Barrabas? We do not intend to *prove* the existence of modern nationalism in earlier times, as Gorski intends to do for the early modern age in “The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of Modernist Theories of

⁷⁵Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 95 a. 2; The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “*jus gentium*,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (12 Apr. 2018).

Nationalism,” in *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 5 (Mar., 2000). Neither are we attempting to make further connections between the modern iteration of nations we have and medieval ones, as Davies in “Nations and National Identities,” 571-572 intended to do - but, like him, we aim to demonstrate, without denying “...the distinctiveness of modern forms of nationhood and national identity. . .” (ibid): that the imagination of a nation in its very specific time-based context *exists*, and that John Paul II does not limit the notion of *freedom* to Westphalian sovereignty. As we read in his address to the Fiftieth General Assembly of the United Nations (1995), 8:

This fundamental right to existence does not necessarily call for sovereignty as a state, since various forms of juridical aggregation between different nations are possible. . .

There can be historical circumstances in which aggregations different from single state sovereignty can even prove advisable, but only on condition that this takes place in a climate of true freedom, guaranteed by the exercise of the self-determination of the peoples concerned.

This perspective can allow for new interpretations of a so-called ‘sovereign’ imagination, both for ancient and modern nations. Although it is not Anderson’s definition of sovereignty, we believe that this principle is what enables notions such as state-sovereignty and Gellner’s nationalist principle.

Nations are not completely separated from other community manifestations. They can be distinguished from other communities, but never completely divorced. They are, in some way, both *communities* and *aspects of community*. According to Benedict Anderson, the distinction between a nation and other communities can be identified by the object of their sense of being: “Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.” (*Imagined Communities*, 6.) Paul James, also referring to this same passage, wrote in *Nation Formation* that “... both tribal and national communities are, *at different dominant levels*, constituted abstractly.” (6) This statement is correct, although we must caution ourselves against being rigid with these stylistic distinctions. Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person* (1980) that “...the ‘community of being’ always conditions the ‘community of acting,’ and so the latter cannot be considered apart from the former.” (279.) But even compared to the family we can see that

nations are sometimes conceived as genealogical (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 78).⁷⁶ Just because a community is imagined in one certain style (as Anderson put it: *Imagined Communities*, 6-7) does not mean that it cannot or is not imagined in another. A family can be imagined as a nation, as a corporation, as a school, or in Catholic terms - a 'domestic church' (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2685). The human race has been conceived of in various places as a family - such as in Benedict XVI's World Day for Peace Message titled *The Human Family: A Community of Peace* (LEV, 2008).

But as culture is contingent on human rationality, as Modrejewski and Galik, "Karol Wojtyla's Personalistic and Universalistic Philosophy of Culture," (100) state, would this mean that a school or a university is a nation, because of its school culture? In order to remain consistent, one must concede this objection. A student interest group exercises the right to its own activities (and culture) within the laws of the institution. The university, most of the time, has some form of self-determination regarding its curriculum and its own culture, including its identity and structure. Each of them have a say, and each of them exercise some sort of culture, which, according to John Paul II in his address to the 50th General Assembly of the UNO, manifests its "...fundamental spiritual 'sovereignty'." (8.) Many of them can name their culture as specific to themselves: Dragon⁷⁷ culture, Pasig culture, Tagalog Culture, etc. If we are to take what Anderson wrote at face value, then we could determine that a school or a university is imagined in a style which would differentiate them from a nation. For all intents and purposes, we will deviate (and have already done so) from Anderson's definition - the style in which a nation is imagined, as I have pointed out earlier, is the acknowledgment of its own culture and community. But we have not yet comprehensively touched on something which is so important to the nation-concept yet hidden in plain sight. In John Paul II's address to the 50th General Assembly of UNO, he declared:

But as a result of the concrete historical conditioning of this same nature, they are necessarily bound in a more intense way to particular human groups, beginning with

⁷⁶My friend brought this up in a conversation. Thanks, Billy.

⁷⁷The student body of the University of Asia and the Pacific refer to themselves by this name. I do not need to cite a source, since I am (at least, as of this moment) a student of the UA&P.

the family and going on to the various groups to which they belong and up to the whole of their ethnic and cultural group, which is called, not by accident, a "nation", from the Latin word "nasci": "to be born". This term, enriched with another one, "patria" (fatherland/motherland), evokes the reality of the family. (7.)

Indeed, the distinction between communities which Wojtyla made in *The Acting Person* was that of a community of being (which he also called natural) and a community of acting (278-279; 282-283). For example, we think that we were born in a nation, but not a school. Gellner denounced the belief that *nationalism* is 'natural' and that men have nationalities (like they have names and blood types) in *Thought and Change* (150-151) except in a certain context (ibid.) But this must be put in its proper context - we are not speaking of nationalism as the belief that nations should be one with states, as Gellner puts it in *Nations and Nationalism* (1): rather, we are talking about the conceptualization of a culture.

For Wojtyla, the community does not signify a mere common action and existence, because it does not signify "the plurality of subjects" in acting, but rather their "specific unity", as we read in "The Person: Subject and Community" (289). In doing so, he defined community according to this "specific unity" which, according to him, "arises as a relation or a sum of relations existing among them [persons]." (ibid.)⁷⁸ Actions can stop, states can be dissolved. But the personal and relational aspect of the human community remains forever constant. We can imagine our community as anything we want it to be - provided that we believe it hard enough. According to Rees Davies, "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (572): "Common identities are often relational; in other words, they are created over and against other groups." We demonstrated how a sense of nationality was simply the acknowledgment of sharing a common culture, territory, and

⁷⁸Wojtyla asserted that societies are exclusively a "...complex of relations..." and therefore, an "...accidental being...". ("The Person: Subject and Community," 289.) We can demonstrate this as we recall in Hugon's *Cursus philosophiae* that *relat* is numbered among the predicaments (I, logica minor, 1:1.7). Therefore, we may identify the notion of society as belonging under *relat*. However, although Wojtyla admits that the terms community and society are used interchangeably: in "The Person: Subject and Community", he differentiates between society and community on the basis of perspective, and even goes as far to declare that "...[w]e may even say that society or social groups achieve their reality or become themselves through the community of their members." (290.) The Acting Person contains another exposition on this distinction, stating that society "objectivizes the community or a number of mutually complementary communities." (278.)

community - manifested in the proper name. This is, indeed, the sense of sovereignty according to the writings of John Paul II in “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom”. This is not to say that Anderson was wrong. This is, quite simply, the dialectic between Wojtyla’s philosophy and Anderson’s formulations. We return full circle to the basic definition mentioned two sections back: *the sense of nationality is simply a sense of existing ‘by’ culture and ‘for’ culture*, similar to what John Paul II said a nation does in his address to UNESCO (13). Indeed, the limitation is expressed in the fact that it claims its culture, which is the proper accident of the individual as Wojtyla attests to in *The Acting Person* and his address to UNESCO as Pope John Paul II. Its sovereignty is expressed in the fact that it has a culture - and therefore, it has choice. But most of all, the nation is imagined as a community, according to Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities* (5-6).

It is in this sense that we introduce the concepts of community and society. The nation “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” (ibid). The sovereignty of our nation concept manifests itself in its very act of limitation, its acknowledgment of collective choice. But based on the principles of Karol Wojtyla’s thought, the maturity of a nation can be thought of not as based only on the solidification of its culture as it is on its ability to, in the words of the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (157), “*balance between particularity and universality*”. This is because, firstly, civil society is defined by Wojtyla as a quasi-subject, “...because even when the being and acting is realized together with others it is the man-person who is always its proper subject.” (*The Acting Person*, 277.) In his discourse “To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom” (2) the Pope declared: “There is no true freedom [w]hen the freedoms of individuals are absorbed by a collective group ‘denying all transcendence to man and his personal and collective history’ (*Octogesima adveniens*, 26).” This becomes relevant once we recall that freedom is “the measure of the maturity of man and of the nation.” (“To Serve Peace, Respect Freedom,” 11.)

If that is the case, then culture is acquired later on in life. For example, according to John Paul II’s address to UNESCO (1980):

The nation exists "by" culture and "for" culture, and it is accordingly the main educative influence ensuring that men can "be more" within the community. It is that community which has a history going beyond the history of the individual and the family. It is also in that community, in terms of which every family acts as an educator, that the family commences its educational task with the simplest thing first, by imparting language and thereby enabling man in his early years to learn to speak, and thus to become a member of the community formed of his family and of his nation. (13.)

But the nation's very etymology, as stated in John Paul II's address to the 50th General Assembly of UNO (7), comes from the Latin word for 'birth.' We are born into a nation, yet a nation consists of something the human person must develop later on in life. Nevertheless, just as the naming of a culture determines its existence in both past, present, and future, something acquired later in life can also become 'inborn'. Communities of being such as nations are considered such on the basis of the communal existence of its people more than a certain shared 'task', as Wojtyla wrote in *The Acting Person* (278-280). We learned how immanent actions such as culture (and knowledge of self - *Memory and Identity*) are associated less with the transitive action (*actio*) and more with a person's *qualitas* by Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 299. The immanent action or the *qualitas* is assumed into the very being of its agent for its perfection (151, 302); unlike the transitive *actio* which is viewed as the perfection of the patient (302). The immanent action becomes less of what one does and more of what one 'is.' This is what allows us to view a time-based culture in light of 'being born.'

For even without having recourse to the scholastic categories we can understand how Herodotus wrote of "kinship" in *The Histories*, trans. A. D. Godley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1920), 8.144: "...the kinship of all Greeks in blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, and the likeness of our way of life, to all of which it would not befit the Athenians to be false." Isidore of Seville likewise wrote in *Etymologiae* IX, 2:1; "Gens est multitudo ab uno principio orta. . .". ("...a *gens* is a multitude coming from one principle. . ." - original translation.) This kinship following a 'common' conceptualization of a

similar concept can even take upon an everyday dimension. According to Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (SAGE, 1995), 93-100; nationals seldom forget their national identity because there are constant and daily reminders of such. As a concrete example; Atsuko Ichijo and Ronald Ranta, in *Food, National Identity, and Nationalism: From Everyday to Global Politics* (Palgrave, 2016) discussed the relationship between this ‘banal’ nationalism and mundane things:

We all notice the waved national flags, but rarely do we observe the many unwaved flags, or for that matter other banal national symbols such as coins, buildings, spaces and monuments. These banal national symbols are a constant reminder of the nation. For the most part, the food images we are exposed to on a daily basis, from food labelling and marketing strategies used by governments and corporations to advertisements and restaurants, constantly remind us that we live in a nation with particular characteristics.

(6.)

But regarding the nation’s ‘communal nature’; it remains unclear as to what we could make of Gellner’s objection in *Nations and Nationalism*, (54): “Any definition of nations in terms of shared culture is another net which brings in far too rich a catch.” This is true regarding the modern nation. But for the general concept of nation, which takes upon many forms (as Rees Davies pointed out in “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World”); we ought to receive this bounty.

With this logic, it becomes possible for us to allow for a conception of the student body (or even the entire corpus) of an institution as a nation, which I might attempt to demonstrate in the future. Let us use the University of Asia and the Pacific as an example. The UA&P are quite aware of their particular culture - it is even mentioned in their own Student Handbook (2021):

As bearers of the university’s institutional culture, all members of the University community (e.g., academic personnel, non-academic/administrative personnel and students) are expected to project the collective culture through their overall [deportment] and bearing. Each one is free to express personal style² or individuality for as long as he or she is able to reflect the university’s culture which subscribes to the standards of simplicity, elegance, decency and respect for others. (110.)

In a final paper I wrote for a class, entitled *The School as Moral Person* (2022); I floated the idea of a school being a nation, based on my interpretation of John Paul II's ideas. But even while using Anderson's threefold imagination of a *sovereign and limited community* (*Imagined Communities*, 5-7); it could still be possible to develop a national identity among the University corpus. According to Rees Davies, in "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (572): "Common identities are often relational; in other words, they are created over and against other groups." The Thomist may infer that the diversity of cultures in a 'horizontal' sense, can also translate to a varying 'concreteness' of cultures in a 'vertical' sense: cultures closer to the individual person are often those which are most noticed by their nationals, such as when nationalist sentiment in early modern France was "both rudimentary and regionally specific", being limited to provinces or cities. . . " as Giddens noted in *The Nation-State and Violence* (University of California Press, 1985), 271. See also *The Historical Construction of National Consciousness: Selected Writings*, edited by Gábor Klaniczay, Balázs Trencsényi, and Gábor Gyáni (Central European University Press, 2022), 85–108.

National identities overlap one another, as Davies wrote in "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (572), and being *accidental beings*, exist only in the human subject, as Wojtyła attested to in "The Person: Subject and Community" (289). A nation can refer to something we would call a city, a province, a region, so on and so forth. Robert Bartlett discussed the overlapping use of the term *gens* in reference to the English and Kentish *nations* in "Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity" (43-44). It is completely possible, more so nowadays, to conceive of Pasig culture; Manila culture; Tagalog culture; lowland culture; and Filipino culture - each identity being conceptualized "...over and against. . ." each other, as Rees Davies noted in "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (572). As John Paul II declared in his address to the 50th General Assembly of the UNO: people are "necessarily bound in a more intense way to particular human groups, beginning with the family and going on to the various groups to which they belong and up to the whole of their ethnic and cultural group, which is called, not by accident, a 'nation', from the Latin word 'nasci': 'to be born'." (7.)

Chapter 3

BECOMING A NATION

“The history of every individual, and therefore of every people, possesses a markedly eschatological dimension. . . Admittedly, it is people and not nations that have to face God’s judgement, but in the judgement pronounced on individuals, nations too are in some way judged.” (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 85-86.)

The nation is now ever present and is limited only by the scope of the culture which it professes. But this collective acknowledgment of common existence should come with the notion of community, which is when our theory gets tested by the nuances of history. According to Benedict Anderson, one of the many paradoxes which surround nations and nationalism is “The objective modernity of nations to the historian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.” (5.)

A nation exists when people become aware of its existence - comprehending the reason why it exists and conceptualizing it with a name (cf. Davies, “Nations and National Identities, 572). Yet those who conceptualize their nation extend the point of origin beyond the actual point in time of its existence. Gellner wrote in *Thought and Change* (168) that “Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. . .”. Anderson criticized Gellner’s conflation between *invention* and *falsity* in *Imagined Communities* (5-7). Yet, it does not *really* address the crux of the problem - whether there is truth in the national conception. Aquinas referred to truth as “..adaequatio rei et intellectus” - the *agreement of the thing and the intellect*, in *Summa theologiae* I (q.16 a.1). Yet it seems that when we put the origin of the nation before it was conceptualized by the primordial peoples who our nationals claim for themselves, there is no

adaequatio rei in tellectus. Yet, it is completely within the realm of truth to view Filipino ‘culture’ as something which existed around the same time as the Filipino ‘nation’. But at the same time, it can be conceived as preexistent.

How can this be possible? According to John Paul II, “...nations have an exclusively historical meaning.” (*Memory and Identity*, 86.) Did John Paul II fail to speak the truth when he wrote that Poland’s baptism made it “exist in history”? (87.) But if we are to reconcile our view on a nation’s *existence* with John Paul II’s statement on Polish history, we will be hard-pressed to demonstrate that Poland had a conception of its nationhood from the date of its baptism - this becomes a point of contention. Theorists such as Gellner contended that industrial processes (such as “labor migration”) allowed peasants to comprehend their culture, which they previously “...took for granted. . .” (*Nations and Nationalism*, 60-62).

But this does not mean that no one was aware of their culture (or nation) before these industrial processes. In *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community* (1996), 9-13; Paul James discussed the medieval concept of ‘natio’, which evolved from groups of soldiers and merchants, to university divisions, up to the ruling class (for the sake of which blood was shed). Based on this historical background, James concluded that “[t]he Latin concept of *natio* had a shifting meaning, designating various associations of people. . .”. (ibid.) Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13-19 wrote more comprehensively about the various uses and meaning of the word ‘nation’ in pre-modernity. (For a summary of his work, see Tural Ismayilzada, “Book Review: Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality by E.J. Hobsbawm,” [Hacettepe University, 2018].) A *natio*, no matter how class-exclusive it may be, is still imagined as a limited community (although, the limitation might overextend the number of imaginers).⁷⁹ The only distinction it may have with Benedict Anderson is its lack of transcendence: as Llobera noted in *The God of Modernity*, nations were conceptualized by small numbers of the population. It is in this sense that I agree with Paul James, when he wrote that:

⁷⁹Cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 5-7.

... social forms which have a recognizable continuity can be constituted through practices with markedly different content and set at a different point in world time. Hence, in terms of the speculative thesis presented here that national association only becomes possible within social formations constituted in the contradictory dominance-in-intersection of relations of disembodied extension, the *natio* is different from but continuous with the modern nation. (*Nation Formation*, 192-193.)

Although this relied on the fact that we do not know of the congruence of national awareness between the masses and the lesser clergy, as Bloch mentioned in *Feudal Society* 2. Nevertheless, James' extrapolation, which sets a 'common ground' behind the existence of medieval national consciousness and modern national identity within the same 'form' but different 'content' (16; 192-193), satisfies us. Aquinas summarized national identity in the statement '*ego ita sicut et illi.*' found in *Super II epistolam ad Corinthios lectura*, ed. Ricardo M. Roman, (Buenos Aires, 1998), 11:1.5. There was an understanding of this concept of 'national community' before there was any notion of the Westphalian state.

Anthony Smith wrote in *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (106-114) about the existence of ethnic or national communities in the ancient world. In *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (13) he contended that the nation is based off the *ethnie*, which is "*a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among the elites.*" But as for the nation, Smith defines the nation as "*a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties*" and writes that the nation is an inclusive, mobilized, transcendental community.⁸⁰ It is in this way that Smith, who mentions the existence of ancient and medieval parallels between nation and national identity, differentiates between the *nation*, which is modern, and the *ethnie*, which is preexistent. (Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* [1988],

⁸⁰Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72, no. 3 (1996): 447; Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 49; 166-168; 212-216; 223, 192.

212-214, 3-7, 11-13; Smith, "The Nation: Real or Imagined?" in *People, Nation, and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism*, ed. Mortimer [London, I.B. Tauris, 1999], 36-9; Smith, "The Origins of Nations," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996]; cf. Davies, "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World," 569.)

Hroch, who defined the nation as "a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships...and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. . ." ("From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation," 79); also wrote that it is formed by a "complicated process" which dates back from the Middle Ages, for particular nations (ibid). Anthony Smith attacked a tendency among many to think of nations as static entities (*The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 212; *Myths and Memories*, 112). I agreed with him when he wrote that "...nations are not static targets, to be attained once-for-all. They are processes, albeit long-term ones." (*The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, 212.) But his *ethnie*-nation distinction is not without its problems. In "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (2003), Davies disputed the foundations of this distinction between nation and *ethnie*, writing that this commitment of "...definitional exactitude. . ." through the "...creation of a private term. . ." manifests a "...present-minded arrogance. . ." and sacrifices "...good historical sense. . .", which "...surely demands that we recognise that what appear to be 'nations' and 'national identity' in common parlance take a variety of forms according to the social, economic, political and cultural context of any period." (569.) This seems to be preferable and in much better taste. Smith himself admitted that the differentiating factors between *ethnie* and nation are not absolute: "To deny the title of 'nation' to communities that lacked economic unity or full legal rights for all members would be unduly restrictive and posit a rather static view of the nation as a target to be attained once and for all, rather than a set of processes and a growth of consciousness, as I am suggesting." (*Myths and Memories of the Nation*, 112). It is in this sense that I concur with Davies, especially when he correctly identifies self-consciousness (and a name) as the becoming factor of a nation. This is not to mean that Smith's *ethnie*-nation distinction is wrong. I simply do not find it necessary.

But, according to Paul James in *Globalism, Nationalism, Tribalism: Bringing Theory Back In* (2006), the *natio* of the medieval occupational association only had one commonality with the modern nation - that they “were abstracted communities forced to examine basic issues of embodiment, temporality and spatiality.” (239.) Indeed, as Llobera discussed in *The God of Modernity* (Routledge, 1994); the medieval national identity was generally limited to a small sector of the population (81.) But this will be hard to determine, as Marc Bloch mentioned in *Feudal Society*, vol. 2 (Routledge, 1993):

The growth of national sentiment was hardly possible among the most educated men. All that survived of culture worthy of the name took refuge till the twelfth century among a fraction of the clergy, and there was much in this legacy to alienate these intellectuals from what they would probably have treated as antiquated notions. . . In order to discover the obscure foreshadowings of nationalism we must turn to groups of men more simple-minded and more prone to live in the present; not so much, indeed, to the popular masses, of whose state of mind we have no documentary evidence, as to the knightly classes and that half-educated section of the clergy which confined itself, in its writings, to reflecting with sharper emphasis the public opinion of the time. (432.)

As Bloch stated, we have very little idea what the common folk thought about the nation. There is legitimate dispute concerning the role (or lack thereof) of intellectuals in national identity formation: According to Paul James in *Nation Formation* (1996) - national sentiment “...was voiced, for the most part by intellectuals and later by the intellectually trained, well before the gradually consolidating and naturalizing conjunction of nation and state gained momentum during the nineteenth century.” (45.)⁸¹

We remember how Giraldus Cambrensis wrote to Innocent II about the nationhood of the Welsh: “No[v]eritis autem proculdubio inter pro[v]incias, nostram quidem et Cantuarieusem Londonie pro[v]inciam cum viii comitatibus interiacere, et populos nostre pro[v]incie, natione, lingua, legibus et raoribus, iudiciis et consuetudinibus discrepare.”⁸² Bishop Gerald was, in a

⁸¹ A reviewer of my earlier work wrote that I failed to point that out.

⁸² Gerald of Wales, *Invectiones* 2.7; edited by W. S. Davies, *Y Cymmrodor* 30 (London, Honourable Society of

great way, the clerical self-obligated *representative* of the *Welsh people*. Another example, more well-known, is when the Jewish intellectual elite instigated the crowds to condemn Jesus Christ, and often spoke on their behalf, as made clear in John 18 and Matthew 27. Indeed, Azar Gat and Alexander Yakobson noted in *Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge University Press, 2013) that “...in the premodern phase the clergy, with its massive spread throughout the countryside, were chief proponents of the national cause.” (225.)

According to them, unlike their ecclesiastical superiors, “the lower clergy, close to the people in background and at the same time linked to the wider world through education and Church channels of information, were as a rule the most effective popular amplifiers of the national sentiment heavily loaded with religious significance.” (206.) As Josep Llobera wrote in *The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Routledge, 1994): “Wars and travelling were the two main factors accounting for the awakening of national identity. It was in the context of these two activities that contacts were made and cultural and linguistic differences noticed and registered, to be elaborated ideologically later on in the form of stereotypes of national character in the literature of the period.” (38.) But whether or not the medieval commonfolk held national sentiments like the lower clergy (Llobera, *The God of Modernity*, 81); these constraints did not make them any less national - according to Johan Huizinga, “Patriotism and Nationalism in European History,” in *Men and Ideas: History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance*, trans. Holmes and van Marle, ed. Huizinga, (New York: Meridian Books, 1959):

... whether the relationship was large or small the basis for the emotion embodied in *natio* was the same everywhere: the primitive in-group that felt passionately united as soon as the others, outsiders in whatever way, seemed to threaten them or to rival them. . . The closer the contacts the fiercer the hate. It is for this reason that there were no more violent enmities than those between neighboring towns. . . (1984.)

Cymmrodorion, 1920): 142; also quoted in Robert Bartlett, “Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity,” in *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 31, no. 1 (2001): 47. Yes, I lifted this transcription (with corrections) from my earlier work *The Filipino Nation and its Fabrication: From a Catholic Perspective*.

With this synthesis, we could possibly argue that the Polish nation *really* was born during the time of its baptism, as John Paul II declared in *Memory and Identity* (87). But we will have to presuppose that Polish national consciousness existed during the time of its baptism and *because* of its baptism. I am not a Polish historian, and therefore am in no position to answer that question - and so, assuming that it did not, can we still reconcile ourselves to John Paul II's position?

The Thomist professes a distinction between 'essence' and 'existence.' According to Aveling, "Essence and Existence," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 5 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909), essence is "...properly described as that whereby a thing is what it is... an answer to the question What?...essence is equivalent to quiddity; and thus, as St. Thomas remarks (I, Q. iii, a. 3), the essence of a thing is that which is expressed by its definition." Existence, on the other hand, is...

... that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things... Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is. Thus, while created essences are divided into both possible and actual, existence is always actual and opposed by its nature to simple potentiality. (ibid.)

What should we make of the relation between essence and existence? Aquinas wrote: "Actio enim est proprie actualitas virtutis; sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae." (*Summa theologiae* I, q.54, a.1.)⁸³ According to de Wulf, *Scholasticism Old and New: An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy Medieval and Modern*, trans. Coffey (Dublin: M H. Gill & Son, Ltd., 1910): "Essence is to existence what potency is to act." (109.) As for the relationship between potency and act, Grenier wrote in *Thomistic Philosophy* (1950):

A thing is engendered from a being in potency. Hence, in the order of generation, i.e., in the order of material cause, potency is prior in time to act, for a thing is engendered in as much as it is reduced from potency to act... (559)... Act is prior to potency in

⁸³"For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence." (trans. English Dominican Province, Benzinger ed.)

its formal aspect, for potency is defined by act. . . Act is prior to potency in perfection, for act is the perfection of potency. . . Act is prior to potency in the order of efficient causality, for a being in potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act. (560.)

According to Walker Connor, in “The Timelessness of Nations,” in *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. ½ (2004), “Identity does not draw its sustenance from facts but from perceptions; not from chronological/factual history but from sentient/felt history. . . while from the viewpoint of objective history, today’s nations are modern creatures, in popular perceptions they are, to borrow a word from Gourgourus, ‘eternal’, that is to say, ‘beyond time’, ‘timeless’.” (45.)

This phenomenological approach could do the job by emphasizing on the subjective - but this might not be enough to satisfy the dogmatic Catholic reader. Rejecting an ‘objective’ reality (such as the modernity of nations) in order to facilitate a certain convenience brings the Catholic thinker into a myriad of problems. In the Thomistic perspective, according to Palicka in “Thomas Aquinas’ Philosophy of Being as the Basis for Wojtyla’s Concept and Cognition of Human Person” (129): “*Being (esse) is not empty (as existentialists imagine). Every being (esse, existence) is filled with some definite content—the essence (essentia).*” This forces us to view the antiquity of nations with due respect to an ‘objective’ reality. If we are to skirt “factual history” for “felt history” (Connor, “The Timelessness of Nations,” 45); how can we continue to hold fast to truth - the “..adaequatio rei et intellectus”? (*Summa theologiae* I, q.16 a.1.) As Ben Shapiro famously quipped: “Facts don’t care about your feelings.”

Yet, the phenomenological perspective holds weight and can be the key to a Catholic conception of this problem. Quite recently, a person we know as Ye made certain comments about a certain group of people which remain fresh in our memory. But, despite this controversy, we also know that he released “Jesus Walks” as Kanye West. Now, the question is: did *Ye* compose “Jesus Walks”? Pope Francis reflected on the significance of name-change in his *General Address* (Paul VI Audience Hall: LEV, 5 January 2022):

In ancient times, the name was the compendium of a person’s identity. To change one’s name meant changing oneself, as in the case of Abraham, whose name God changed to

“Abraham”, which means “father of many”, “for”, says the Book of Genesis, he will be “the father of a multitude of nations” (17:5). The same goes for Jacob, who would be called “Israel”, which means he who has “striven with God”, because he fought with God to compel Him to give him the blessing (cf. Gen 32:28; 35:10).

Although in a sense the artist of “Jesus Walks” was not known as Ye but rather Kanye West, it would still be correct to say that Ye sang “Jesus Walks”. At the same time, it was Kanye West who got himself ‘canceled’ for making certain statements on Jews. What point am I trying to make? It is that despite this real and ontological change in identity, there can be a conceived identity between Kanye West and Ye, both being in the same person, although Ye *qua* Ye did not ‘exist’ [as Ye] until later in his life. So, it would be true - even if not *accurate*, to say that Ye composed “Jesus Walks.” Our image of a national culture, therefore, when predicated to those who had no such conception, remains identifiable to those that conceptualize it - then even the persons of long past may belong to that nation (cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 187-206.)

3.1 MEMORIAL AND MYSTERY

But this only explains how nations can *be in potency*, and not how nations can exist outside of its *act*. But note how John Paul II wrote about how nations begin “to *exist* in *history* [italics mine].” For him, *human* history is an “objectified” history which is often “recorded in writing. . .” (*Memory and Identity*, 83-84). He wrote: “...the histories of nations, objectified and recorded in writing, are among the essential elements of culture — the element which determines the nation’s identity in the temporal dimension.” (84.)

His Holiness did not limit human history to horizontal time - but also spoke of a “vertical dimension” of human history: “Human history obviously unfolds in a horizontal dimension within space and time. Yet it also has a vertical dimension. It is not only we who write our history: God writes it with us. This dimension of history, which we might label ‘transcendent’, the Enlightenment decisively rejected.” (*Memory and Identity*, 173.) This transcendent dimension reminds us of God’s time as defined by Erich Auerbach in *Mimesis* (Princeton University Press, 2003):

The horizontal, that is the temporal and causal, connection of occurrences is dissolved; the here and now is no longer a mere link in an earthly chain of events, it is simultaneously something which has always been, and which will be fulfilled in the future; and strictly, in the eyes of God, it is something eternal, something omni-temporal, something already consummated in the realm of fragmentary earthly event. (74.)

When a nation *exists* in history, what we mean to say is that it exists in our historical recollection - not necessarily the ontological order of time. The nation of Poland might have not *existed* as a community at the calendarial time of its baptism (supposing that it was not conceptualized) - but it would have stretched out in any given remembrance of that event which lives on in their historical memory (cf. *Memory and Identity*, 162-163). It would, therefore, have begun to “exist in history” at the moment of its baptism, this history being our own remembrance and objectification of the past (cf. *Memory and Identity*, 83-87).

According to Thomistic philosophy, Ye did not ‘exist’ [as Ye] until later in his life, but God still knew Ye before Ye was Ye - even before Ye was conceived. For Aquinas wrote: “Unde manifestum est quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis comparata.”⁸⁴ (ST I, q.14, a.13). As Ye can be predicated in the subject in which he inheres in, a national culture can also be predicated in the subjects within its imagined scope (cf. *Summa theologiae* I, q.14, a.15).

But from thence we encounter a problem. Anderson contended that nations appeal to the conception of “...’homogeneous, empty time,’ in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.” (Imagined Communities, 24-26.) This conception of time replaced the “...medieval conception of conception of simultaneity-along-time.” (ibid., 24.) We can therefore assume that it occurred at some point after the medieval period - following an increase in print literacy (116).

⁸⁴“Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.” (trans. English Dominican Province, Benzinger Bros. ed.)

In fact, this Messianic conception of time was not only replaced, but also "decisively rejected" by the Enlightenment (*Memory and Identity*, 173). Yet was this Enlightenment which facilitated the nation-concept as we know it today (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 122; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 7; Felicita Medved, "Nation and Patria in the Emerging World Order," *GeoJournal* 43, no. 1 [1997], 13.) This can put us in an awkward situation - how can we theologize on something which relies on a break in our Theocentric conception of time and history? Yet, it seems to be possible - if not necessary, to consider what John Paul II called "transcendent" history (*Memory and Identity*, 122). For according to Medved, in "Nation and Patria in the Emerging World Order" (13): "The Enlightenment could successfully destroy paradise and salvation but not the needs that they satisfied. The nation was well suited for this purpose and even though just 'invented', it was supposed to have existed from time immemorial, to last for ever and to realise its 'mission' in the world." To put it short: we might have desacralized the transcendental, but we could never detranscendentalize history (ibid).

Anderson explained this new concept of simultaneity through the concept of the novel, in which the reader has a bird's eye view and can connect two strangers through the lens of time and society (*Imagined Communities*, 25-26). Its importance in the national imagination stems from the fact that "[An American] has no idea of what [Americans] are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity." (26.) It appears that this would challenge any conception of the medieval nation, for it might destroy any notion of an Andersonian 'imagined community' in the premodern era, as Breuilly mentioned in "Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities: A Symposium*"(20). Yet, it is possible to conceive the nation through a Messianic lens - in fact, it is that very concept which could justify the *veritas* of some phenomenological approaches to the nation.

With respect to the conception of time considered-in-itself; Smith wrote in *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000) that "As the medieval historian Lesley Johnson has pointed out, time in the Middle Ages was not only conceived of as messianic; people had clear linear conceptions of

time, as, we may add, did some ancient peoples like the Jews and Greeks.” (58.) Weeda wrote in “Meanwhile in Messianic Time: Imagining the Medieval Nation in Time and Space and English Drinking Rituals,” in *Imagining Communities: Historical Reflections on the Process of Community Formation*, ed. Blok and Kuitenbrouwer (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018) that medieval peoples experienced. . .

...horizontal, homogenous time. . . through the daily rhythms of agriculture, the daily hours of sunlight and the seasons, but especially through the chiming of church bells, as well as in correspondence with liturgical and saint’s calendars. . . medieval people could certainly imagine their co-members’ simultaneous goings about, when both the laity and clergy attended mass and communal feasts throughout the country. . . (25.)

The significance of this can be demonstrated in the adherence of the faithful towards the liturgical calendar, which enabled people to have a sense of simultaneity, e.g. on the feast day of St. So-and-so, we all go to church (ibid.) Additionally, time was measured through means such as notched wax candles or the liturgy of the hours and other monastic routines (26).

Yet, even in *Messianic* time (which she also called *liturgical time*), Weeda argued that national identity and simultaneity existed (ibid). According to her, “In liturgical time, historical events are thus transfigured ‘ritually and liturgically, into repetitions and re-enactments’ that revivify the past, bringing it to life in the present in the liturgical event.” (27.) From this point, we can apply what we know about ‘sacramental theology’ to the nation. According to John Paul II’s *General Audience* (Rome: LEV, October 4, 2000), “... ‘To remember’ is therefore ‘to bring back to the heart’ in memory and affection, but it is also to celebrate a presence.” He connected this to the mystery of the Eucharist by comparing the Jewish Passover with the Christian Passover: “The Eucharist is thus the memorial of Christ’s death, but it is also the presence of his sacrifice and the anticipation of his glorious coming. It is the sacrament of the risen Lord’s continual saving closeness in history.” (3.) In his encyclical *Ecclesia in Eucharistia* (LEV, 2003), John Paul II wrote:

Sacrificium Crucis praesens efficit Missa, non illi adiungitur neque id multiplicat (16).

Quod repetitur est memorialis celebratio, memorialis demonstratio (17) ipsius, unde

unicum et postremum redimens Christi sacrificium sese in tempore semper efficax praestat. Sacrificialis Mysterii eucharistici natura non potest propterea intellegi tamquam res a se stans, longe a Cruce, vel cum obliqua sola coniunctione cum Calvarii sacrificio.⁸⁵

The Jewish Passover also had a similar aspect. In his *General Audience* (Oct. 4, 2000), John Paul II said: “In the Old Testament, the “memorial” par excellence of God’s works in history was the Passover liturgy of the Exodus: every time the people of Israel celebrated the Passover, God effectively offered them the gifts of freedom and salvation. . . By virtue of this event, as a Jewish philosopher said, Israel will always be ‘a community based on remembrance’ (M. Buber).”

The USCCB explained in detail how this ‘remembrance’ is executed: “Each family was then to eat the lamb with unleavened bread as a reminder of the haste with which the Israelites had to prepare for their departure from Egypt and with bitter herbs as a reminder of their deliverance from slavery.”⁸⁶ What does this have to do with the nation concept?⁸⁷ The celebration of a ‘presence,’ as John Paul II mentioned in his *General Audience* (October 4, 2000), is present in the national remembrances. According to Weeda, in “Meanwhile in Messianic Time,” this conception of liturgical time. . .

...does not, however, mean that medieval people could not make a distinction between events of the past and the present; only that within this religious, conceptual framework, past events continued to shape the experience of and lend meaning to the present, serving as a code for their interpretation, with an eye to the future. As such, time could be both linear and coetaneous, horizontal-homogenous and vertical at the same moment. (27-28.)

⁸⁵“The Mass makes present the sacrifice of the Cross; it does not add to that sacrifice nor does it multiply it. What is repeated is its memorial celebration, its ‘commemorative representation’ (*memoralis demonstratio*), which makes Christ’s one, definitive redemptive sacrifice always present in time. The sacrificial nature of the Eucharistic mystery cannot therefore be understood as something separate, independent of the Cross or only indirectly referring to the sacrifice of Calvary.” (official translation.)

⁸⁶Donald Card. Weurl made an important distinction between the Eucharist and other remembrances in *The Institution of the Holy Eucharist, Gift of God* (Quebec: LEV, June 16, 2008): “Unlike any other form of remembrance or commemoration, the Mass, the Eucharistic Liturgy, thanks to God’s gracious gift, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, has the power to make present the very reality it symbolizes.” UA&P chaplain Fr. Noel mentioned this in a lecture. I find it to be relevant.

⁸⁷Of course, it would be a terrible error to liken the nation to the Eucharist, inasmuch as the Eucharist “...has the power to make present the very reality it symbolizes.” (Weurl, *The Institution of the Holy Eucharist, Gift of God*.)

We can see some similarities of this conception of time with Anderson's findings: "If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future." (*Imagined Communities* 11-12.)

Furthermore, we can see how John Paul II weaved together this homogenous and liturgical conception of time with respect to nations. In *Memory and Identity*, we read: "The history of every individual, and therefore of every people, possesses a markedly eschatological dimension. . . . Admittedly, it is people and not nations that have to face God's judgement, but in the judgement pronounced on individuals, nations too are in some way judged." (85-86.) John Paul II concluded that while "[n]ations have an exclusively historical meaning, whereas man's vocation is eschatological. Yet man's vocation leaves its mark on the history of nations." (86.) We find a concrete example in the Christian conception of the Filipino nation. The logo (or motto) of the 2021 anniversary of 500 Years of Christianity (in the Philippines) was 'gifted to give.' Archbishop Valles explained in his *Pastoral Statement on Stewardship* (CBCP, January 28, 2021) the significance behind this motto:

We are not, however, the ultimate owners of this special gift. We are 'stewards' - 'katiwala' (tinugyanan, katalek) of God's gifts. 'Is there anything that we did not receive as gift?' (Cf. 1 Cor. 4:7). Each gift we receive is meant to be shared to one another. And so, 'we are gifted to give'; we must share the Faith. . . . After five centuries of striving to live the Christian Faith more fully, we heighten consciousness of our identity as stewards. . . . These gifts are given to us for service, that we may become channels of God's Providence to one another. . . . We are certainly blessed not only when we receive, but especially when we give.

In the *Message of His Holiness John Paul II to the President and to the People of the Philippines* (LEV, 1981), he made a link between the historical baptism of the Philippine nation to its present-day telos of global evangelization - the fulfillment of the Christian missionary effort. (2-3).

But Valles also connected this to a present and concrete reality - poverty, the proliferation

of which does not need more than a quick Internet search: “God calls us to serve one another more generously, especially our poor brothers and sisters. The Lord Jesus made his own the prophecy of Isaiah, “the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to bring glad tidings to the poor” (Lk. 4:18).” (*Pastoral Statement on Stewardship*). Valles also wrote in the *CBCP Pastoral Letter for the 2021 Year of Missio Ad Gentes: Becoming Jesus’ Missionary Disciples* (CBCP, November 29, 2020) that just as the Faith of the Filipino nation was sustained by the missionary efforts of foreigners, now it is their calling to engage in their own missionary activity. In the *Holy Mass for the Indigenous Tribes: Homily of the Holy Father John Paul II* (Baguio: LEV, Feb. 22, 1981), His Holiness echoed this sentiment, which Valles also quoted in the *CBCP Pastoral Letter for the 2021 Year of Missio Ad Gentes*: “I wish to tell you of my special desire; that the Filipinos will become the foremost missionaries of the Church in Asia.” He then quoted the *Address of the Holy Father Paul VI to the Members of Various Communities* (Manila: LEV, Nov. 29, 1970), in which he said:

At this moment one cannot but think of the important calling of the peoples of the Philippine Islands. This land has a special vocation to be the city set on the hill, the lamp standing on high (Cfr. Matth. 5: 14-16) giving shining witness amid the ancient and noble cultures of Asia. Both as individuals and as a nation you are to show forth the light of Christ by the quality of your lives.

He was more explicit in his mention of the teleo-eschatological aspect of the Philippine *nation* (Italian *nazione*). The way in which some Filipino Catholics connect these events of past, present, and future is, as Weeda wrote in “Meanwhile in Messianic Time” that “...within this religious, conceptual framework. . .”; in which “...past events continued to shape the experience of and lend meaning to the present, serving as a code for their interpretation, with an eye to the future.” (27-28.) Nevertheless, the ‘prefiguration’ (as Anderson put it) of even the event of the past (the introduction of Christianity in the Philippines) can be projected back to Christ’s command in Matthew 28: 18-19 to “...teach ye all nations; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” (DRB.)

In order to demonstrate the necessity of the new notions of time for national community imagination, Anderson wrote in *Imagined Communities* that “[an American] has no idea of what [Americans] are up to at any one time. But he has complete confidence in their steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity.” (26.) But one must consider that nations are conceived of as communities of *being*, not of *acting* (Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 278-280). It is, even up to the modern age, conceived as something very similar to *sex* and *blood type* (Gellner, *Thought and Change*, 150). It is not absolutely necessary to know what your co-nationals “...are up to at any one time [*operatio*]. . .” (*Imagined Communities*, 26) but it would be necessary to know what they *are* through time (*esse*) which does not necessarily rely on clocks.

For example, according to Weeda in “Meanwhile in Messianic Time,” liturgical time allowed for conceptions of specific *national* sins which merit Divine punishments (28). Therefore the English clergy would warn against such “ethnic sins” (drunkenness) by pain of Divine retribution, which was manifested in “national disasters” such as famines (29). But this was to no avail: according to her, the more these ethnic sins were mentioned, the more community was imagined:

At pivotal moments, such as in the wake of the Church interdict of 1208-1213, which was attributed to communal drinking, the ritual of wassailing must have sparked imaginings about the anonymous co-members doings, particularly at events marked on the religious calendar. On such occasions, participants of rituals that referred to ‘inherited ethnic sins’ engaged with their ancestors, co-members and future progeny. Acting out these rituals replete with meaning served as a bonding experience, as communal drunkenness offered a passage way to a new ‘English’ or ‘British’ identity. (39.)

In this way, she was able to make the connection between the liturgical calendar (and its attached notion of simultaneity - Secondly, she noted in p.26 how there was an awareness of simultaneity in feast days, when everyone was expected to go to church) and the nation in the English drinking ritual. Wojtyla’s concept of community, manifested in “I-you” and “we,” would also include those of past and future (“The Person: Subject and Community,” 291). Catholics believe in the communion of saints, which transcends the Great Divide (*Catechism of the Catholic Church [Catechismus*

Catholicae Ecclesiae], 962). It is true that we have for ourselves the calendrical concept of the simultaneous present, just like the liturgical celebrations of the feast days - but it is a present which is spiritually connected to the past (Weeda, “Meanwhile in Messianic Time,” 27-28). Ironically, this epistemology can justify the ‘historic’ antiquity of nations. Nations, according to the Pope, “...are endowed with historical memory.” Memory, he wrote, “...is the faculty which models the identity of human beings at both personal and collective level. In fact it is through memory that our sense of identity forms and defines itself in the personal psyche. . . . Memory evokes recollections.” (ibid., 162.) The Pope continued:

The Church is, in a certain sense, the ‘living memory of Christ: of the mystery of Christ, of his Passion, death and resurrection, of his Body and Blood. This ‘memory’ is accomplished through the Eucharist. It follows that Christians, as they celebrate the Eucharist in ‘memory’ of their Master, continually discover their own identity.” (ibid. Cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 204.)

For him, this memory allows people to understand their nation, including “...the history of language and culture. . . .” (ibid., 163). No point could be further brought home than in the concept of Tradition.

The Catechism of the Catholic Church defined *traditio* in this way: “Haec viva transmissio, in Spiritu Sancto peracta, quatenus distincta a sacra Scriptura, licet arcte cum ea coniuncta, Traditio appellatur. Per eam « Ecclesia, in sua doctrina, vita et cultu, perpetuat cunctisque generationibus transmittit omne quod ipsa est, omne quod credit.” (78.)⁸⁸ It also distinguished between ‘Tradition’ and ‘traditions’ - the latter of which we are concerned with today.

Ab illa «traditiones» theologicae, disciplinares, liturgicae aut ad devotionem pertinentes sunt distinguendae, quae temporis decursu in Ecclesiis localibus natae sunt. Hae sunt particulares formae sub quibus magna Traditio expressiones diversis locis et diversis aetatibus accommodatas recipit. Sub eius luce, Magisterio Ecclesiae duce, possunt hae

⁸⁸“This living transmission, accomplished in the Holy Spirit, is called Tradition, since it is distinct from Sacred Scripture, though closely connected to it. Through Tradition, ‘the Church, in her doctrine, life and worship, perpetuates and transmits to every generation all that she herself is, all that she believes’.”

servari, immutari vel etiam derelinqui. (83.)⁸⁹

Yet, despite acknowledging the temporary nature of these traditions, it connects them to this greater Tradition, which gives meaning and validates these traditions. But, according to Hobsbawm in *The Invention of Tradition*, "...‘Traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented." (1.)

These ‘invented traditions’ refer to "...a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past." (ibid.) A good example of this would be the Scottish kilt - invented in the eighteenth century yet draws back to the Scottish past (22-23).⁹⁰ The creation of certain traditions, as Hobsbawm noted, normally calls back to the past (*The Invention of Tradition*, 1). In the Catholic context, however, these *traditions* call back not necessarily to the temporal past but to ‘vertical history’ (as put by John Paul II in *Memory and Identity*, 175).⁹¹ In ethnic terms, we can look at the events which are taking place at the so-called ‘liturgy wars’ - what some call the conflict between liturgical ‘traditionalists’ who support the older ‘Tridentine’ form of the Roman Mass and those who support the current edition (1970), while is colloquially called the *Novus ordo missae* (New Order of Mass). As I mentioned in the

⁸⁹"Tradition is to be distinguished from the various theological, disciplinary, liturgical or devotional traditions, born in the local churches over time. These are the particular forms, adapted to different places and times, in which the great Tradition is expressed. In the light of Tradition, these traditions can be retained, modified or even abandoned under the guidance of the Church's Magisterium." (official translation.)

⁹⁰But there must be some sensitivity in the use of the word ‘invented’ - especially in matters of faith traditions. Anderson lamented the conflation between invention and fabrication instead of creation in *Imagined Communities* (5-7). Nevertheless, we will be using the term ‘invention’ in a neutral sense - the term ‘creation’ would be much better, similar to what Anderson noted in *Imagined Communities*.

⁹¹The development of doctrine in the Church can help us conceptualize this. Sergio Certofanti, in his article "The Development of Doctrine is Fidelity in Newness," in *Vatican News*, June 22, 2020; lamented the "freezing" of Tradition and attempted to explain it with historical precedent:

Pius IX in 1854 proclaimed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. But a great saint, Bernard of Clairvaux, though one of the most ardent propagators of Marian devotion, expressed his opposition to this truth some centuries earlier. "I am very concerned, since many of you have decided to change the conditions of important events, such as introducing this feast unknown to the Church, certainly not approved by Reason, and not even justified by ancient Tradition. Are we really more erudite and pious than our ancient fathers?"

But as these actions (proclamation of dogmas, institution of feasts) were viewed to be true and in complete accordance with God's will (manifest in papal authority), they were generally accepted by the Church universal despite this seeming ‘break’ with some conceptions of Tradition.

past, “The *Novus Ordo* was an attempt to meet modern and antique contexts. On one hand, it was based on a desire to return to ancient (or pseudo-ancient, depending on your source) models: this included the prayers of the faithful, responsory, and the *berkerah* offertory.” (*A Mass(ive) Question: A Case Study of the Roman Missal in Terms of Nationalism and Industrialization*, Circumstantia Philippina, Feb. 21, 2023)

Sacrosanctum concilium mentioned a certain desire to adapt the Mass in order to restore lost and ancient customs: “Quamobrem ritus, probe servata eorum substantia, simpliciores fiant; ea omittantur quae temporum decursu duplicata fuerunt vel minus utiliter addita; restituantur vero ad pristinam sanctorum Patrum normam nonnulla quae temporum iniuria deciderunt, prout opportuna vel necessaria videantur.” (50.) As I wrote in “A Mass(ive) Question”:

The *Novus Ordo* was an attempt to meet modern and antique contexts. On one hand, it was based on a desire to return to ancient (or pseudo-ancient, depending on your source) models: this included the prayers of the faithful, responsory, and the *berkerah* offertory. On the second hand, it attempted to meet the modern needs of modern people where they were: vernacular language, facing the people, etc.

The arguments for these changes relied on both appeals to modern contexts and continuity with the past. The latter is best exemplified in *Sacrosanctum concilium* 50...

Of course, this claim does not go uncontested. Father Stephen Sommerville wrote in “The Six Marks of the *Novus Ordo* Mass” (*Tradition in Action*) that this new form of the Mass is

“...antiquarian. This means emphasizing the alleged early, original features of the Mass in the time of the Fathers, that is, the first four to six centuries of the History of the Church. . . recovering supposed early simplicity of worship, and other primitive qualities. . . diminishing or removing the enrichments of the Catholic Mass that were developed in medieval, baroque, and post-reformation times.

Many would refer to Pius XII’s *Mediator Dei* (Rome: LEV, 1947) in which he mentioned certain instances of this ‘antiquarian’ mentality: “. . . qui priscam altari velit mensae formam restituere; qui liturgicas vestes velit nigro semper carere colore; qui sacras imagines ac statuas e templis prohibeat;

qui divini Redemptoris in Crucem acti effigies ita conformari iubeat, ut corpus eius acerrimos non referat, quos passus est, cruciatus; qui denique polyphonicos, seu multisonos concentus reprobet ac repudiet. . . ”⁹²

Of course, such an appeal goes hand-in-hand with comparing it with the ‘organically developed’ traditional form. Johannes Bökmann, in “Teilnahme an der himmlischen Liturgie,” in *Theologisches* 20, no. 2 (1990); once quoted a certain Joseph Ratzinger, who declared: “Man wollte nicht mehr das organische Werden und Reifen des durch die Jahrhunderte hin Lebendigen fortführen, sondern setzte an dessen Stelle - nach dem Muster technischer Produktion - das Machen, das platte Produkt des Augenblicks.” (104).⁹³ If we focus ourselves purely on the human (anthropological) aspect of the Sacred Liturgy and not its Divine (sacramental) dimension, we must approach the question of continuity in human terms - without consideration for Divine intervention, the Roman *missa* (in both forms) would have been considered rather unusual for Christians in the Early Church. Paul James, in *Nation Formation*, wrote:

The past is a thoroughly unfamiliar place; in ways that contemporary sensibilities tend to block out, the extent of this discontinuity with the present is subjectively confronting. However, from a more abstract vantage point it is possible to conceive of continuities in the discontinuity of social formations and practices in a way which does not succumb to the contemporary, nostalgic tendency to flatten the past into a rustic or undeveloped version of the present. (191.)

It is through consideration of the ‘form’ and not the ‘content’, Paul James argued, that allows for a continuous conception of a ‘social form’ through human history (191-192). We, as Catholics, would rightly argue that the Real Presence (or even a mere profession thereof) would provide a real continuity between the Roman Rite Mass (perhaps, even a touchy manifestation like the 1970

⁹²“...were he to wish the altar restored to its primitive tableform; were he to want black excluded as a color for the liturgical vestments; were he to forbid the use of sacred images and statues in Churches; were he to order the crucifix so designed that the divine Redeemer’s body shows no trace of His cruel sufferings; and lastly were he to disdain and reject polyphonic music or singing in parts. . . ”

⁹³Some might recognize this quote as that famous Ratzinger comment on the foreword of a certain book. Sharon Kabel, “Catholic fact check: Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and the fabricated liturgy,” June 19, 2021. Of course, I am not saying that the traditionalist movement does not likewise appeal to continuity in the face of perceived breaks. In the same Facebook post I made several criticisms on the traditionalist line of thought.

revision - depending on who you ask) and the ancient liturgies - dating back to the Last Supper.⁹⁴

The same can (and has been) applied to the nation - concept. James used this to justify the existence of historic *nations* - by this, he meant university communities of a certain type - and their continuity with modern nation states (*Nation Formation*, 191-192). But reference to a calendar remains important, even in the most messianic of nationalisms - as James wrote:

Cultural invention might be better described as an emergent ontological relation to time and space based on a sense of historicity which turns the past into a source of authenticity. Under conditions which break the nexus of time with kinship or the sacred, that is, in empty time, the past becomes a source of artefacts and condensed meanings available for displaying in the present, and a series of calendrical reference points which mark the passage of progress. (187.)

In *Memory and Identity*, John Paul II made sure to remember the calendrical date of the Polish baptism (87.) In fact, we do remember the calendrical date of Philippine baptism - including its place in the calendar.

Although we have already reconciled the seeming dichotomy of time-conceptions (through Weeda's framework), it must be said that according to Shan-Yun Huang, in "'Wandering Temporalities': Rethinking 'Imagined Communities' through 'Wandering Rocks,'" in *James Joyce Quarterly* 49, no. 3/4 (2012), Anderson misunderstood the idea of empty time by associating it with calendrical time (592). In the same place, he quoted Michael Lowy's *Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin's "On the Concept of History,"* trans. Turner (Verso, 2005), who wrote: "For Benjamin calendars represent the opposite of empty time: they are the expression of a historic, heterogeneous time, freighted with memory and presentness. Holidays are qualitatively distinct from other days: they are days of memory and remembrance that express a real historical consciousness." (90-91.) Benjamin in *On The Concept of History* (1940) wrote: "The initial day of a calendar serves as a historical time-lapse camera. And, basically, it is the same day that keeps recurring in the guise of holidays, which are days of remembrance. Thus the calendars do not measure time as clocks do;

⁹⁴Steve Ray, "The Continuity of the Mass," Catholic Answers, 2012.

they are monuments of a historical consciousness of which not the slightest trace has been apparent in Europe in the past hundred years.” (XV.)

It is this historical memory which lives on in “historic, heterogenous time”: not in the empty time of minutes and seconds (Lowy, *Fire Alarm*, 90). It is vertical and liturgical, relying on the sacramental ‘making present’ of commemoration (Weurl, *The Institution of the Holy Eucharist*). It continues to exist in the “transcendental” and “vertical” history which the Holy Father discussed: a history written by God (173); who knows all things (John 21:17; *Summa theologiae* I, q.14, a.13). But there would still be *truth*, an agreement between mind and matter (“...adaequatio rei et intellectus...”), as defined by Aquinas in *Summa theologiae* I (q.16 a.1). For as long as the conception of national culture is broad enough to be interpreted loosely - which is often the case (Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 124-125); then it is reasonable to assume that it would remain ‘true’. They would be, ontologically speaking, two (in fact, more than two) different cultures - by virtue of its context (ibid), or even the difference of subjects. But they would share a unity in the memory of those who claim it as their own. The nation, therefore, is not only imagined as Anderson’s ‘horizontal comradeship’ (15), but also as a communion with the dead. This could be comparable with the role of the Church as the “communion of saints.” (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 946.) The communion of saints transcends the mortal realm - according to Paul VI in *Lumen gentium* (Rome: LEV, 1964): “Hanc communionem totius Iesu Christi Mystici Corporis apprime agnoscens, Ecclesia viatorum inde a primaevae christianae religionis temporibus, defunctorum memoriam magna cum pietate excoluit et, quia ‘sancta et salubris est cogitatio pro defunctis exorare, ut a peccatis solvantur’ (2 Mach 12, 46), etiam suffragia pro illis obtulit.”⁹⁵

3.1.1 NATIONS AND THE CHURCH

According to John Paul II, *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections* (W&N, 2005): “...it is good to turn once again to Sacred Scripture: here we find the elements of an authentic theology of the

⁹⁵“Fully conscious of this communion of the whole Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, the pilgrim Church from the very first ages of the Christian religion has cultivated with great piety the memory of the dead, and ‘because it is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from their sins’, also offers suffrages for them.” (official translation.)

nation.” (78.) For it is through this inquiry into Sacred Scripture that God’s role in the formation of the nation can be revealed.

In Gen. 1:28 God commanded Adam: "Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis animantibus, quae moventur super terram." From our earlier discourses we have come to understand that this command pertains to "human culture" (*Memory and Identity*, 91-92); especially to the act of naming (*Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 113). It is from this point of reference, among others, that ‘naming’ and ‘culture’ are interconnected, so that through the very act of naming a culture, the persons in a given nation practice culture. Yet, at the same time, God declared: "...‘Non est bonum esse hominem solum; faciam ei adiutorium simile sui’..." (Gen. 2:18). According to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (372) and John Paul II in his *General Audience* (Rome: LEV, 14 November 1979); this refers to the fact that man belongs to a "communio personarum."⁹⁶

The synthesis of these commands, however, manifested in the making of the first community - that between the man and the woman. For it was Adam who named Eve "Virago" in his very acknowledgment of their community as "os ex ossibus meis et caro de carne mea..." (Gen. 2:7) - hence exercising culture, hence forming the first cultural community, that is, a proto-nation, formed even before the creation of various nations and languages (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 56).⁹⁷ But this command to form nations - both by culture and by community - cannot be perfectly understood without reference towards the relationship between a man and a woman (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 372. For in the very command to practice culture (Gen. 1:28) - as John Paul II put it in *Memory and Identity* (91-92) also contains the command to multiply the population

⁹⁶With respect to the human community, he wrote in his *General Audience* (14 November 1979):

The term "community" could also be used here, if it were not generic and did not have so many meanings. Communio expresses more, with greater precision, since it indicates precisely that "help" which is derived, in a sense, from the very fact of existing as a person "beside" a person. In the Bible narrative this fact becomes eo ipso - in itself - the existence of the person "for" the person, since man in his original solitude was, in a way, already in this relationship. That is confirmed, in a negative sense, precisely by this solitude. (ibid. cf. John Paul II, *Sources of Renewal: The Implementation of the Second Vatican Council* [San Francisco, Harper & Row, 1980], 61; John Paul II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, trans. Waldstein [Pauline Books and Media, 2006], 89.)

⁹⁷By using the term ‘proto-nation’ I do not diminish the nationhood of the first community, but rather I am using Anderson’s framework of a limited community (*Imagined Communities*, 5-7).

(*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 378) - thus commanding the formation of human families (John Paul II, *Homily "Jubilee of Families,"* [LEV, Oct. 15, 2000]). Hence, it can also be said that the command to multiply pertains to the family, but this command to multiply *and* subdue the earth pertains to the nation - as genealogy - both biological and spiritual - is essential to the nation (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 78; Isidore, *Etymologiae*, IX, 2:1; Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 1107).

But the creation of nations, which was in some way prefigured by this first community, was a component of God's salvific plan - as we read in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*:

Deus, unitate generis humani peccato comminuta, statim humanum intendit salvare genus cum unaquaque ex eius partibus interveniens. Foedus cum Noe initum post diluvium principium Oeconomiae divinae exprimit erga «nationes», id est, erga homines «secundum linguam suam et familias suas in nationibus suis» (Gn 10,5) coniunctos.
(56.)⁹⁸

We may already know that the ancient nation of Israel, whom God elected as His chosen people, was elected for nothing less than the purpose of human redemption (CCC 1819; etc.). God endowed the people of Israel (more accurately, the persons of Israel), like the other nations of its time (and of our time), with free will and a choice - constitutive of a nation. Although their laws were imposed upon them by God (instead of coming from one of their own rulers), the Israelites nevertheless adhered to this law (at least in paper, and *sometimes* - see Leviticus). Hence the Judeans were adamant about the preservation of their own law within the bounds of the Roman Empire.

Their ability of choice based on a perception of national identity (relative to its time) manifested itself when Pilate honored the Jewish festival of the Passover by allowing them to free (by acclamation) a prisoner on death row - thus giving proper respect to their faculty of collective choice (Matthew 27:15-18). In John 18:31-32, Pilate dealt with Jewish law: "(31) Dixit ergo eis [Judaeis] Pilatus: 'Accipite eum vos et secundum legem vestram iudicate eum!'. Dixerunt ei Iudaei:

⁹⁸"After the unity of the human race was shattered by sin God at once sought to save humanity part by part. [T]he covenant with Noah after the flood gives expression to the principle of the divine economy toward the 'nations', in other words, towards men grouped 'in their lands, each with (its) own language, by their families, in their nations'." (official translation.)

‘Nobis non licet interficere quemquam’, (32) ut sermo Iesu impleretur, quem dixit, significans qua esset morte moriturus.”⁹⁹ Let us keep in mind that the judgment “secundum legem vestram [Judaeorum]...” (Jn. 18:31) was on the basis of “blasphemia” (Matthew 26:65). From thence the Jews manifested their attitude toward their own perceived culture: “Responderunt ei Iudaei: ‘Nos legem habemus, et secundum legem debet mori, quia Filium Dei se fecit’.” (John 19:7.)¹⁰⁰ In this very statement we can observe how the Jews were 1) aware of their own law/culture and 2) eager to have it enforced/practiced. Therefore, the judgment of a man accused of blasphemy took upon a dimension of national perception. The crowd, upon the instigation of the Jewish leaders (Matt. 27:20) used this faculty of collective choice (Matt. 27:25) - “Et respondens universus populus dixit: ‘Sanguis eius super nos et super filios nostros’.” We can interpret this more clearly according to the principles of our theology of the nation. For the Judean mob, identifying, naming, and sharing their culture and community, also identified, named, and shared their choice - an act which is consistent with that of other nations.

What are we to make of this? Firstly, we must come to an understanding that Christ knew with certainty (not a hunch) that these events would unfold the way they did. In Matt. 20: 18-19, Christ declared: “...(18) ‘Ecce ascendimus Hierosolymam, et Filius hominis tradetur principibus sacerdotum et scribis, et condemnabunt eum morte (19) et tradent eum gentibus ad illudendum et flagellandum et crucifigendum, et tertia die resurget’.” Therefore, the ‘oeconomia Divina’ which involved “nationes” and was part of a plan to save humanity (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 57) was intricately tied in the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and therefore took a more active role in the salvation of man.

But it would be unfortunate if the only link between Israel, nation, and salvation was, in the words of some, a *total catastrophe* - a ‘perversion’ of the faculty of free choice.¹⁰¹ Hence, in *Memory and Identity*, John Paul II began his approach to national theology through the concept of genealogy,

⁹⁹(31) “Pilate therefore said to them: Take him you, and judge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said to him: It is not lawful for us to put any man to death; (32) That the word of Jesus might be fulfilled, which he said, signifying what death he should die.” (DRB.)

¹⁰⁰“The Jews answered him: We have a law; and according to the law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God.” (DRB.)

¹⁰¹Thanks, Doc.

which “usually refers to biological ancestors” (78). In Genesis 10:5 we behold a genealogical record of the descendant of Noah following the Great Deluge, which includes an interesting verse: “Ab his divisae sunt insulae gentium in regionibus suis, unusquisque secundum linguam suam et familias suas in nationibus suis.”¹⁰² Isidore of Seville wrote in *Etymologiae* IX, 2:1: “Gens est multitudo ab uno principio orta, sive ab alia natione secundum propriam collectionem distincta, ut Graeciae, Asiae. Hinc et gentilitas dicitur. Gens autem appellata propter generationes familiarum, id est a gignendo, sicut natio a nascendo.”¹⁰³ Davies in “Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World” associated this “unum principium” with blood descent.

Connecting this to our earlier reflections on nation and nationalism we begin to see that despite not having a proper sense of place (as Billig demonstrated in *Banal Nationalism*, 20-21), ancient peoples had some sense of common ancestry. According to Smith, in *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford University Press, 1999),

... [ethnic communities] include accounts of the time and place of the community's origins, and trace the lines of descent from presumed common ancestors; thus Turks trace their ancestry to Central Asia in the first millennium, and to their founding father, Oghuz Khan, and Jews do likewise to Abraham and Canaan (or even to Ur or Haran). Equally important for the survival of ethnies has been the development of myths of ethnic election. (15.)

It follows that there was some semblance of blood-descent (like a family) in the primordial conceptions of ‘nation,’ more so than today. But notice how the name of the common ancestor (whether real or putative) was in many cases the name of the ancient nation. When reading Genesis 10 holistically we are able to find very familiar names: Egypt and Canaan (10:6); Uz (10:23); Sheba (10:26); and Ophir (10:29). These names, upon reading further in the Bible, correspond to places and peoples. For example, we read in Job 1 that the ‘protagonist’ (Job) lived in the Land of Uz. In

¹⁰²“By these were divided the islands of the Gentiles in their lands, every one according to his tongue and their families in their nations.” - *The Holy Bible: Douay-Rheims* (Abundant Life Publishing).

¹⁰³“A *gens* is a multitude which comes from one principle or is distinguished from other nations according to its collection, such as the Greeks, Asians. This is called *gentility*. But the *gens* is named as such according to the generation of families, i.e. being generated, just as a nation accords to being born.” (original translation.)

Genesis 19:37 we read of a person named Moab who would later become the “pater Moabitorum”. What set Israel apart from the other nations was the manner in which it came to be. According to John Paul II, God elected Israel not so much by its historical dimension but rather by the nation’s spiritual life, that is, the special “face to face” bond between God and the leaders of his people (*Memory and Identity*, 79). He wrote: "Israel’s mission is defined as ‘Messianic’ because from that nation the Messiah was to come, the Anointed one of the Lord." (ibid.)

We have already approached this Messianic aspect - that of the "oeconomia divina" (cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 57) through the death of Christ. But we can also approach it from our previous analysis of collective names. Scripture presented the names of the various nations or peoples as organic and logical processes stemming from what Isidore referred to as “gentilitas” (*Etymologiae* IX, 2:1). But in the case of the Israelite nation, God directly intervened in the naming process. In Genesis 17:4-5 we may read: “(4) Dixitque ei Deus: ‘Ecce pactum meum tecum. Erisque pater multarum gentium, (5) nec ultra vocabitur nomen tuum Abram, sed Abraham erit nomen tuum, quia patrem multarum gentium constitui te’.” While in Gen. 35: 9-11, we may read: “(9) Apparuit iterum Deus Jacob, postquam reversus est de Paddanaram, benedixitque ei (10) dicens: ‘Non vocaberis ultra Jacob, sed Israel erit nomen tuum’, et appellavit eum Israel. (11) Dixitque ei: ‘Ego Deus omnipotens. Cresce et multiplicare; gens et congregatio nationum erunt ex te, reges de lumbis tuis egredientur’.”¹⁰⁴ Pope Francis reflected on the significance of this name-change in his *General Address* (Paul VI Audience Hall: 5 January 2022):

In ancient times, the name was the compendium of a person’s identity. To change one’s name meant changing oneself, as in the case of Abraham, whose name God changed to “Abraham”, which means “father of many”, “for”, says the Book of Genesis, he will be “the father of a multitude of nations” (17:5). The same goes for Jacob, who would be called “Israel”, which means he who has “striven with God”, because he fought with God to compel Him to give him the blessing (cf. Gen 32:28; 35:10).

¹⁰⁴“(9) And God appeared again to Jacob, after he returned from Mesopotamia of Syria, and he blessed him, (10) Saying: Thou shalt not be called any more Jacob, but Israel shall be thy name. And he called him Israel. (11) And said to him: I am God Almighty, increase thou and be multiplied. Nations and peoples of nations shall be from thee, and kings shall come out of thy loins.” (DRB.)

By changing the name of Jacob to Israel, the omniscient God directly interfered in the nation formation process: this he acknowledged in Genesis 11. But this alone says nothing about why ‘spiritual genealogy’ takes precedence over biological descent.

Consider the process of naturalization, which, according to Anderson, is accepted in principle by ‘all’ nations (*Imagined Communities*, 146). How could a foreigner ‘belong’ to a nation which he was not born in - or, in this context, not born *of*? We may justify the preference of spiritual genealogy before attempting to justify its existence. If there was such a thing as a spiritual genealogy, concepts such as the ‘New Israel’ (CCC 877) would have a justification. We are aware of the existence of an Israel “secundum carnem” (1 Cor. 10:8) and an “Israel Dei” (Gal. 6:16), which Augustine (among others) acknowledged in *De civitate Dei* (XVI).¹⁰⁵ Saint Peter spoke of a “genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus in acquisitionem. . .”. (1 Peter 2:9.)¹⁰⁶ In fact, John Paul II wrote that we can refer to the Christian people as a “...Divine nation. . .” (*Memory and Identity*, 80). We may ontologically justify its existence through the principle of naturalization, i.e., the ‘adoption’ of a foreigner into a nation.

According to Pope Francis’ *General Address* (Paul VI Audience Hall: 5 January 2022), Joseph had the legal rights of a father, including naming his child. In his apostolic letter *Patris corde* (Rome: LEV, 2020) he expounded on its theological significance:

“Ille legalem paternitatem Iesu accipere non timuit, cui imposuit nomen revelatum ab angelo: «Vocabis nomen eius Iesum: ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum» (Mt 1,21). Ut notum est, nomen dare cuidam personae vel rei – sicut fecit Adam in narratione Genesis (cfr 2,19-20) – apud populos antiquos significabat illam ad se pertinere.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵See Jimmy Akin, “Israel and the Church,” in *Catholic Answers* (February 1, 1999). Augustine understood the Israel of the Spirit to be manifested in the “congregatio nationum” which Genesis 35:11 mentioned (*De civitate Dei*, XVI, 42). But, at the same time, 1 Peter 2:9 spoke of a “...genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus in acquisitionem. . .” in the singular.

¹⁰⁶“...a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people. . .” - DRB

¹⁰⁷“Joseph had the courage to become the legal father of Jesus, to whom he gave the name revealed by the angel: “You shall call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins” (Mt 1:21). As we know, for ancient peoples, to give a name to a person or to a thing, as Adam did in the account in the Book of Genesis (cf. 2:19-20), was to establish a relationship.” (official translation.)

In doing so, Joseph exercised a legitimate authority over his Son, which Pope Francis corroborated in his *General Audience* (Jan. 5 2022).¹⁰⁸ There was a ‘spiritual’ and ‘legal’ if not biological relation between Joseph the father and Jesus the son (Pope Francis, *General Address*, [5 Jan 2022]). The same can be said of the nation of Israel. For the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* [*Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae*] stated:

(2810) In Promissione Abrahae facta et in iureiurando, quod eam comitatur, Deus Se obligat quin Nomen detegat Suum. Ipse id Moysi revelare incipit idque oculis manifestat totius populi, eum ab Aegyptiis salvans: «Gloriose [...] magnificatus est» (Ex 15,1). Post Sinai Foedus, hic populus est «Eius» et debet esse «gens sancta» (seu consecrata, quod Hebraice idem est verbum) quia Nomen Dei in eo habitat.¹⁰⁹

Hence we can understand how God had a special relationship with the people of Israel due to the fact that he participated in its naming process.

Furthermore, as the passage reads, God revealed His name to Moses and therefore granted a special relationship to His people. But, at the same time, by directly interfering with the naming process, God directly determined the course of that nation’s history. For John Paul II acknowledged the necessity of not limiting genealogy to blood-descent:

The term ‘genealogy’ usually refers to biological ancestors. Yet we can also speak of genealogy, perhaps even more validly, in a spiritual sense. Our thoughts turn here to Abraham. Not only do the Israelites trace their ancestry to him, but in a spiritual sense, so too do Christians (Rom. 4:11-12) and Muslims. The story of Abraham and his call by God, of his unusual paternity, of the birth of Isaac — all this illustrates how the road to nationhood passes through ‘generation’, via the family and the clan. (*Memory and Identity*, 78.)

Saint Paul expounded on this spiritual genealogy in Romans 9:6-7: “...(6) Non autem quod exciderit

¹⁰⁸“Pater non nascitur, sed fit.” (Franciscus, ep.ap. Patris corde, Rome: LEV, MMXX).

¹⁰⁹“In the promise to Abraham and the oath that accompanied it, God commits himself but without disclosing his name. He begins to reveal it to Moses and makes it known clearly before the eyes of the whole people when he saves them from the Egyptians: ‘he has triumphed gloriously.’ From the covenant of Sinai onwards, this people is ‘his own’ and it is to be a ‘holy (or ‘consecrated’: the same word is used for both in Hebrew) nation,’ because the name of God dwells in it.” (official translation.)

verbum Dei. Non enim omnes, qui ex Israel, hi sunt Israel; (7) neque quia semen sunt Abrahae, omnes filii, sed: ‘In Isaac vocabitur tibi semen’. (8) Id est, non qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei, sed qui filii sunt promissionis, aestimantur semen; (9) promissionis enim verbum hoc est: ‘Secundum hoc tempus veniam, et erit Sarae filius’.” (Nova Vulgata.) In Gal. 3:15-18, he wrote:

(15) Fratres, secundum hominem dico, tamen hominis confirmatum testamentum nemo irritum facit aut superordinat. (16) Abrahae autem dictae sunt promissiones et semini eius. Non dicit: “Et seminibus”, quasi in multis, sed quasi in uno: “Et semini tuo”, qui est Christus. (17) Hoc autem dico: Testamentum confirmatum a Deo, quae post quadringentos et triginta annos facta est lex, non irritum facit ad evacuandam promissionem. (18) Nam si ex lege hereditas, iam non ex promissione; Abrahae autem per promissionem donavit Deus.

He inverted the contemporary Jewish perceptions of nationhood, from their conception of blood-descent to their promise - both of which have historical basis. In one way, there is a true continuity with the past - but in another way, as Gellner puts it (*Nations and Nationalism*, 125), there was a “...profound break in human history...” - we interpret the reality behind this statement not in the sense that it (the “profound break”) went against God’s will, but rather, that it went against the contemporary conceptions of that time.

There was a true *change* in the conception of Israel: yet, despite this obvious break, they aligned themselves (at least, for us Christians) more closely to God’s will and plan - or, in some way, the *true* destiny of Israel (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 79; *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 436).¹¹⁰ From thence grew two ‘national identities’ both competing for the name Israel and the seed of Abraham, united (aside from a common conception of Adonai) by common conceptions of person and place as well as shared experiences and memories. Breaking from the contemporary Israel-as-concieved “secundum carnem” (1 Cor. 10:8) yet totally continuous with God’s plan of Israel-as-made; the holy nation (chosen people) was both perfectly continuous with Ancient Israel yet was in many ways distinguishable. For common conceptions and shared experiences also

¹¹⁰Thanks, Doc.

allowed for a certain unity which allowed Ancient Israelites, Jews, and Christians to refer to the same persons, places, and events of Divine Revelation (although the Ancient Israelites did not know Christ and the Jews reject him) - by virtue of this, even Jews still share some unity with Christians by virtue of this (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 839-840; Rom. 9:4-5). For while it is true that identification, naming, and sharing was a component in the death of the Messiah, it is also a component in the life of the Church. For these common conceptions which can unite the contemporary Church with the Israel of old - conceptions going through the very being of the Israelite nation - being identified, named, and shared, allow for continuity and difference, both aspects of the "Israel Dei" (Gal. 6:16).

But it would seem now that the Christian world has no need for the nation. For Saint Paul wrote in Gal. 3:28 - "non est Iudaeus neque Graecus, non est servus neque liber, non est masculus et femina; omnes enim vos unus estis in Christo Iesu." We understand that his Epistle to the Galatians dealt primarily with the question of Jewish customs in the Christian Church. Therefore, the Christian world would have no need for national identities. Furthermore, Paul VI in *Evangelii nuntiandi* wrote of the "Discidium inter Evangelium et culturam" which is ever present in human history (20). For, just as in the epistle to the Galatians, these various national differences impeded the function of the Christian Church: and even in this present day, brother Christians kill each other in the name of their respective national boundaries. Recently, the Eastern Orthodox Church suffered a schism between the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople based on the status of Ukrainian Christians - a conflict which might not be resolved in the near future.¹¹¹ It would be easy to view nations as obstacles to Christian unity and the spread of the gospel. Yet, despite this, Catholic thought continues to respect the existence of nations.¹¹² Why do they maintain such a

¹¹¹ Andrew Roth and Harriet Sherwood, "Russian Orthodox Church cuts ties with Constantinople," *The Guardian*, October 15, 2018.

¹¹² In the "Address of President Stefano Zamagni to the Holy Father Pope Francis," in *Nation, State, Nation-State*, he wrote:

We cannot sacrifice the nation on the altar of sovereignty. At the same time, however, it would be unwise to accept the model of post-national democracy in the name of a cosmopolitan citizenship that considers the concept of nation to be outdated. National sentiment can still go hand in hand with democracy, as long as the latter does not regress towards forms of illiberal democracy. (17-18.)

tenacious grip to the nation concept? In light of these other concrete realities, the Catholic position warraants a systematic explanation and an argumentative presentation.

Firstly, we must understand that the Apostles did not repudiate the nation-concept in itself. Saint Peter spoke of a “...genus electum, regale sacerdotium, gens sancta, populus in acquisitionem. . .” (1 Peter 2:9.)¹ When speaking of the relationship of the nations to the Christian people, we could apprehend it like how we would conceptualize some nations to consist of many peoples - as if a people was a lower tier or class than a nation (see John Paul II, “To Build Peace, Respect Minorities,” 3). Hence, we understand that the nation-concept per se was not rejected - in fact, it was almost reaffirmed through the subordination of different ‘peoples’ to the Christian ‘nation’.

But what does the Catholic Church make of these individual nations, who hitherto existed by virtue of themselves and not as a mere ‘people’ in the Christian ‘nation’? It does not follow that just because Saint Paul acknowledged the utility of the national concept, that we should promote the continued existence of the individual nations. Yet, as we will see later in *Lumen gentium* (13), this Christian ‘nation’ - it seems, is a nation which is more ‘spiritual’ than temporal (cf. John 18:36): therefore, the Church allows for nuances with regard to the Pauline quotation (Gal. 3:28). *Lumen gentium* (13) acknowledged this nuance when, after incuding Galatians 3, stated:

Omnibus itaque gentibus terrae inest unus Populus Dei, cum ex omnibus gentibus mutuetur suos cives, Regni quidem indolis non terrestres, sed coelestis. Cuncti enim per orbem sparsi fideles cum ceteris in Spiritu Sancto communicant, et sic "qui Romae sedet, Indos scit membrum suum esse". Cum autem Regnum Christi de hoc mundo non sit (cf. Io 18,36), ideo Ecclesia seu Populus Dei, hoc Regnum inducens, nihil bono temporali cuiusvis populi subtrahit, sed e contra facultates et copias moresque populorum, quantum bona sunt, fovet et assumit, assumendo vero purificat, roborat et elevat. Memor est enim se cum illo Rege colligere debere, Cui gentes in hereditatem datae sunt (cf. Ps 2,8), et in Cuius civitatem dona et munera adducunt (cf. Ps 71[72],10; Is 60,4-7; Apoc 21,24).¹¹³

¹¹³The official translation reads:

It follows that though there are many nations there is but one people of God, which takes its citizens from

The Church refrains from interpreting Saint Paul according to the temporal realm - i.e., this Christian identity is not meant to destroy the various 'ethnic' or national identities.

But, at the same time, these national identities are not meant to subsume nor destroy the Christian identity - rather, they are interconnected. The Pontifical Council for Culture's document *Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture* (1999) brought up the event at Pentecost, when the Holy Spirit allowed the Apostles to speak in various languages - according to Acts 2:1-3. "The nations gathered in the Upper Room at Pentecost did not hear in their respective tongues a discourse about their own human cultures, but they were amazed to hear, each in their own tongue, the Apostles proclaim the marvels of God." (*Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture*.) Let us quote the text (Acts 2:7-11) for further context:

(7) "Stupebant autem et mirabantur dicentes: "Nonne ecce omnes isti, qui loquuntur, Galilaei sunt? (8) Et quomodo nos audimus unusquisque propria lingua nostra, in qua nati sumus? (9) Parthi et Medi et Elamitae et qui habitant Mesopotamiam, Iudaeam quoque et Cappadociam, Pontum et Asiam, (10) Phrygiam quoque et Pamphylia, Aegyptum et partes Libyae, quae est circa Cyrenem, et advenae Romani, (11) Iudaei quoque et proselyti, Cretes et Arabes, audimus loquentes eos nostris linguis magnalia Dei".

But, as the Council cited, John Paul II wrote in *Catechesi tradendae*: "On the one hand the Gospel message cannot be purely and simply isolated from the culture in which it was first inserted...it does not spring spontaneously from any cultural soil; it has always been transmitted by means of an apostolic dialogue which inevitably becomes part of a certain dialogue of cultures..." It also quoted John Paul II's *Fides et ratio*, in which he stated:

every race, making them citizens of a kingdom which is of a heavenly rather than of an earthly nature. All the faithful, scattered though they be throughout the world, are in communion with each other in the Holy Spirit, and so, he who dwells in Rome knows that the people of India are his members". Since the kingdom of Christ is not of this world the Church or people of God in establishing that kingdom takes nothing away from the temporal welfare of any people. On the contrary it fosters and takes to itself, insofar as they are good, the ability, riches and customs in which the genius of each people expresses itself. The Church in this is mindful that she must bring together the nations for that king to whom they were given as an inheritance, and to whose city they bring gifts and offerings.

Ratio ipsa, secundum quam Christiani suam fidem experiuntur, cultura imbuitur illius loci qui proximus est et efficit vicissim ut eiusdem natura procedente tempore effingatur. Unicuique culturae Christiani immutabilem Dei veritatem praebent, quam Ipse in populi historia et cultura revelavit. Saeculorum sic decursu ille repetitur eventus cuius testes fuerunt peregrini qui die illo Pentecostes Hierosolymis adstabant... Evangelium diversis in culturis enuntiatum, dum a singulis quibus destinatur fidei adhaesionem requirit, non impedit quominus ii suam culturalem proprietatem retineant. Id nullam discretionem gignit, quandoquidem baptizatorum populus illa universalitate distinguitur, quae omnes humanos cultus recipit, progressum iuvando illius rei quae in ea implicatur, ad plenam in veritate explicationem consequendam.¹¹⁴

But what is this Church, so that we may speak of it? The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* defined the Church in more than one way. Primarily (for us), it stated:

In sermone christiano, verbum «Ecclesia» congregationem denotat liturgicam, sed etiam communitatem localem et totam communitatem universalem credentium. Hae tres significationes de facto sunt inseparabiles. «Ecclesia» est populus quem Deus congregat ex mundo universo. Ipsa in communitatibus exsistit localibus et tamquam congregatio liturgica, praecipue eucharistica, ducitur in rem. Ex verbo et ex corpore vivit Christi et sic ipsa corpus Christi fit. (752.)

This Church - the "populus Dei" (*Catechism of the Catholic Church* II, III, 9:2.1), which it identified with the "gens sancta" (ibid., par. 782), is characterised by (among other things), holiness (I, II, 3:9.3). But the *Catechism* quoted a more detailed explanation of the Holiness of the Church (827) in Paul VI's *Solemni hac liturgia* (Rome: LEV, 1968): "[Ecclesia] Est igitur sancta, licet in sinu suo peccatores complectatur; nam ipsa non alia fruitur vita, quam vita gratiae; hac profecto si aluntur,

¹¹⁴"To every culture Christians bring the unchanging truth of God, which he reveals in the history and culture of a people. Time and again, therefore, in the course of the centuries we have seen repeated the event witnessed by the pilgrims in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost...While it demands of all who hear it the adherence of faith, the proclamation of the Gospel in different cultures allows people to preserve their own cultural identity. This in no way creates division, because the community of the baptized is marked by a universality which can embrace every culture and help to foster whatever is implicit in them to the point where it will be fully explicit in the light of truth." (official translation.)

membra illius sese sanctificant, si ab eadem se removent, peccata sordesque animi contrahunt, quae obstant, ne sanctitas eius radians diffundatur."¹¹⁵ Indeed, the *Catechism* defined grace as the "...favor, auxilium gratuitum..." (1996) or the "...vitae Dei participatio..." (1997). With respect to this "participatio" it reads:

Gratia est vitae Dei participatio, ea nos in vitae trinitariae introducit intimitatem: per Baptismum, christianus gratiam participat Christi, Capitis corporis Eius. Tamquam «filius adoptivus», deinceps Deum potest « Patrem », in unione cum Filio unico, appellare. Vitam recipit Spiritus, qui ei caritatem inspirat et qui Ecclesiam format.
(ibid.)

Yet, at the same time, the Church is the "mysterium unionis hominum cum Deo" (I, II, 3:9.1). The *Catechism* explained it this way: "In Ecclesia, haec hominum communio cum Deo per caritatem quae «numquam excidit» (1 Cor 13,8), finis est qui ordinat quicquid in ea medium est sacramentale huic connexum mundo qui praeterit." (773.)

Applying the Wojtylan notion of community and participation in this very context, which he explained in "The Person: Subject and Community" (304-308) and *The Acting Person* (276-280); we can understand that grace is to participation as communion is to community. We have not yet mentioned the role of the Sacraments, "[quae] gratiam conferunt quam significant..." (1127). Yet, the Church's role in this is not as a mere dispenser of Sacraments -the *Catechism* refers to the Catholic Church as the "sacramentum universalae salutis":

Opus salvificum Eius humanitatis sanctae et sanctificantis sacramentum est salutis, quod manifestatur et operatur in Ecclesiae sacramentis...Septem sacramenta signa sunt et instrumenta per quae Spiritus Sanctus gratiam effundit Christi qui est Caput, in Ecclesiam quae corpus est Eius. Ecclesia ergo invisibilem continet et communicat gratiam quam ipsa significat. Hoc sensu analogico, ipsa appellatur «sacramentum».
(774.)

¹¹⁵"She [the Church] is therefore holy, though she has sinners in her bosom, because she herself has no other life but that of grace: it is by living by her life that her members are sanctified; it is by removing themselves from her life that they fall into sins and disorders that prevent the radiation of her sanctity." (official translation.)

Furthermore, the unity of the Church among human persons is also considered as an aspect of the Sacramental nature of the Church (775). Yet, this unity of the Church is also considered through the lens of grace - as we read in John Paul II's *Ut unum sint* (Rome: LEV, 1995), either as a grace in itself (21) or a manifestation of the grace of the grace as 'participation' (9).

But according to Aquinas, "gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat..." (*Summa theologiae* I, q.1, a.8). Nations, as we have already determined (along with Wojtyla), "correspond to the social nature of man..." (*The Acting Person*, 282-283). More so for human culture, which is intrinsically connected with human nature - as John Paul II declared in his Address to UNESCO (11). Therefore, the nature of grace of membership in the Church (communion with God) does not in any way destroy the nature of man - including that which enables him to belong to a nation distinct from the People of God. Any eschatological position which necessitates the abolishment of natural societies (for the sake of grace) depend on a grave misunderstanding on the nature and the extent of grace and its interaction with human nature.

By accepting that "gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat..." (Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q.1, a.8), we can defend the Church's position on culture and nation. As Benedict XVI wrote in his discourse on the relationship between grace and nature in his *General Audience* (Rome, LEV: June 16, 2010):

Divine Grace does not annihilate but presupposes and perfects human nature. The latter, in fact, even after sin, is not completely corrupt but wounded and weakened. Grace, lavished upon us by God and communicated through the Mystery of the Incarnate Word, is an absolutely free gift with which nature is healed, strengthened and assisted in pursuing the innate desire for happiness in the heart of every man and of every woman. All the faculties of the human being are purified, transformed and uplifted by divine Grace.

Aquinas understood evil as the "privatio boni" (*ST* I-II, q.87, a.2) - a privation which is only conceived in light of a certain (and lacking) perfection: "Et per consequens malum, quod nihil est aliud quam privatio debitae perfectionis." (*Contra gentiles*, 71:5). In analyzing the role of nations

as 'obstacles' to the unity of the Church or its membership, it behooves the reader to view it with the lens of Aquinas' "privatio boni" - so that one may understand that the grace dispensed by the Church will serve to perfect, not destroy, the national community and human culture (cf. Prov. 14:34).

Rees Davies, in "Nations and National Identities in the Medieval World" (572), stated: "Common identities are often relational; in other words, they are created over and against other groups." But Christian nations, being perfected by grace - the "vitae Dei participatio" and the life of the Church (CCC 1996-7; Paul VI, *Solemni hac liturgia*), therefore belong to the Universal Church (*Lumen gentium*, 13; John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 80-81) by virtue the baptized and faithful persons (cf. CCC 1996; Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 277).¹¹⁶ It is true that even without the Church, there already exists a concept of a "family of nations" (John Paul II, *Address to the 50th General Assembly of the UNO*, 14). But in the participation in the life of the Church, nations can participate in a more profound way in other-reference, in which all nations look towards a common direction (*Lumen gentium*, 13) while referring to their own source of particular national identity, for the diverse members of the church is united by *their* faith.¹¹⁷ For the Christian faith and Church joins the particular culture of a given nation (John Paul II, *The Church and Culture* [Rome: January 13, 1983]; John Paul II, *Address to the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council of Culture* [Rome: LEV, March 14, 1997]), which in turn joins its sense of national identity (Marchetto, 'Religion, Migration, and National Identity'). But communities - perhaps even those of non-persons such as 'nations'; inasmuch as they have some level of equivocal "moral" personhood as Grenier wrote in *Thomistic Philosophy* (1035) or depends on the subjectivity of human persons as is written by Wojtyla in *The Acting Person* (277) - require that the "I" refers to itself in its evaluation of the

¹¹⁶This involves culture, as Paul VI wrote: "The Church fosters and takes to itself, in so far as they are good, the ability, riches and customs in which the genius of each people expresses itself. Taking them to itself, it purifies, strengthens, elevates and consecrates them." (*Homily*, Bombay: LEV, Dec. 4, 1964).

¹¹⁷*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 814-815. Cf. Pontifical Council for Culture, *Towards a Pastoral Approach to Culture*; Paul VI, *Declaratio de ecclesiae habitudine ad religiones non-Christianas: Nostra aetate* (Rome: LEV, 1965), 1; *Gaudium et spes*, 42; John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, 71; John Paul II, *Ut unum sint* (Rome: LEV, 1995); John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 97-98; Regino Prumiensis, "Epistula Regionis: ad Hathonem archiepiscopum missa," xix-xx; Leo XIII, *Adiutricem* (Rome: LEV, 1895); Benedict XVI, *Homily* (Rome: LEV, June 29, 2005); *Lumen gentium*, 13; John Paul II, *Ecclesia in America*, 5; John Paul II, *Dialogue between Cultures for a Civilization of Love and Peace*, 7.

"you," as Wojtyla wrote in "The Person: Subject and Community" (291-292) - this process could be facilitated by the Church (*Gaudium et spes*, 90). As Paul Card. Poupard wrote in *Christian Humanism: Illuminating with the Light of the Gospel the Mosaic of Asian Cultures* (Bangkok: LEV, 1999):

The Gospel must not only assume and redeem culture but also elevate it. That is the third phase of the Church's evangelising mission. The Word became flesh, redeemed humankind, but also lifted it up and made it share in Its divinity. This demands reliving the mystery of Pentecost when the Spirit came down with power and might enabling diverse peoples from diverse cultures to hear each in his own language the mighty works of God. Pentecost is the reverse of Babel. In the episode of Babel one people with one language and culture got confused, as communication broke down and the project of building the tower had to be abandoned. In the Pentecost event, a diversity of people with a diversity of cultures got united and were able to understand and communicate with each other.

But in this participation in the life of the Church, the nation takes upon itself an ecclesiological dimension of its own. For the Catechism (752) reads; the Church refers to the universal *and* local community of believers. But just as Christian families, by virtue of their role in Christian education, are elevated as the "Ecclesia domestica" (ibid., 2685); so can nations, in some way, be elevated to such a role. For according to John Paul II's address to UNESCO (13):

The nation exists "by" culture and "for" culture, and it is accordingly the main educative influence ensuring that men can "be more" within the community. It is that community which has a history going beyond the history of the individual and the family. It is also in that community, in terms of which every family acts as an educator, that the family commences its educational task with the simplest thing first, by imparting language and thereby enabling man in his early years to learn to speak [perhaps, even to pray?], and thus to become a member of the community formed of his family and of his nation.

Nations-perfected-by-grace therefore, inasmuch as they are both local communities of believers,¹¹⁸ educators, and constituents of the universal Church (*Gaudium et spes*, 13), in some way participate in church-ness - especially in the mission of the family, which is the Domestic Church (*Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 2685). Hence, they, too, can be called domestic churches, inasmuch as they are connected to the family unit.¹¹⁹

This aspect of nations perfected by grace can be inferred in papal attitudes towards the teleology of what they deem to be Christian nations. Leo XIII, in *Sancta Dei civitas* (Rome: LEV, 1880), wrote:

Ceterum utraque sodalitas antiquiori illi, cui a fidei propagatione nomen est, adiutricem operam praebet, et stipe precibusque christianarum gentium sustentata ad idem propositum amico foedere conspirat; omnes enim eo intendunt, ut evangelicae lucis diffusione quamplurimi ab Ecclesia extorres veniant ad agnitionem Dei, Eumque colant, et quem misit Iesum Christum.¹²⁰ (5.)

In a particular context, as I mentioned in the past, the logo (or motto) of the 2021 anniversary of 500 Years of Christianity (in the Philippines) was ‘gifted to give.’ In the *Message of His Holiness John Paul II to the President and to the People of the Philippines* (LEV, 1981), he made a link between the historical baptism of the Philippine nation to its present-day telos of global evangelization - the fulfillment of the Christian missionary effort. (2-3). Valles, on the other hand, in his *Pastoral Statement on Stewardship* (CBCP, January 28, 2021) also connected this to a present and concrete reality - the need to help fellow citizens. Hence, we can conclude that the perfection of a Christian

¹¹⁸I use local in a place-based sense, not in its colloquial usage.

¹¹⁹It can be called a ‘national’ church, but not in the sense condemned by Pius XI in *Mit brennender sorge* (15), in which he stated:

Nur oberflächliche Geister können der Irrlehre verfallen, von einem nationalen Gott, von einer nationalen Religion zu sprechen, können den Wahnversuch unternehmen, Gott, den Schöpfer aller Welt, den König und Gesetzgeber aller Völker, vor dessen Größe die Nationen klein sind wie Tropfen am Wassereimer, in die Grenze eines einzelnen Volkes, in die blutmäßige Enge einer einzelnen Rasse einkerkern zu wollen.

Nor does it refer to the Anglican position, as was condemned in "A National or State Church," in *The Catholic World* 19 (1874). Thank you, Doc.

¹²⁰"But both of these societies yield support to that older one entitled the Society of the Propagation of the Faith, and, united with it in a friendly alliance, aim at the same end, relying on the alms and prayers of the Christian nations: for all have the same purpose in view, namely, by the diffusion of the Gospel light to bring the largest possible number of those outside the Church to the knowledge and worship of God and Jesus Christ Whom He has sent." (official translation.)

nation allows it to remain a nation while participating in a mode of other-reference, maintaining the balance between “particularity and universality” expected of it by the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (157) while conducting a specific *telos*.

CONCLUSION

It becomes possible now to reach our synthesis regarding the role of the nation in God's plan for salvation. With an extension in Wojtyła's discourse on the nation, we understand that God revealed Himself in and through the nation-concept in his cosmological and salvific plan.

We know that *a nation is a community which is aware of a proper and specific culture, territory, and community which it names*. Its relationship with culture is multifaceted, for not only does it exist by culture (formal cause), but it also exists for it - as John Paul II mentioned in his address to UNESCO (13). We have interpreted his statement thus: the nation is identified and distinguished by its culture, as John Paul II mentioned in *Memory and Identity* (77). It is united by its culture, as mentioned in his address to UNESCO (13). It is united not only by this objective reality, but by the act of naming this objective reality, dominating it as implied in Genesis 3 and explicated in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (113). Finally, it relies on the knowledge of both external things (science) and the truth of the self and its humanity, which John Paul II called 'culture' in *Memory and Identity* (91-92); as well as acting upon that knowledge through participation (the knowledge of the other) which forms community, as Karol Wojtyła mentioned in "The Person: Subject and Community" (304-308) and *The Acting Person* (276-280). But Anderson wrote that nationalism and nations are also "...cultural artefacts of a particular kind." (*Imagined Communities*, 4.) It is this act of naming and self-discovery which brings a nation into existence by providing it with a culture - yet, at the same time, it is the first act of a nation's very existence. (*Centesimus annus*, 49-50.) Just as the Sacraments make the Church and the Church makes the Sacraments (Pope Francis, *General Audience; Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1118), then the *nation* makes its *culture* and *culture* makes the nation. (Cf. John Paul II,

“Dialogue between Cultures,” 5.)

It is properly conceived in a time in which “past events [continue] to shape the experience of and lend meaning to the present, serving as a code for [our] interpretation, with an eye to the future.” (Weeda, “Meanwhile in Messianic Time,” 27-28.) In determining their own history, the people of a nation extend the existence of the nation to its ‘essence,’ its potentiality before the actualization which we call its determination. In doing so, the nation begins to exist in an ‘objectified’ history which transcends space and horizontal time (*Memory and Identity*, 83-84). This conceptualization of history is both contingent on culture, as Anderson wrote in *Imagined Communities* (4; 24-26), but is also an element of culture, as John Paul II wrote in *Memory and Identity* (84). When considering a national culture, we do not only consider the elements which manifest it, but also the very act of self-knowledge which is the “...most complete definition of human culture. . .” (ibid., 91). Its formal cause is in reality the conglomeration of certain accidents, from the disposition of the individual person to his relation with others and with their ‘common good’ as discussed by Wojtyla in “The Person: Subject and Community” (298; 304). It is by this that the nation can be imagined (in some way) according to Anderson’s classical definition of a limited and sovereign community.

But speaking of the significance of naming (*Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 113) and transcendental history (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 122) in the nation-concept (Davies, “Nations and National Identities,” 572, Medved, “Nation and Patria in the Emerging World Order,” 113) compels us to move to what is truly timeless - or, in other words, divine (John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 122). Hence we can deductively conclude that the nation can be conceived as a way in which God reveals Himself. The most perfect link between God and the nation comes from the very account of creation, when God created the first community with a command to form families and nations. (Gen. 2:18; 1:28; Cf. John Paul II, General Audience [November 14, 1979]; John Paul II, *Homily “Jubilee of Families,”* [LEV, Oct. 15, 2000].) In this first community, Adam exercised culture in naming Eve (Gen. 2:7) - hence forming the first proto-nation. God’s command to form nations came with his plan of salvation in mind (ibid). For

it was the free faculty of choice which enabled the execution of God's salvific plan - that is to say, the free and very 'national' will of the Judeans to declare his crucifixion (cf. Jn. 19:7.) The nation-concept also manifested itself and its own *telos* in the building of the People of God (cf. John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 49; *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 56) - a Church which is both inclusive of all nations (*Lumen gentium*, 13) and a nation in and of itself (1 Ptr. 2:5). Yet, nations, too, are elevated as Domestic churches (cf. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 752, 2685; John Paul II's address to UNESCO, 13; *Lumen gentium* 13).

But from this deductive 'Messianic' approach comes out inductive and cosmological conclusion.¹²¹ *For just as God reached man through the nation, man may also come to know God through it.* We return to the God whom Aquinas called the *actus purus*¹²². For as we return to the self-comprehending and relational God, as Aquinas wrote in his *Summa theologiae* (I, q.14, a.3; q.28, a.2), we begin to understand the extent of culture in the existence of human persons and therefore, the relationship between the nation and God. For we understand that God is the highest perfection of a certain good (*Summa theologiae*, I, q.2, a.2), the "primum movens" who brings what is potential to what is actual (*Summa theologiae* I, q.2, a.2; *Summa contra gentiles* III, II:100). From these principles we also begin to understand how beings are created to represent God's goodness (ibid., a.65, a.2). And from both these premises one may discover the way in which man, being made in God's image (Gen. 1:27), reflects God in his actions, as Aquinas wrote in *Summa theologiae* (I, q.93, q.7) - and in this context, through his self-knowledge (ibid) and his social life (*Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 33, 36).¹²³ From thence we can

¹²¹ It is this conclusion which I could have not reached if not for the contributions of my mentor Dr. Mariano who before my eyes pieced together my sections into a coherent whole. Thank you, Doc.

¹²² "Primum igitur agens, quod Deus est, nullam habet potentiam admixtam, sed est actus purus." - Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* I, 16:5.

¹²³ Aquinas wrote:

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, notitia et amore.

Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens. (*Summa theologiae* I, q.93, q.7)

say that the nation reflects on God's 'cultural'¹²⁴ and relational aspects through the act of culture (the knowledge of self, according to John Paul II in *Memory and Identity*, 91-92) and participation (the knowledge of the other person as Wojtyla wrote in "The Person: Subject and Community," 305-306).

Hence, from the first principles up to the very beginning of human history, culture and community remain inescapable realities. Iraneus, in "Contra haereses IV," *Patrologiae cursus completus, series greca* 7, ed. J.P. Migne (1857), 20:7 declared: "Gloria...Dei [est] vivens homo..." As John Paul II identified culture with life in his address to UNESCO (14), we find that "Gloria Dei" - in the word of Iraneus - *est culturalis homo*. But in another way, nations, being communities, "correspond to the social nature of man" (Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 282). But Wojtyla noted that man's living "together with others" is a fundamental aspect of his subjective existence:

This of course is a direct and natural consequence of the fact that man lives "together with other men," and indeed we may even go so far as to say that he exists together with other men. The mark of the communal—or social—trait is essentially imprinted on human existence itself. (262.)¹²⁵

As human life is not only identified with culture (cf. John Paul II's address to UNESCO, 11), but also by his relational aspect, and as nations are communities with cultures (cf. *Memory and Identity*, 78); it would also be appropriate to declare: *Gloria Dei est nationalis homo*. Laus Deo.

¹²⁴I use the term 'culture' in a metaphorical sense, as culture requires a material aspect, according to John Paul II's address to UNESCO (11).

¹²⁵We also read in the Bible: "Non est bonum esse hominem solum..." (Gen. 2:18).

Part II

APPENDIX

DRAFT

Appendix A

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Appendix B

THOMISTIC PRINCIPLES

Because Grenier stated that "definition must contain the genus and differentia of the thing defined" (160); we must begin with being (419, cf. Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, prologus). According to Aquinas, "ens per se dicitur dupliciter, uno modo quod dividitur per decem genera, alio modo quod significat propositionum veritatem." (cap. 1). Grenier makes the definition clearer - contrasting Aquinas' second mode with "things that have or can have existence in reality" (492). He then divides being into actual and potential being (493). Act is, according to Father Mandia in *The Leaves are Green in Summer* (Chorabooks, 2019), "anything that is perfect or complete - a perfection. It is opposed to potency (*dynamis* in Greek) which means a real capacity (not only a possibility) to acquire a certain perfection." (48.) Therefore, Grenier defined actual and potential being as such: "An actual being is a being which has existence in act, i.e., it is either act or actuated potency. A possible being is a being which, though not possessing existence in act, can exist." (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 774.) He divided actual being into finite and infinite being (493).

According to him, "Infinite being is being whose essence and existence are identified, whereas finite being is being whose essence and existence are really distinct..." (504). It is finite being which "is divided into the ten predicaments." (493) - this is being in the first mode of Aquinas' *De ente et essentia* (cap. 1). Aquinas also synonymized finite being with *essence, form, nature, and quiddity* (ibid). The ten predicaments are divided into substance and accidents, of the latter there are eight: quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, posture, when, habit (151). As finite being is divided into these predicaments (493), it necessarily is a composite of substance and accidents (627). Grenier defined substance as "a thing or quiddity to which it appertains to exist in

itself, and not in another as in its subject of inherence..."; while he defined accidents as "...a thing or quiddity to which it appertains to exist not in itself, but in another as in its subject of inherence." (151). Aquinas explained the connection between quiddity and substance: "Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subiecto; nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligitur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio." (*Summa contra gentiles*, 25:10.)

He defined existence as "*the act by which a thing is placed outside its causes and outside the state of nothingness.*" (620.) Hence, according to Aveling, in "Essence and Existence," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 5, (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909); "[e]xistence is that whereby the essence is an actuality in the line of being. By its actuation the essence is removed from the merely possible, is placed outside its causes, and exists in the world of actual things." In short, if a thing is *actual*, it exists (and vice versa). At the same time For Grenier, an object "exists" when it is in act because existence *is* act (*Thomistic Philosophy*, p. 290).

He also called act perfection and the vice versa (548). Aquinas defined perfection in *Summa theologiae*, I, q.5, a.3: "Perfectio autem alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem."¹²⁶ The conversion of the potential to the actual is what we call *motion*, as Henri Grenier wrote (*Thomistic Philosophy*, [St. Dunstan's, 1950], 292). With respect to this, the Thomists distinguish between *primary* and *secondary* existences: primary existences exist in themselves, while secondary existences refer to those which only exist in another thing.¹²⁷ Accidents are identified with secondary existences (625, 237).

But the Thomist professes a distinction between 'essence' and 'existence.' According to Aveling, "Essence and Existence," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 5 (New York: Robert Appleton

¹²⁶"Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place." (*Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Province.)

¹²⁷Henri Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 151; 223; 625-627; 642.

Company, 1909), essence is "...properly described as that whereby a thing is what it is. . . an answer to the question What?...essence is equivalent to quiddity; and thus, as St. Thomas remarks (I, Q. iii, a. 3), the essence of a thing is that which is expressed by its definition." Compared to existence, "Whereas the essence or quiddity gives an answer to the question as to what the thing is, the existence is the affirmative to the question as to whether it is." (ibid.) According to de Wulf, *Scholasticism Old and New: An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy Medieval and Modern*, trans. Coffey (Dublin: M H. Gill & Son, Ltd., 1910): "Essence is to existence what potency is to act." (109.) As for the relationship between potency and act, Grenier wrote in *Thomistic Philosophy* (1950):

A thing is engendered from a being in potency. Hence, in the order of generation, i.e., in the order of material cause, potency is prior in time to act, for a thing is engendered in as much as it is reduced from potency to act. . . (559). . . Act is prior to potency in its formal aspect, for potency is defined by act. . . Act is prior to potency in perfection, for act is the perfection of potency. . . Act is prior to potency in the order of efficient causality, for a being in potency can be reduced to act only by a being in act. (560.)

It is here where one must tread carefully. Essence is defined: "that whereby a thing is what it is" (Aveling, "Essence and Existence"). But in the context of being, Aquinas defined form as "aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur" (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 1). Form is also defined: "that by which a thing is what it is" (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 237). But in this context, Aquinas defines form as "certitudo uniuscuiusque rei" (*De ente et essentia*, cap. 1). Grenier defined nature as "The principle and cause of the motion and the rest of the thing in which that principle exists fundamentally and essentially, and not accidentally." But in this context, Aquinas used a definition of Boethius - "omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest." (*De ente et essentia*.) Hence Aveling writes in "Essence and Existence":

Essence and nature express the same reality envisaged in the two points of view as being or acting. As the essence is that whereby any given thing is that which it is, the

ground of its characteristics and the principle of its being, so its nature is that whereby it acts as it does, the essence considered as the foundation and principle of its operation. Hence again St. Thomas: "Nature is seen to signify the essence of a thing according as it has relation to its proper operation" (*De ente et essentia*, cap. i).

Quiddity, according to Grenier in *Thomistic Philosophy*, "signifies anything that can be perceived by the intellect of a thing, and it manifests what the thing is..." (18).

These terms are in some way interchangeable - as Aquinas shows in *De ente et essentia* (cap. 1). Aveling identified quiddity with essence in "Essence and Existence," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 5: "As furnishing in this manner an answer to the question What? (Quid?) — as, e.g., What is man? — essence is equivalent to quiddity..." (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo, in *Metaphysics* (Sinag-Taga, 1991) wrote of the various significations of essence: "*Insofar as the essence is signified by a definition, it is called quiddity (quidditas or 'whatness')*." (91.) Aquinas himself stated: "*essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei*" (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 3). He also wrote: "*Non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentiam suam.*" (*De Ente et Essentia*). But Aquinas also wrote: "*In substantiis igitur compositis forma et materia nota est, ut in homine anima et corpus. Non autem potest dici quod alterum eorum tantum essentia esse dicatur.*" Aveling wrote that "... if we consider man as a being composed of matter and form, body and soul, the physical essence will be the body and soul." (Aveling, "Essence and Existence.") Aquinas also wrote: "... *essentia comprehendit materiam et formam.*" (Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, II.) This is because form can be conceived in multiple ways.

It is true that form "is that by which a thing is what it is" (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 237), and it is also true that it is act and perfection (ibid). But Grenier divided form into extrinsic form and intrinsic forms, the latter of which are divided into subsisting and informing forms, the latter of which are divided into substantial and accidental forms (ibid). Even within accidents, form (and figure) fall under the species of quality as "an accident which results from the termination of quantity considered according to the diverse disposition of its parts." (151.) Alvira et al. in

Metaphysics identified intrinsic form with formal cause (189), which is "is an intrinsic act of perfection by which a thing is whatever it is, either in the realm of substance or of accidents." (196.)

According to them:

The form without which a being would be nothing at all is called substantial form. Those forms which affect an already actual being by conferring on it further modifications are called accidental forms. The substantial form gives a thing its basic manner of being, making it a substance: a man is a man and therefore he is, because of his soul. The accidental forms, in contrast, only give a substance certain secondary configurations, which obviously can only affect something which is already a substance. (196).

According to Edward Feser in *Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction* (New Jersey, Transaction Books, 2014), accidental forms are any forms which are made of certain substances and can be reduced to a substance 183-5). "A liana vine is, accordingly, a true substance, as Scholastic philosophers understand substance. A hammock is not a true substance, precisely because it does not qua hammock have a substantial form – an intrinsic principle by which it operates as it characteristically does – but only an accidental form." (ibid. Cf. Alvira et al., *Metaphysics*, 194.)

According to Alvira et al., "The form is the principle of being (esse) of a thing (ens): *forma est principium essendi*, or *forma dat esse*. Matter shares in esse by means of the form, inasmuch as it is made actual by the form." (*Metaphysics*, 94.) But they qualified that "the form does not have the act of being in itself, but only insofar as it gives actuality to matter." (ibid.)¹²⁸

But according to Dezhi Duan, in "Aquinas' Transcendences to Aristotle in the Doctrine of Essence," in *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 2, no. 4 (2007):

¹²⁸The Scholastic maxim states: *forma dat esse, dat distingui, et dat operari*. 'Form gives esse, distinguishes, and gives operation.' For the general maxim, see G. F. Rossi, "S. Tommaso nell'Insegnamento Filosofico Alberoniano (Cont.)," in *Divus Thomas* 61 (1958): 205–36. For more on *forma dat esse*, see Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, 29.8; *Sententia libri metaph.*, V, 2.14; Aquinas, *De anima*, II, 1.5. For more on *forma dat distingui*, see QD de veritate, 29.8; Otto Willmann, "Idealism," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 7 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910); Gioachino Ventura, *La philosophie chrétienne*, vol. 2, (Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861), 55; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, q.56, a.14; II, q.40, a.3. For more on *forma dat operari*, see Rossi, "S. Tommaso nell'Insegnamento," 205–36; *Summa contra gentiles*, II, q.59, a.12. Note that *esse* refers to existence, or the 'act of being'; according to Maágorzata Jaócho-Palicka, in "Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy of Being as the Basis for Wojtyla's Concept and Cognition of Human Person," in *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 127–153; and Paul Gerard Horrigan, *Being (Ens), Essence (Essentia), and the Act of Being (Esse)* (2017), 6-11.

Aquinas divided the form into "form of the whole" and "form of the part," and "form itself and "individuated form" correspondingly. By "form of the whole" (*forma totius*), Aquinas meant the form which contains both the form and the matter of a substance. And by the "form of the part," he meant the form which is a part of a material substance's essence. (577).

Petr Slovák, in "Form, essence and matter in Aquinas' early work *De ente et essentia*. Notes to the metaphysical foundation of Aquinas' psychology," in *Logos i Ethos* 59, no. 21 (2015) wrote: "Aristotle's form, which does not contain matter, is captured by Thomas as a *forma partis*, the essence or the form which captures the matter as a *forma totius*." Aquinas explained the nuances surrounding the word form in *De ente et essentia*:

Et ideo humanitas significatur ut forma quaedam, et dicitur quod est forma totius, non quidem quasi superaddita partibus essentialibus, scilicet formae et materiae, sicut forma domus superadditur partibus integralibus eius, sed magis est forma, quae est totum scilicet formam complectens et materiam, tamen cum praecisione eorum, per quae nata est materia designari. (Cf. William M. Walton, "Being, Essence and Existence for St. Thomas Aquinas (II): Being: That Which Is," in *The Review of Metaphysics* 5, no. 1 (1951): 83–108.)

He also wrote in *Summa Theologiae* (I, q.3, a.3): "Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis." (Also quoted in Mandia, *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, 140.) He, quoting Aristotle, connected the *forma totius* with quidditas: "Quaelibet enim res naturalis habet substantiam, idest formam partis, et quod quid est, idest quidditatem quae est forma totius." (*Sententia Aristotelis libri metaphysicorum*).

Extrinsic forms, on the other hand, refer to "form which a thing imitates: imitated form; v.g., an artificer's idea to the likeness of which a house is built." (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 237.) Grenier identified the extrinsic form with the exemplar (*ibid*); which Alvira et al defined as "the model or pattern which guides an agent in the execution of his work." (*Metaphysics*, 196).

They are speaking in context of the four causes, which include the formal cause, the material cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause (188). Material cause refers to "Anything out of which and of which something is made...('ex qua et in qua aliquid fit')." (194.) With respect to efficient cause, Grenier notes that it is "the principle from which motion first flows forth." Alvira et al. defined it thus: "that primary principle or origin of any act which makes a thing to be, or to be in a certain way." (201.) ¹²⁹

According to Grenier, "An exemplar cause proximately signifies an idea, an objective concept, existing in the mind of an artificer, because this is the proximate form on which the artificer patterns his artifact..." (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 677). According to Willmann in "Idealism," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 7 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910):

the ideal principles possess real validity, that as ideas they subsist in the Divine mind before the things corresponding to them are called into existence, while, as forms and essences, they really exist in nature and are not really products of our thinking.

Nevertheless, Aquinas wrote: "[u]nde dicit Commentator in principio de anima quod intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in rebus." Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, submitted by Andre Alonso, (The Latin Library), IV. Aquinas likewise quoted Augustine's definition of (divine) ideas: "...dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., ideae sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia continentur." (Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 15, a. 2.) But according to Mahre in "Idea," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 7 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910); the same can also apply to human intellectual concepts which we colloquially call ideas. Aquinas likewise stated: "[s]ed tamen si ideam communiter

¹²⁹The use of the term 'principle' in this respect is nuanced. For, according to Grenier:

A principle is that from which a thing in any way proceeds...A thing can proceed from another either as regards knowledge or as regards reality. Hence we have the principle of knowledge and the principle of reality...The principle of a thing may be extrinsic, as an efficient cause; or it may be intrinsic. Intrinsic principles are of two kinds, viz., metaphysical and physical, i.e., natural. Metaphysical principles are principles which are common to every genus of being, that is to say, principles which are the constituents of every kind of finite being, namely, potency and act. Physical or natural principles are principles from which mobile being is first made or constituted. By mobile being we understand any being that is subject to sensible and corporeal motion. (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 217.)

appellemus similitudinem vel rationem, sic idea etiam ad speculativam cognitionem pure pertinere potest.” (Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 3 a. 5.) Aquinas demonstrated how the immutability of a particular form is distinct from the immutability of an essence:

Ad tertium dicendum quod formae dicuntur invariables, quia non possunt esse subiectum variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi, sed quia eis aliquid est. (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 9 a. 2.)

The Catholic Encyclopedia reads that “[e]very essence. . . is immutable in this, that it cannot be changed or broken up into its constituent parts and yet remain the same essence.” (Aveling, *Essence and Existence*.) Yet not all essences are the same. Aveling differentiated between two types of essences based on the degree of its invariability (Aveling, “*Essence and Existence*”):

Forms are called invariable because they themselves cannot be the subject of a variation. Yet they are subject to variation in the sense that their subjects are variable with respect to them. Hence, it is clear that they vary in a sense that accords with what they are. For they are called beings not because they themselves are the subject of being, but because something exists by virtue of them. The attribute is transcendental and is applied to essence precisely as it is essence. *Thus, while the essence of any given man may be broken up into body and soul, animality and rationality, man as man and humanity as humanity is changeless.* [italics mine]

He expounded on this by distinguishing between real or physical essence and logical or metaphysical essence: “[i]t is the metaphysical essence that is eternal, immutable, indivisible, necessary, etc.; the physical essence that is temporal, contingent, etc.” (ibid.) Grenier applied this distinction concerning definitions qua definitions:

A real definition is one which explains the nature of the thing signified; v.g., man is a rational animal. . . Real definition is divided into essential definition, descriptive definition, and causal definition. An essential definition is one which explains a thing by

means of its parts or essential predicates. An essential definition is physical, if it explains a thing through the really distinct physical parts of its essence; v.g., man is a substance composed of matter and a rational soul. An essential definition is metaphysical, if it explains an essence through its metaphysical parts, namely, genus and differentia; v.g., man is a rational animal. (Thomistic Philosophy, 98.)

Real or physical essence is “. . . that real particularization of the universal that provides the basis for the abstraction.” (Aveling, "Essence and Existence.") It “consists in, or results from, the union of the constituent parts.” (ibid.) “Thus if we consider man as a being composed of matter and form, body and soul, the physical essence will be the body and soul. Apart from any act of abstraction, body and soul exist in the physical order as the constituents of man.” (ibid.) Logical or metaphysical essence “is no more than the composition of ideas or notions, abstracted mentally and referred together in what are known as ‘second intentions’.” (ibid.)¹³⁰ In short; “. . . the metaphysical essence is a formal universal, while the physical essence is that real particularization of the universal that provides the basis for the abstraction. (Aveling, "Essence and Existence.")

With respect to the universal, which is a "a thing apt to exist in several and to be predicated of them" (Grenier, *Thomistic Philosophy*, 130); Aveling made a certain identity between logical essence with species, which is "a universal which is predicated of several numerically distinct subjects and which completely expresses their essence" (141):

A further synonym of essence is species; but it is to be carefully noted that essence in this connexion is used rather with a logical or metaphysical connotation than with a real or physical one. Apart from any act of abstraction, body and soul exist in the physical order as the constituents of man. On the other hand, we may consider man as the result of a composition of genus proximum and differentia ultima, i.e. of his animality and his rationality. Here the essence, humanity, is metaphysical or logical. Thus, while the real essence, to speak still only of composite beings, consists in the collection of all those physical component parts that are required to constitute the entity

¹³⁰For Grenier in *Thomistic Philosophy*, second intentions refer to genera and species (123).

what it is, either actually or potentially existent, without which it can be neither actual nor potential, the logical essence is no more than the composition of ideas or notions, abstracted mentally and referred together in what are known as "second intentions".

(Aveling, "Essence and Existence.")

Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo in *Metaphysics* describe this simply: "Insofar as the essence is known, it can be referred to many individuals; for this reason it is called a universal." Universals are "... those ideas which, while excluding whatever constitutes the difference of things of the same genus or species, represent that which is necessary to their constitution, is essential, and is therefore common to all, remaining fixed in all vicissitudes (universalia post rem, in re)." Alois Pichler, "Universals," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* 15, (New York, Robert Appleton Company, 1912). But it is important to note that, according to Mahre in "Idea" (*The Catholic Encyclopedia*); "The universal cannot exist, as such, apart from the individual. It is immanent in the individual as the essence, or nature, specifically common to all members of the class...This is the foundation for the general concept in the mind, which abstracts the universal form (eidos nonton) from the individual." The concept, according to Grenier, is what represents the essence (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 24). Duan in "Aquinas' transcendences to Aristotle in the doctrine of essence" noted that for Aquinas, essences are particular (576-578). Hence we cannot strictly identify the essence with the idea or concept.

Aquinas also defined essence in *De ente et essentia* as "aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis."¹³¹ This distinction between essence (aliquid commune omnibus naturis) and species is noteworthy. Yet the termination of a being to species involves the form, as Aquinas discussed in *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 63: "...individuationis enim principium materia est, sicut forma est principium speciei."¹³² In his *Summa theologiae* I (q.7. a.3) he further explained that "...essentia sua [corporis] esset terminata ad aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum

¹³¹ "the word "essence" must signify something common to all natures, by means of which (nature) diverse beings are placed into diverse genera and species; as, for example, humanity is the essence of man, and so with other things." (Aquinas on Being and Essence.)

¹³² "...for the principle of individuation is matter, just as form is the principle of species." Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O'Neil, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (New York: Hanover House, 1955-57).

per materiam.”¹³³

From thence we may return to our Boethian definition: "naturae rationalis individua substantia" (Severinus Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis: contra eutychem et Nestorium*, cap. III.) Thomas Aquinas defined *substantia* as either a thing's quiddity or what he called the *suppositum*:

Uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam Graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. Alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. (Summa theologiae I, q.29, a.2)¹³⁴

Alvira et al., in *Metaphysics* provided another definition of substance: "*substance is that reality to whose essence or nature it is proper to be by itself and not in another subject.*" (47.) They disambiguated the distinction between substance and essence:

The essence determines a thing's manner of being, and the substance is nothing but a certain manner of being that is actually subsisting. Nevertheless, "essence" and "substance" are not perfect synonyms. Both refer to the same reality, but "essence" designates it insofar as it constitutes a particular or determinate manner of being, by virtue of which it falls under a given species (e.g. man, dog, horse), whereas the term "substance" stresses its being the substratum of accidents ("substat") and its receiving the act of being as its own act (i.e., it subsists). (47.)

But as substance in its first sense corresponds to the quidditas, its second sense (suppositum) is not necessarily correspondent to the same (According to Mandia in *Naming, Sense, and Reference*: "The essence, however, is not yet the whole being. It does not yet include the accidents. The

¹³³“...its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter.” Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (Benzinger Brothers, 1947).

¹³⁴“In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, what we may call ‘essence.’ In another sense substance means a subject or ‘suppositum,’ which subsists in the genus of substance.” (*Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Province.)

essence is not the individual and singular existing being. St Thomas explains that in material things which are composites of matter and form, the nature is not the same as the suppositum." (139.)

We are currently concerned with the second definition of substantia - the suppositum. The *suppositum*, according to Grenier, is "that which exists, for that which exists is properly the subject of other things, i.e., of existence, operations, and all else that pertains to it" (*Thomistic Philosophy*, 663). But the *suppositum* is "a subsisting, individual, complete substance" (633). Grenier defined subject as "*a principle which is capable of receiving a form.*" (1116.) The subject can also be as something which properly receives accidents, as Aquinas stated in *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia* (2:1; 7:2), while Aquinas defined subsistence as: "quod per se existit et non in alio" (I, q.29, a.2). Individual, on the other hand, is "one which is undivided in itself and divided from others... it is indistinct in itself and distinct from others." (Mandia, *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, 141.)

We are already aware of the definition of the substance. We are now concerned with 'individual'. Individual substances or supposita, such as men, are often set apart from others of the same type by their accidents; as Loftus wrote in his thesis *St Thomas' Principle of Individuation: Materia Quantitate Signata* (Loyola University, 1951): "One ham may differ from another, or one rose from the next because it has a different shape, occupies a different place, and so on through the legendary "forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, patria, nomen," which no two things can share in the same degree." But he mentioned that although this is true, " ...form, figure, place and the rest are accidents that are not the ultimate constituents of individuation, but rather manifestations of an individual substance." From thence he distinguished between 'what' and 'this':

Every individual is a *hoc aliquid* containing two elements: a *whatness* and a *thisness*.

Whatness indicates the nature, e.g. man, rose, stone. By this element the individual belongs to a determined species, which it shares with 'other individuals of the same species. Thisness indicates the suppositum, which is not communicable to others.

"Individual and species, individuals of the same species, exclude themselves correlative through the supposite."

It becomes clear that 'this' refers to an individual substance or suppositum, according to Grenier's definition.

Christopher Hughes, in his article "Matter and Individuation in Aquinas," in *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (1996), expounded on the consequences of 'thisness':

If being this stone just is being a stone made of this matter, then the difference between being a stone and being this stone is being made of this matter. And if being this stone just is being a stone made of this matter, and being that stone just is being a stone made of that matter, then the difference between being this stone and being that stone is the difference between being made of this matter, and being made of that matter. So (individual) matter is what makes a particular stone this stone, and what makes this stone different from that stone. (7.)

According to Aquinas in *Summa theologiae* (I, q.29, a.1, q.86 a.3); *De ente et essentia*, (cap.1) Joseph M. Loftus in *St. Thomas' Principle of Individuation: Materia Quantitate Signata* (Chicago: Loyola University, 1951); Grenier in *Thomistic Philosophy* (1950), 316; and Mandia in *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, (143); matter (signed by quantity) is the principle of individuation, and forms are individuated by matter (and accidents by their substances).¹³⁵ Aquinas wrote in *Summa contra gentiles* IV, 63: "...individuationis enim principium materia est, sicut forma est principium speciei."¹³⁶ In his *Summa theologiae* I (q.7. a.3) he further explained that "...essentia sua [corporis] esset terminata ad aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam."¹³⁷ Yet, in *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, Mandia emphasized on the fact that *this matter*, by which form is

¹³⁵We read in *Summa theologiae* (I, q.29, a.1) that "accidentia individuantur per subiectum, quod est substantia, dicitur enim haec albedo, in quantum est in hoc subiecto." ("...whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject." - *Summa Theologica*, trans. English Dominican Province.) For, as Loftus explains, accidents are the manifestations and not the constituents of individuation (Loftus, *St. Thomas' Principle of Individuation: Materia Quantitate Signata*, 17). Aquinas corroborated this in *Summa contra gentiles* IV when he wrote that accidents, "cum sint formae, individuari non possunt nisi per subiectum." (q. 62, a.6. "Also, since accidents are forms, they cannot [b]e individuated except through a subject." - *Contra Gentiles*, trans. O'Neil.)

¹³⁶"...for the principle of individuation is matter, just as form is the principle of species." Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, translated by Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O'Neil, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (New York: Hanover House, 1955-57).

¹³⁷"...its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, edited with Latin and HTML by Joseph Kenny (Benzinger Brothers, 1947).

individuated, is *signate* matter (in contrast with common matter), that is, matter signed by quantity or “subject to dimensions.” (139-150.) The notion of quantity does not refer to how much of a particular thing is (quot), but rather, its dimensions. (Grenier, Thomistic Philosophy, 276; Hughes, “Aquinas’ Principle of Individuation,” 60. Vide Summa Theologiae, III, q.77, a.2.) Hence, signate matter is matter which is given dimensions in the real world (ibid., cf. Mandia, *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, 139-150).¹³⁸

From thence we are confronted with another definition of essence. According to Aquinas, the essence of a man is different from the essence of Socrates: “Sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum.”¹³⁹ Hughes expounded on this in in “Matter and Individuation in Aquinas,” in *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (1996) by mentioning the distinction made between communicable (shareable) and incommunicable (non-sharable) essences:

Also, Aquinas calls a form or nature communicable if there could be different individuals with that form or nature. The specific nature, humanity, that by which Socrates is a man, is communicable, since there are, and a fortiori could be, different men. By contrast, the individual nature or essence by which Socrates is Socrates is incommunicable, since there could not be more than one Socrates. (See Summa Theologiae, Ia, 11, 3, responsio). (3.)

Alvira et al. in *Metaphysics* described the process of individuation:

As it actualizes matter, the substantial form of a corporeal being causes the accident quantity to arise in matter, since quantity constitutes the body as such...As quantity gives dimensions to matter, it makes some parts in it distinct from other parts, thus making it individual. By virtue of its concrete dimensions, quantity limits matter

¹³⁸Mandia explained:

Signate matter means matter that is subject to dimensions. But something has dimensions only when it has parts. And when something has parts it is because of the accident quantity. Hence, St Thomas explains that matter cannot be divided unless through the accident quantity. (*Naming, Sense, and Reference*, 149.)

¹³⁹Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, cap.1; Mandia, *Naming, Sense, and Reference*, 148.

to being this matter, distinct from all the rest...Matter, thus singularized by quantity, individuates the specific form. (103.)

According to Aquinas, "Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam individuata." (*Summa theologiae*, I, q. 119, a.1.) Combining these two principles we understand that 'form' reaches 'matter' which makes 'form' into 'this form' (cf. Hughes, "Matter and Individuation in Aquinas," 3; Alvira et al., *Metaphysics*, 103.)

Part III

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